Evaluating the Impact of Pro Environmental Energy Policy in Scotland and the UK : the Case of Increased Efficiency in Household Energy Use by Figus, Gioele et al.
Figus, Gioele and Turner, Karen and McGregor, Peter (2017) Evaluating 
the Impact of Pro Environmental Energy Policy in Scotland and the UK : 
the Case of Increased Efficiency in Household Energy Use. PhD thesis, 
University Of Strathclyde. , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/61406/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
University of Strathclyde
Department of Economics
Evaluating the impact of pro environmental energy
policy in Scotland and the UK: the case of increased
efficiency in household energy use
Presented in fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Gioele Figus
2017
Declaration
This thesis is the result of the author’s original research. It has been
composed by the author and has not been previously submitted for ex-
amination which has led to the award of a degree.
The copyright of this thesis belongs to the author under the terms of
the United Kingdom Copyright Acts as qualified by University of Strath-
clyde Regulation 3.50. Due acknowledgement must always be made of
the use of any material contained in, or derived from, this thesis.
Signed: Date:
i
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Centre for Energy
Policy, University of Strathclyde, and the Economic and Social Research
Council, via the Scottish Graduate School of Social Science (grant num-
ber 1562665).
Thanks to my primary supervisor, Professor Karen Turner for the
incredible support during these years from the PhD application process
to the end of the thesis, and for encouraging and guiding my work, and
giving me the opportunity to study and work at the University of Strath-
clyde. Thanks to my second supervisor Professor Peter McGregor, for
kindly devoting a considerable amount of his time to guide me through
the development of the thesis, for never using one of his retirement cards
for not reading my drafts, and for inspiring me with his dedication to his
job.
The thesis has beneffited from extensive discussions with Professor
Kim Swales, especially in the development of Chapter 5. For this reason,
I would like to thank him for constantly challenging all my results, and
for his enthusiasm in sharing his infinite knowledge not only in the field
of economics.
I would like to acknowledge the support of Dr Patrizio Lecca for
encouraging me to pursue my studies in economics, for being my GAMS
mentor, for his infinite generosity and for teaching me to push the limits
of the hard work in order to survive into the ‘tiger’s den’.
Thanks to the Fraser of Allander Institute and Professor Graeme
Roy for allowing the necessary flexibility to work and finish the thesis
at the same time. I also acknowledge the kind support of my colleagues
ii
Oluwafisayo Alabi for helping me proof-reading the final draft, Andrew
Ross for his help with the Scottish data, and Antonios Katris for his help
with the disaggregation of the UK dataset.
Thanks to my partner Arianna for listening to all my presentation
rehearsals, reading my drafts, discussing my ideas, dealing with my rants,
and in general for showing interest in my work.
This thesis is dedicated to my mother Floreanna and my father An-
tonello.
iii
Abstract
In this thesis, I use multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium
techniques to investigate the system wide impacts of improvements in
households’ energy efficiency use, and technical progress in delivering
households’ energy services, in Scotland and the UK. The thesis consists
of three main, self-contained but correlated essays.
The first essay looks the system wide impacts of an illustrative 5%
energy efficiency improvement in households’ energy use in Scotland and
highlights the economic implications of increasing energy efficiency in a
regional economy. I find that this results in a small economic stimulus,
accompanied by a reduction in energy use that is less than the expected
energy savings from the pure energy efficiency increase- the rebound ef-
fect. The stimulus is higher when migration of workers is allowed between
Scotland and the rest of the UK. However, the higher expansion also de-
livers a higher rebound in energy use. The stimulus from the higher
efficiency in energy use if further enhanced when I consider the impact
of greater fiscal autonomy in Scotland, and allow for endogenous govern-
ment expenditure or tax rates.
The second essay analyses the distributional impacts of households’
energy efficiency improvements in the UK, focussing the attention on effi-
ciency improvements in lower income households. I discuss whether there
is an argument for the Government to fund household energy efficiency
programmes via a temporary reallocation of current government expen-
diture or an increase in the income tax rate. While reallocating public
spending has short-term negative impacts on demand over the period of
the payment, the efficiency improvement delivers a net long-run stimu-
iv
lus. However, an increase in income tax adversely affects the real take
home wage and delivers a long-term reduction in GDP. In all scenarios,
lower income households are able to increase their energy consumption
and their income by approximately the same amount.
The third essay looks at the consumption of energy intensive ser-
vices using the example of private transport. Here I argue that private
transport should be modelled as a household self-produced commodity,
composed of refined fuels and motor vehicles. By using a simple partial
equilibrium model, I show that technical improvement in motor vehicles
can reduce refined fuels use, when there is enough substitutability be-
tween the two inputs, and depending on the price elasticity of demand
for private transport. By taking the case of the UK, and using a CGE
model, I find that technical progress in motor vehicles delivers a small
expansionary improvement if the consumer price index is adjusted to
account for the implicit price of private transport.
v
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Chapter 1
An introduction and guide to
the thesis
1
1.1 Context: a paradigm shift in analysing
the impacts of energy efficiency
In this thesis, I focus on the economy-wide implications (including energy
use) of efficiency improvements in households’ energy consumption using
the UK and Scotland as case studies. The UK and the Scottish Govern-
ments, albeit with different strategies, are both committed to delivering
reductions in final energy demand through a range of policies, including
energy efficiency improvements in industrial and household energy use.
The UK Department of Business and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS) has
recently renewed its commitment to “support greater energy efficiency”
in the development of the new industrial strategy (DBEIS, 2017, p. 20).
The Scottish Government (2017b) has recently released its new draft
Energy Strategy, where it renews its commitment to pursue the Scottish
Energy Efficiency programme (SEEP) (The Scottish Government, 2017a)
as it “highlights a renewed emphasis on energy efficiency as a strategic
priority [...], recognises significant economic benefits of energy efficiency
investment and the importance of tackling fuel poverty” (The Scottish
Government, 2017b, p. 11).
However, in this context, both Governments are constrained by a
wider set of policy objectives and targets in terms of both wider energy
strategies as well as a range of social and economic policies, while func-
tioning in an environment of public sector budget constraints. These
include, for example, delivering affordable energy for both industry and
households (where fuel poverty is a key concern with regard to the latter)
and sustainable and inclusive economic development.
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Among other energy policy instruments, improving energy efficiency
has received considerable attention both from the policy community and
from academic researchers. The basic idea of energy efficiency is that
physical energy sources such as oil, gas and coal can be used in a more
productive way as a result of technical progress. This implies, for exam-
ple, that households can achieve the same level of comfort from home
heating, using less physical energy, less resources and generating a lower
level of emissions.
The traditional approach in the energy economics literature has often
focused on the energy reduction aims of energy efficiency actions and
the induced ‘rebound effect’, which, in the simplest case, focusses on the
fact that potential energy savings from efficiency increases can be par-
tially offset by the initial relative price reduction of services delivered
via the use of energy.1 Although this has proven to be a concrete is-
sue in several countries, an overly narrow focus on energy rebound has
limited the scope of most analyses of energy efficiency to its capacity to
reduce energy consumption, neglecting other important impacts, thereby
potentially discouraging governments from pursuing energy efficiency en-
hancing policies.
The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014) identifies the ‘multiple
benefits’ of energy efficiency improvements, where energy use reduction is
only one of many benefits that are likely to result from energy efficiency
actions. From an economic perspective, the reduction in the relative price
of using energy associated with energy efficiency improvements can have
1In Chapter 3 I describe different types of rebound effects and highlight the differ-
ences.
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impacts that go beyond reduced energy use. For example, in production,
where energy is an input, an improvement in energy efficiency will lower
the cost of producing output and thus generate competitiveness effects
similar to those delivered by technological progress in the use of capital
or labour. However, even in consumption, the reduction in the relative
price of delivering energy services (e.g. heating, lighting, driving a given
distance) could free up resources that can be re-allocated to the consump-
tion of other non-energy goods, thereby both boosting real income and
stimulating aggregate demand. In turn, this may impact on investment,
employment and overall disposable income (although, like any demand-
driven expansion, it may also have negative impacts on competitiveness).
The IAE multiple benefits argument can be seen as a cornerstone for
a paradigm shift2 in the economic analysis of energy efficiency improve-
ments. It shifts focus from the narrow perspective of a cost effective
means of delivering a pure energy reduction to a more holistic analysis of
how a wide range of economic and social benefits may be delivered. Even
from a policy perspective, there is increasing interest in adopting a multi-
ple benefit approach from governments around the world, because of the
opportunity to achieve a higher coordination of multiple objectives, and
to appeal to both political and public opinion by highlighting positive
aspects of a more efficient use of resources. Again, for example the UK
DBEIS in the new energy strategy aims to “secure the economic benefit
of the transition to a low-carbon and resource-efficient economy”(DBEIS,
2017, p. 20)), while the Scottish Government defines “energy efficiency
2The shift mostly concerns the way policy thinks about energy efficiency issues.
From a methodological point of view, the traditional framework already captures
potential benefits, and trade-offs between different policy objectives.
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as a strategic priority [...] recognising the significant economic benefits of
energy efficiency investment” (The Scottish Government, 2017b, p. 10).
1.2 Household energy efficiency increases
and potential benefits
In economics, energy efficiency is conventionally defined as any technical
progress that allows an increase in the output per unit of physical en-
ergy. As I have already mentioned, in the use of energy in production,
this is not very different from a technical improvement in capital use or
an increase in labour productivity (although the analysis is complicated
by the fact that energy is a produced input rather than a primary one).
It is, therefore, an almost unambiguous outcome that improving energy
efficiency in production would deliver a productivity-led stimulus and in
most cases help to reduce energy use to some extent. There is an in-
creasingly large literature using multi-sector, economy-wide computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models to analyse the nature and outcomes of
such a stimulus (see for example Allan et al., 2007; Broberg et al., 2015;
Grepperud and Rasmussen, 2004; Hanley et al., 2009; Jenkins et al., 2011;
Mahmood and Marpaung, 2014; Turner, 2009; Xiao et al., 2017; Yu et al.,
2015).
However, with a change in demand from improved household’s en-
ergy efficiency the outcome may be more ambiguous, and depends on
a number of factors and economic conditions. Normally, the household
budget is not fixed, and it will vary according to income from employ-
ment and other sources. A change in the composition of demand implies
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that some industries would sell/produce more and some other less. If,
for example, non-energy consumption increases and energy consumption
decreases, this would have gross impacts on the jobs and capital revenues
involved in the supply chain of these goods. Thus, a net stimulus would
be possible only if the lost income from the decreased production of en-
ergy is more than compensated by the increase in income from the higher
production of non-energy goods. This type of issue could apply to some
extent to energy efficiency improvements in industrial energy use. How-
ever, in the industrial energy use case, potential negative impacts are
normally offset by competitiveness gains from reduced prices, at least
in the case of a small open economy, such as Scotland and the UK. In
contrast, in the household case if any supply constraint is imposed in pro-
duction, such as a fixed labour force, the price of domestically produced
goods will increase, as wages increase in response of any demand stim-
ulus. This in turn impacts negatively international competitiveness and
reduce exports demand. Clearly, these (and other) issues are of primary
importance for any Government seeking to implement energy efficiency
improvement with the double objective of reducing energy use without
sacrificing economic growth.
However, the multiple benefits framework is not limited to macroe-
conomic gains. Energy efficiency improvements can be targeted to those
households who are normally under-heating or ‘under-powering’ their
homes and/or are considered to be fuel poor. Given that energy effi-
ciency reduces the effective cost of energy, its introduction means that
home heating and lighting become more affordable. Thus, governments
could be persuaded to adopt these measures because of their commitment
6
to social policies generally, and to energy affordability, inclusive growth
and fuel poverty reduction in particular.
Overall, it is increasingly important in a policy context that the entire
range of economic (and ideally social) impacts triggered by increasing
household energy efficiency improvements must be clearly articulated.
This thesis considers how a multi-sectoral system wide approach is re-
quired when trying to capture these multiple impacts simultaneously.
The objective of this work is to develop modelling frameworks that can
capture the complex interaction of these impacts and to use these to as-
sess the capacity of energy efficiency improvements to make contributions
to our understanding of the new paradigm of energy efficiency analyses.
1.3 CGE modelling
While many studies have used partial equilibrium models to estimate the
impact of households’ energy efficiency improvements, here I argue that,
given the important links between the economy, energy use and envi-
ronmental impacts, it is necessary to utilise a modelling framework that
is capable, at least in principle, of capturing system wide interactions
between energy/environmental issues and the economy. Moreover, given
policy attention on multiple objectives for and outcomes of any type of
policy, I consider that computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis is
particularly well suited to explore all the system-wide impacts of house-
hold energy efficiency improvements at regional or national level, here
focussing on case studies for the UK and Scotland.
CGE models are widely used for the analysis of energy, environmental
and economic policies, trade and fiscal issues, not only by the academic
7
community but also by policy analysts and governmental bodies. For
instance, the Scottish Government and HMRC use their own CGE models
for policy analysis (The Scottish Government, 2014; HMRC, 2013), but
also other countries such as Norway, US, Australia and institutions such
as the European Commission and the OECD make extensive use of this
modelling approach (Chaˆteau and Lanzi, 2014; Holmøy, 2016; Mercenier
et al., 2016; Pezzey and Lambie, 2001; The World Bank, 2011).
There are several reasons why CGE analysis more generally, and the
specific model used in this thesis, is an appropriate modelling framework
to adopt when exploring the multidimensional impacts of households’
energy efficiency improvements, and analysing potential trade-offs and
multiple benefits of energy efficiency. First, while most partial equi-
librium models have only one economic sector, CGE models have an
intrinsic multi-sectoral structure capable of capturing the economic re-
sponse of different industries to an external disturbance, and how these
responses may interact with one another. For example, if improvements
in energy efficiency actually deliver a reduction in final energy use, this
will result in a decreased demand for energy from households, which im-
pacts energy producers and suppliers, their returns to capital and, thus,
their investment decisions going forward. However, income effects from
the reduced energy bill lead to increases in expenditure on other energy
and non-energy goods, thereby positively impacting capital returns and
investment decisions in those sectors, but also potentially increases em-
bodied energy use in their supply chain. The overall impact on energy
use would vary depending on the energy intensity of each sector that is
positively or negatively impacted by the demand shift, and on the type of
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energy used. Thus, a knowledge of sectoral composition of any expansion
is essential.
Moreover, in a CGE framework, where data permit, economic sec-
tors can be easily disaggregated (or aggregated) to display more (or less)
details about a specific industry’s sales and purchases, and about the
nature of each industry’s final demand. For example, in Chapter 4, I
propose a model that includes consideration of the UK household sector
disaggregated by income quintiles. This facilitates analysis of the distri-
butional impacts of energy efficiency, across groups that have different
consumption patterns.
Second, CGEmodels capture endogenous market prices and nom-
inal incomes. Energy efficiency is likely to trigger price responses when
the economy adjusts to a new macroeconomic equilibrium after a dis-
turbance. For example, energy firms may try to recover from revenue
losses and reduced returns to capital when energy demand decreases by
raising prices (Turner, 2009). These price decisions will affect interme-
diate and final consumption of energy across the economy. Moreover, as
supply conditions and behaviour are endogenous to the model, expan-
sions or contractions in the economy are reflected in income variations
that impact household consumption decisions. This is perhaps one of
the main advantages of CGE models, as prices and income variations
can be of great importance when trying to assess household consumption
decisions.
Third, it is possible in a CGE model to have an endogenous gov-
ernment sector. This implies that we can directly address government
fiscal policies, linked to the actual implementation of energy efficiency,
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such as funding efficiency via taxation or changes in public expenditure
composition. Moreover, for the particular case of Scotland, it allows us
to run specific scenarios reflecting the new devolved fiscal powers that
Westminster is giving to the Scottish Government (Scotland Act, 2016).
Fourth, depending on the configuration and specification of a CGE
model, the labour market can be modelled as endogenous and with
quite a high level of detail. The main area of focus is often to treat the
real wage and employment as being determined within the CGE model.
The Scottish model that I use in this thesis also offers the possibility
of capturing interregional net migration of workers from Scotland to the
rest of UK and vice versa. This is crucial to assess the impact of a policy
in terms of job creation or destruction and on the purchasing power of
households.
Fifth, CGE models increasingly involve endogenous investment.
In the models used in this thesis, supply responses to any disturbance
are determined in part by adjustment in capital stocks driven by cost
minimising production technology. For example, if energy demand de-
creases, profitability falls, and energy firms will reduce their capacity
and their capital stock. However, this happens gradually, according to
different adjustment mechanisms.
Sixth, increasingly CGE models solve over multiple periods and
are dynamic. The model that I adopt and develop for this thesis pro-
duces results for transition periods towards equilibrium. This can be par-
ticularly interesting for Governments who operate in a time-constrained
framework governed by elections and other shorter term deadlines. More-
over, the model considers the dynamic choices of consumers and investors
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that can be either myopic or forward looking with perfect foresight. It
is also possible to consider heterogeneous behaviour of firms and house-
holds, where one is myopic and the other is forward looking, and hetero-
geneity of behaviour within different groups of consumers.
Seventh, CGE models are increasingly developed to have policy ap-
plicability and impact. Because CGE methods are used by both the
UK and Scottish Governments, I believe that, as well as producing use-
ful results, my work can help to inform and address these Governments’
use of CGE models. This can occur through stimulating a critical debate
around CGE modelling for policy analysis, including implementation and
applications, and through developing the knowledge for building more so-
phisticated models.
Of course, I acknowledge that CGE models have limitations that
should be taken into account in their application. In fact, one of the
objectives of this thesis is to address some of this limitations and try to
move towards more robust modelling foundations. However, with this in
mind, and for the reasons explored earlier in the text, I am convinced
that CGE is the most appropriate modelling framework to use in the
context of investigating and understanding the economy-wide impacts of
increased household energy efficiency from the perspective of multiple
policy objectives and outcomes.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 I pro-
vide an introduction to the CGE models of the UK and Scotland used in
this thesis. My modelling work builds upon the existing CGE modelling
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framework developed by researchers of the Fraser of Allander Institute
and Centre for Energy Policy at the University of Strathclyde. I describe
the main components and features of the model, and highlight, when
appropriate, the extensions to the model that constitute the originality
of this work in terms of modelling. I report the full mathematical repre-
sentation of the models in Appendix A. Although this does not directly
constitute an output of the thesis, here I report that part of this thesis
work is also the development of my own GAMS3 codes, in order to be
able to solve the simulation models for each chapter.
Chapter 3, 4 and 5 are three independent (but related) essays on the
wider economic impacts of household energy efficiency improvements.
Each paper aims to contribute to the academic literature, by discussing
the implications of household energy efficiency enhancing policies in Scot-
land and the UK and testing the current techniques utilised for the anal-
ysis of economy-wide impacts of energy efficiency. However, I aim also to
contribute to the current energy policy and economic debate of Scotland
and the UK as a whole: the analysis are all policy relevant.
The first paper, corresponding to Chapter 3, is entitled ‘Increasing en-
ergy efficiency in Scottish households: trading-off benefits of an economic
stimulus and energy rebound effects? ’. This paper has a regional focus,
and is dedicated entirely to the case of Scotland. In this work I start
from the most recent analysis of economy-wide implications of improving
households’ energy efficiency in the UK (Lecca et al., 2014a) and extend
it to study the implications of moving from the national case of the UK,
3General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) is high level mathematical
command-line based system used to solve large scale optimisation problems, such
as those composing a CGE model.
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to the regional case of Scotland. The paper analyses the impacts of an
illustrative 5% energy efficiency improvement in household energy use in
Scotland. It initially replicates the analysis conducted in Lecca et al.
(2014a), and then introduces additional regional-specific elements in the
model, notably by including migration of workers between Scotland and
the rest of the UK.
In the UK case (Lecca et al., 2014a), an energy efficiency improvement
in household energy use results in a small economic stimulus, accompa-
nied by a reduction in energy use that is less than the expected energy
savings from the pure energy efficiency increase. However, the economic
benefits are limited by the fact that households increase their consump-
tion of goods and services, putting upward pressure on domestic prices
and crowding out exports. Regions are normally characterised by more
open goods and labour markets, given their integration with the host
national economy. In the case where workers can freely migrate between
regions in response to variations in wages and unemployment rate, the
prices of goods and services in the economy tend to remain constant
in the long-run. This is because the net in-migration triggered by the
economic stimulus from the higher efficiency puts downward pressure of
wages and prices. In equilibrium, because migration responds to differ-
ences between the regional and the national real wage (and the national
real wage is exogenous) prices go back to the baseline value and the initial
level of exports is restored.
However, in this paper I consider also the implications of potential
new fiscal powers attributed to the Scottish Government by Westminster.
In a context where economic activity is growing, tax revenues increase,
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giving room for additional stimulus to the economy via additional gov-
ernment spending. Alternatively, the additional revenue could be used
by the government to reduce taxes on income. This work is the first econ-
omy wide study on the impact of household energy efficiency in Scotland
to date. It contributes to the still small literature on the system wide
impact of energy efficiency and proposes efficiency as a tool for regional
development.
The second paper, Chapter 4, entitled ‘Making the case for support-
ing broad energy efficiency programmes: impacts on household incomes
and other economic benefits ’ is more policy focused. Here I take the case
of the UK, and look at the distributional impacts of households’ energy
efficiency improvements across households from different socio-economic
groups. I explore the implications of energy efficiency for the wider econ-
omy, but also focus the attention on those households whose use of energy
is considered to be insufficient to properly heat and light their homes, the
so called ‘fuel poor’.
Using a CGE model of the UK, I begin by introducing a 10% per-
manent costless increase in residential energy efficiency. Then I explore
different options for the government to fund energy efficiency and improve
the energy conditions of the poorest households. I look at two main op-
tions. The first is a temporary reallocation of government spending, to
fund a permanent increase in residential energy efficiency. Although a de-
crease in government expenditure would have potential negative impacts
on demand over the period of the payment, it does not cause the kind
of distortive effects typically associated with taxation. The temporary
negative impact only lasts for the duration of the change in spending,
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and it is followed by the same positive stimulus observed in the costless
case.
The second option that I explore is a temporary increase in the income
tax rate, to simulate a redistribution from richer to poorer households.
This has more negative impacts, because of the impact of income tax
variations on salaries and wage bargaining. However, again the tempo-
rary nature of the policy can be justified in the light of a medium to long
term return from the investment in energy efficiency. This paper tackles
the criticism of CGE studies on energy efficiency improvements of only
considering costless efficiency changes. It also proposes an endogenous
mechanism by which the Government can support efficiency programs
and analyses its impacts.
The third paper, Chapter 5, is entitled ‘Can a reduction in fuel use
result from an endogenous technical progress in motor vehicles? A par-
tial and general equilibrium analysis ’. Here I tackle a potential issue
with the way energy consumption is modelled, and look at alternative
ways of decreasing energy demand via technical progress. Also I con-
sider whether this technical progress can deliver both fuel use reduction
and an economic stimulus. Up to this point, in the thesis, I assume that
households consume physical energy such as petrol or electricity similarly
to other non-energy goods. However, in reality people consume energy
services that are the result of a combination of physical energy and some
energy-using technology.
I develop a simple partial equilibrium model, where households self-
produce private transport, by combining motor vehicles and refined fuels
(petrol and diesel). In turn, private transport is consumed directly by
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households along with all other consumption goods. In this context, I
show that a technical improvement in motor vehicles can reduce the use
of refined fuels, when there is enough substitutability between the two
inputs, and even if fuels efficiency has not changed. The output of miles
travelled produced by households ultimately depends on the elasticity
of demand for this service. Given that a technical progress in motor
vehicles decreases the price of a mile travelled, if the household’s demand
is price-elastic they will simply travel more, therefore demanding more
fuels and motor vehicles. If the household’s demand is price-inelastic
it will demand less private transport and both fuel and vehicle use will
decrease.
Taking the case of the UK, I then incorporate the partial equilibrium
model described above into a CGE model. Simulation results show con-
sistent results with the partial equilibrium model in regard to the compo-
sition of household consumption. However, macroeconomic impacts vary
depending on how the consumer price index is calculated, in particular
whether or not it includes the price of energy services self-produced by
households.
This paper proposes a more sophisticated way of modelling energy
services through the example of private transport, and to think of tech-
nical progress that is not directly energy saving as a potential endogenous
mechanism for energy reduction in consumption. The paper also assesses
through simulations the impact of vehicles efficiency improvements in the
provision of the energy service private transport, and identifies the condi-
tions under which this leads to fuels use reduction. Moreover, it assesses
the impact of such efficiency improvements on the wider economy. It con-
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stitutes the basis for future development of micro-foundations of house-
hold energy consumption both in a partial and in a general equilibrium
setting, and reflects on the importance of considering energy consumption
in the context of its use and not as a simple consumption good.
In the final Chapter I draw the thesis’ conclusions and general lessons,
and I outline future plans for research and potential extensions to this
work. The thesis contributes to the energy efficiency/economics litera-
ture in several ways. Firstly, the three core Chapters (3,4 and 5) tackle
the energy efficiency literature under different perspectives, contributing
to different literatures. The first paper has a regional focus. The main
contribution of this work is in the system wide analysis of household
energy efficiency improvements in Scotland. To the best of my knowl-
edge, this is the first Scottish-focussed study in this field. It adds to
the current debate in regional economics by proposing energy efficiency
as a means not only to reduce energy use but also to promote regional
development. Furthermore, it is also original in the analysis of energy
efficiency improvements in the context of a fiscally devolved Scotland.
The second paper is more policy oriented. It extends previous work
on system wide energy efficiency improvements in the UK households
conducted by Lecca et al. (2014a) but adding depth to the analysis in
at least two main ways. First, it considers the distributional impacts of
energy efficiency improvements across different household income groups.
While to the best of my knowledge, only one study to date considers the
distributional effect of energy efficiency in the UK (Chitnis et al., 2014),
this work is limited to the calculation of direct and indirect rebound ef-
fects and does not take into account economy wide impacts. Moreover,
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while past system wide studies have assumed costless energy efficiency
improvements, I consider in this work the impact of energy efficiency
measures funded via government spending and taxes on income. Sim-
ulation results show that, depending on the source of funding for the
efficiency improvement and on the duration of the payments, costly en-
ergy efficiency improvements can have different short term implications,
while in the long-run they tend to converge to the same equilibrium.
The third paper has a theoretical and analytical orientation. Here
I consider ways of improving the modelling of energy intensive services
using the example of private transport, adding to the micro literature
that has started to consider such services as being composed of energy
and some technology. However, while past studies have assumed that the
role of technology is only to transform physical energy into service output
(such as miles travelled for example), I argue that a technology/capital
good such as motor vehicles can influence the price of the produced energy
services, for example when its efficiency improves, affecting thereby the
consumption of physical energy. Finally, in contrast to previous studies,
this paper also assesses the system wide implications of efficiency im-
provements in motor vehicles, and the ability of such improvements to
reduce fuel use and deliver an economic stimulus.
Finally, I conclude that the current work can be extended in several
aspects. Among these, one natural extension is to model interactions
of Scotland and Rest of UK (RUK) in a multiregional CGE modelling
framework. This allows the capture of feedback and spillover effects be-
tween the two regions, and the impact of asymmetric policies as Scotland
moves in the context of a more devolved fiscal system. Another natural
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extension is to explore other modelling techniques such as energy system
models, which are currently used by both the Scottish and the UK Gov-
ernments. From the technical modelling perspective, my main priority
could be to test the implications of alternative micro foundations for ex-
ample from behavioural economics models, both from the consumption
and the production sides.
19
Chapter 2
An introduction to the
AMOS-ENVI and UK-ENVI
CGE models
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2.1 Introduction
In economics, models are used to study specific real world issues in isola-
tion. Over the years, a variety of models have been developed to explain
specific aspects of economic systems such as consumption, production
or labour market behaviour. Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
models take the complexity of economic systems whose components are
believed to be well understood in isolation, but whose interaction is dif-
ficult to assess following a disturbance. Such interaction, is studied in
CGE models by identifying the sign of each component’s variation, as well
as the magnitude of the variation. In doing this, CGE models analyse
the countervailing forces operating within the economy as each market re-
acts to a disturbance and adjusts towards a new equilibrium. Essentially,
CGE models provide a means of isolating the system-wide ramifications
of any disturbance or intervention, including policy actions.
CGE models are widely applied by academics and practitioners to
assess the economic impact of different disturbances. There are several
reason for this. Firstly, CGE models are based on rigorous theoretical
foundations. All CGE models are based on the general equilibrium theory
of the existence of equilibria that clear supply and demand in all markets
simultaneously (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). However, each component of
a CGE model, consumption, investment, production etc., is also based
on specific microfoundations. Secondly, CGE models are extremely flex-
ible. Depending on the research question or policy issue to be analysed,
different parts of a CGE model can be developed in more details, in order
to provide a more accurate answer to a given question. However, at the
same time, other elements can remain relatively simple and this allows
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us to keep track of results and avoid that the model becomes a ‘black
box’. Finally, CGE models are calibrated on real world data. These data
can be disaggregated according to the specific issue to be addressed.
To develop a CGE model it is typically necessary to go through the
following steps: specification, parametrisation, solution and ultimately
simulation. The specification of a CGE model implies the development
of theoretical structure represented by a set of equations describing a
given general equilibrium model. The specification varies from model
to model, and can be adapted according to the characteristics of the
modelled economic system and of the needs of the researcher.
Once the theoretical structure has been decided, it is necessary to
parametrise the model using data from the real world. Structural pa-
rameters are typically derived using a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM).
However, depending on the structural form of the theoretical specifica-
tion, other ‘key’ parameters, such as elasticities, are imposed exogenously
to reflect for example the result of econometric analyses. All the remain-
ing parameters are derived through the calibration process.
When these steps have been completed a CGE model is solved numeri-
cally, utilising different specialised software packages and algorithms such
as GAMS. Essentially, the solution is found for a set of prices that satisfy
the market clearing conditions of each market within the economy simul-
taneously, for given demand and supply functions. In the absence of any
disturbance, the solution of the model simply replicates the benchmark
values that have been used to parametrise the model. Policy impacts
are evaluated by introducing a counterfactual (what if..?) simulation
scenario and comparing the results with the business as usual scenario.
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As flexibility is one of the strengths of CGE models, there is a wide va-
riety of such models. Differences are normally determined in the theoret-
ical specification and in the temporal and spatial dimension of the model.
From the theoretical perspective, early CGE models were largely based
on neoclassical assumptions of perfectly competitive markets (Shoven
and Whalley, 1984). However, currently many models include elements
of imperfect competition, and other market imperfections. For example,
the models that I use in this thesis consider imperfectly competitive be-
haviour in the labour market.1 Moreover, models can in principle include
elements of behavioural economics, as well as other alternative theories.
For the time dimension, simpler models assume fixed factors of produc-
tion and are comparative static in nature. Other models include factors
of production adjustment mechanisms of several types, and can be used
to analyse the evolution of impacts across time, as well as across different
equilibria (Pereira and Shoven, 1988). As I explain in Sections 2.2 and
2.4, the Scottish and the UK models adopted in this thesis allow different
dynamic behaviour of households’ consumption and firms’ investment.
From the spatial perspective, CGE models can represent cities, re-
gional, national or international economies, with the possibility of mod-
elling multiple regions at the same time to study the interaction among
these (Wiedmann, 2009). However, often, due to computational limits,
models describing very large agglomerates of regions2 are limited in other
aspects, such as the specification of dynamic behaviour.
1I am currently working on developing monopolistic and imperfect competitive
behaviour in the electricity market of the UK with colleagues of the Centre for Energy
Policy, University of Strathclyde, as part of an EPSRC funded project.
2See for example the European Commission CGE model, RHOMOLO (Mercenier
et al., 2016).
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In the analysis of energy-environmental issues, CGE models have been
widely adopted for at least two additional main reasons. First, most CGE
models are based on sectoral data which offers details about the compo-
sition of energy production, industrial use of energy, and final demand.
Energy use and emissions vary significantly among sectors, so that the
composition of economic activities becomes critical. Second, because they
have endogenous market prices and income. This is important especially
in the determination of interconnections between energy/environment
and the wider economic system (Bergman, 2005; Sue Wing, 2009).
In this dissertation I use two main CGE modelling environments
called AMOS-ENVI and UK-ENVI. AMOS is the acronym of A Model
of Scotland. This CGE model has been developed and maintained over
the years at the University of Strathclyde starting from Harrigan et al.
(1991). The ENVI extension of AMOS is specifically designed to anal-
yse the impact of energy and environmental disturbances in the Scottish
Economy (Allan et al., 2014; Hanley et al., 2009). UK-ENVI is a national
version of AMOS-ENVI (Allan et al., 2007; Lecca et al., 2014a; Turner,
2009).
The two models have a similar structure, but they are calibrated
on different datasets, and allow the choice of different macroeconomic
closures appropriate to either a regional or a national economic system.
In this chapter I outline the core common structure of the specification
of the two models and highlight differences between the regional and the
national models. The full mathematical representation of the models is
provided in Appendix A.
AMOS/UK-ENVI are multisectoral, dynamic CGE modelling frame-
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works that offer the possibility of making different assumptions regarding
household consumption, investment behaviour, labour market and gov-
ernment decisions. In the remainder of this Chapter I illustrate in turn
the key characteristics of the models’ specification main components.3
Specifically, in Section 2.2 I describe the consumption’s specification of
the model, focussing on both intertemporal and on within period con-
sumption. In Section 2.3 I describe the production structure of the model.
In Section 2.4 I discuss investment behaviour in the myopic and forward-
looking specifications. In Sections 2.5 and 2.6 I describe respectively the
available different labour market and government closures. In 2.7 I pro-
vide a brief overview of the structure of the SAM used in the model.
Finally, in Section 2.8 I describe the solution’s procedure.
2.2 Consumption
2.2.1 Intertemporal consumption: myopic vs forward-
looking behaviour
The consumption component of the model describes the behaviour of a
representative household that makes consumption decisions over time and
at each period in time. The models offer the possibility of considering the
intertemporal consumption behaviour of ‘myopic’ or ‘forward looking’,
perfect foresight households.
Myopic intertemporal consumption decisions are based on the follow-
3The basic structure of the CGE model in its non-energy version is largely based
on Lecca et al. (2013). Although this thesis is meant to be self-contained, the reader
can also refer to this work for further discussion about the model’s characteristics.
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ing conventional consumption function:
Ct = Yt − St −HTAXt − CTAXt (2.1)
In (2.1) total consumption C is a equal to income Y minus savings
S, income taxes HTAX and direct taxes on consumption CTAX. t is a
subscript for a period of time, which is considered to be one year, given
that the underlying data are annual. Any changes in income, savings or
taxes are therefore reflected in each year’s consumption decision. House-
holds’ income includes capital income KY and labour income LY , plus
any transfer from Government and other institutions.
KYt = dsrk,h
J∑
j=1
KDj,t · rkj,t (2.2)
LYt = dsrl,h
J∑
j=1
LDj,t ·Wt (2.3)
In (2.2), capital income is described as the sum across sectors of cap-
ital demand KD times rent of capital rk and where dsrk,h is the share
of capital income that goes to households and it is calibrated from the
SAM.4 Similarly, in (2.3) labour income is given by the share of labour
income that goes to households dsrl,h times the sum of labour demand
LD across sectors times the wage w. Households’ income also includes
transfers from the government and other institutions.
The myopic specification lacks any expectations of future intertem-
poral consumption decisions (Devarajan and Go, 1998; Go, 1994; Lecca
4Capital and Labour income are distributed among domestic institutions, such as
households, government and firms.
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et al., 2013; Partridge and Rickman, 2010). To accommodate future
expectations we have the possibility of assuming that households have
perfect foresight forward looking behaviour. The forward looking con-
sumption model describes the behaviour of a representative household
who seeks to maximise utility across time, subject to a budget constraint.
U t(ct, . . . , cT ) =
T−t∑
i=0
(
1
1+ρ
)t
C1−σt −1
1−σ
so that W˙ = Yt + rWt − PctCt
(2.4)
In equation (2.4) U is the intertemporal utility function, c is con-
sumption at each time period t, ρ is the time discount factor and σ is
the constant elasticity of marginal utility. The budget constraint states
that at each period in time the change in total wealth W is a function
of income, plus returns on wealth, minus consumption times the price of
consumption Pc.
Households’ wealth is composed of financial wealth (FW ) and non-
financial wealth (NFW ) so that the following identity holds:
Wt = NFWt + FWt (2.5)
The non-financial wealth includes wealth from labour income. It ac-
cumulates as follows:
NFWt(1 + r) = NFWt+1 + Y Lt +
∑
ins
TRSins,t (2.6)
Equation (2.6) indicates that the compound value of today’s non-
financial wealth is equal to tomorrow’s wealth plus net labour income Y L,
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plus transfer from other institutions ins, such as firms and government,
TRS. The financial wealth accumulation can be expressed as follows:
FWt(1 + r) = FWt+1 +KYt − St (2.7)
Equation (2.7) states that current compounded wealth is equal to
future period’s financial wealth, plus net income from capital KY minus
savings S. The saving rate is exogenous and can be expressed as a share
of income.
St = mps · Yt (2.8)
where mps is the marginal propensity to save and it is a parameter
calibrated from the SAM, while Y is total income and it is equal in
equilibrium to the discounted sum of financial wealth plus non-financial
wealth. The solution of the utility maximisation intertemporal problem
gives the Euler equation describing the optimal path of consumption
across time.
Ct
Ct+1
=
[
Pct · (1 + ρ)
Pct+1 · (1 + r)
]
−
1
σ
(2.9)
According to (2.9) with fixed exogenous interest rate r5 the present
discounted value of future consumption depends on future consumption
prices. The parameter σ can be interpreted as the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, measuring how easily household substitute current
consumption for future consumption. This is set to 1.5 (Lecca et al.,
5I assume a fixed world interest rate equal to 0.04% (Lecca et al., 2013).
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2014b).
In a steady state equilibrium, the present value of wealth is equal
to the discounted sum of net income, which implies that the myopic
and forward looking behaviour produces the same equilibrium results.
However, the short-run equilibrium and the adjustment paths in response
to any disturbance to the economy differ between the two models (Lecca
et al., 2013).
In this thesis I assume forward looking consumption behaviour in
Chapter 3, in order to ensure consistency with the analysis of the na-
tional case study of the UK conducted by Lecca et al. (2014a). In this
way, differences in results are purely driven by the regional nature of
Scotland, reflected in the different dataset and in the assumption of in-
terregional migration of workers. In Chapter 4, I assume that households
are myopic. It can be argued that there is some degree of myopia in
households’ consumption behaviour. Therefore, the assumption of in-
tertemporal perfect foresight, household maximising behaviour can be
regarded as a limiting case that may not be a good representation of
real consumption behaviour. Additionally, the analysis in Chapter 4
is focussed on the lowest income households, whose ability to optimise
their lifetime income is significantly circumscribed by their dependence
on transfers from government and other types of transfers. Ideally, I
could have assumed that some groups are myopic and some other are
forward-looking or some other type of behaviour.6 However, in the con-
text of Chapter 4 this would have gone beyond the main objective of
the paper which is to investigate the implications of energy efficiency on
6In fact, it is straightforward to set the model to reflect this type of assumption.
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lower income households. Finally, in Chapter 5, I focus on long-run equi-
librium results, and therefore I utilise for simplicity the myopic model
given that the results are the same for this specific equilibrium solution.
2.2.2 Intra-temporal consumption
Regardless of the dynamic specification, the intertemporal component
of the consumption function only determines how aggregate household
consumption is allocated across different periods in time. However, one
of the main characteristics of CGE models is the possibility to identify
the demand for a range of different consumption goods that are the out-
puts of productive industries. Previous versions of AMOS and UK-ENVI
CGE models assume that household’s aggregate consumption is allocated
among goods according to its initial share of consumption, using a Leon-
tief type function (see for example Allan et al., 2007; Hanley et al., 2006;
Turner, 2009). This implies that when total consumption varies (i.e. dis-
posable income changes) the consumption of each single good changes
by the same proportion. However, those studies were mostly interested
in industrial energy use and for this reason they do not model in details
households’ consumption.
However, when the focus of a study is on household energy use, en-
ergy consumption needs to be treated more carefully. Depending on
household’s consumption preferences, the consumption of certain energy
or non-energy goods may be more or less price elastic and some goods
may be complements or substitute to other goods. For this reason Lecca
et al. (2014a) extends the earlier version of the UK-ENVI CGE model
by assuming that household can choose to consume energy or non-energy
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goods. To this end they allocate aggregate consumption using a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) function where energy and non-energy
are treated as imperfect substitute.
In Chapter 3, I follow Lecca et al. (2014a) and assume that within
each period consumption Ct is allocated between energy goods EC and
non-energy goods NEC so that:
Ct = γ
[
δEEC
ε−1
ε
t + (1− δ
E)NEC
ε−1
ε
t
]− ε
ε−1
(2.10)
In (2.10) ε is the elasticity of substitution,7 and measures the ease
with which consumers can substitute energy goods for non-energy goods,
δ ∈ (0, 1) is the share parameter, and γ is an efficiency parameter. Any
price change in one of these two goods will be reflected in some substi-
tution towards the cheaper good. For example, if energy consumption
becomes more efficient, its price in efficiency units (and possibly its mar-
ket price) decreases, and the households will increase their demand for
energy. However, if there is some complementarity between energy and
non-energy, non energy consumption will also increase. The full list of
equations describing household’s intra-temporal consumption behaviour
for this Chapter are reported in Appendix A.2.
The composite energy good EC in (2.10) includes the consumption
of electricity, gas, coal and refined oil, as described in Figure 2.1. Al-
though this is a straightforward way of allocating consumption between
different energy goods, in the literature we find arguments in favour of
alternative solutions. For instance, a growing (CGE and non-CGE) liter-
7Lecca et al. (2014a) also estimates the value of this elasticity over the short and
the long-run. These are respectively 0.35 and 0.61
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Figure 2.1: The structure of consumption in Chapter 3
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ature has introduced the distinction between static or non-motive energy
and motive energy. Motive energy refers to the use of refined fuels in
transport. Static/non-motive energy refers to residential energy use and
other uses that are not intended for transport purposes (see for exam-
ple Araar et al., 2011; Beuuse´jour et al., 1995; Dissou, 2005; Fitzgerald
et al., 2011; Gilchrist and Louis, 1995). While residential (static) en-
ergy use can be considered a primary need for households, because its
under-consumption can rise health concerns particularly in very warm
or hot climates, private transport (motive energy) use can be considered
a non-essential service especially where public transport alternatives are
available. For this reason, the two energy types require different policy
attention.
In Chapter 4, I explore the distributional impact of households’ en-
ergy efficiency improvements across different household income groups,
accounting also for potential implications of increased energy efficiency
on fuel poverty. While I do not directly model fuel poverty, I account
for the fact that according to the most common definitions, fuel poverty
refers to a situation where households are not able to properly heat or
light their homes, that is they do not consume enough residential energy.
This excludes the consumption of refined fuels for private transport. To
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represent this, I modify Equation (2.10) to exclude the consumption of
energy for private transport from residential energy use. Additionally,
to capture the distributional impacts I use a disaggregated dataset that
reports household consumption data for five household income groups.
Equation (2.10) is therefore modified as follows:
Ch,t =
[
δEh (γREt,h)
εh−1
εh + (1− δEh )TNEC
εh−1
εh
h,t
]− εh
εh−1
(2.11)
In (2.11) RE is residential energy consumption, that includes only
electricity gas and coal, while TNEC is non-energy consumption plus
refined fuels consumption for private transport purposes. The subscript h
indicates household group. This implies that each household has the same
consumption structure, represented in Figure 2.2, but the underlying data
are different. The full list of equations for this Chapter is reported in
Appendix A.3.
Figure 2.2: The structure of consumption in Chapter 4
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σ = 0.61
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In Chapter 5, I start from the observation that households do not
directly consume physical energy but they normally draw utility from
services that are energy intensive, such as private transport, or space
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heating (Haas et al., 2008; Hunt and Ryan, 2015; Walker and Wirl, 1993).
To reflect this, I explicitly model private transport as an example of an
energy intensive service formed of refined fuels and motor vehicles. Given
that there is no corresponding production sector for private transport, I
assume that households self produce this service to consume it directly
without selling it in a market (Barker et al., 2007), using vehicles and fuels
for which there a is supply sector. This allows us to observe the implicit
price of transport and to consider the price responsiveness of private
transport consumption. To accommodate this modelling framework, I
use a consumption structure similar to those in Bye et al. (2015), Scha¨fer
and Jacoby (2005) or Steininger et al. (2007), represented in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: The structure of consumption in Chapter 5
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To implement this structure I modify Equation (2.10) as follows:
Ct =
[
δTRTR
σm,a−1
σm,a
t + (1− δ
TR)A
σm,a−1
σm,a
h,t
]− σm,a
σm,a−1
(2.12)
In (2.12) TR is private transport consumption, A is the consumption
of all other goods, and σm,a is the elasticity of substitution between pri-
vate transport and all other goods. In turn, private transport is described
by the following relation:
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TRt =
[
δV (γV Ct)
σv,r−1
σv,r + (1− δV )F
σv,r−1
σv,r
t
]− σv,r
σv,r−1
(2.13)
where V C represents motor vehicles, F refined fuels and σv,r is the
elasticity of substitution between vehicles and fuels. In this case, the
response to a change in efficiency (or other price change) is determined
by a more complex system of relations as the two level nesting structure
of the consumption function implies that there is a dual substitution
between vehicles and fuels and between transport and everything else.
The full list of equations for this part is reported in Appendix A.4.
Finally, all model versions (both AMOS and UK) assume that house-
holds consume both domestically produced and imported goods, where
imported and domestic goods are imperfect substitutes (Armington, 1969).
QHI=i,t = γ
f
i
[
δhirQHIR
ρAi
t + (1− δ
hm)QHM
ρAi
t
] 1
ρA
i (2.14)
In (2.14) QH is total household consumption by sectors, QHIR is
consumption of locally produced goods, and QHM is consumption of
imported goods. With the price of imports being exogenous, substi-
tution between imported and domestically produced goods depends on
variations of national/regional prices.
2.3 Production
On the production side of the economy, the simple AMOS and UK CGE
model assume that capital and labour are combined together to form
value added. In turn value added combines with intermediates to produce
gross output. This is described in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: The structure of production in the non-energy
AMOS and UK CGE models
gross output
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In the ENVI variant, energy is included in the production function
as an intermediate input so that the structure described in Figure 2.4
becomes the one represented in Figure 2.5. This is the so called capital,
labour, energy and materials (KLEM) production function.
Figure 2.5: The structure of production in AMOS and UK-
ENVI models
gross output
Value Added
capital labour
Intermediate
energy materials
In this model, energy is nested with materials to form intermedi-
ate inputs input because unlike capital and labour it is a produced in-
put and an intermediate sector in the SAM. Although this is the most
widely adopted production structure, in the literature we find examples
of alternative nesting structures (see for example Grepperud and Ras-
mussen, 2004; Koesler and Schymura, 2015; Mahmood and Marpaung,
2014). There is an ongoing debate about whether energy should enter
the production function, and whether it should be nested with materials,
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labour, capital or with both at the same time as illustrated in Figure 2.6
(Chang, 1994; Dissou, 2005; Kemfert, 1998; Koetse et al., 2008; Perroni
and Rutherford, 1995; Van der Werf, 2008).
Figure 2.6: Main nesting structure combinations when energy
is included in the production function
1. (KLE)M nesting structure 2.((KL)E)M nesting structure
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3. ((KE)L)M nesting structure 4.((LE)K)M nesting structure
gross output
(KE)L
capital
energy
capital energy
labour
M
intermediate
gross output
(LE)K
labour
energy
labour energy
capital
M
Intermediate
The implication of utilising different nesting structures in the nested
CES production has also being discussed with experiments using AMOS-
ENVI in Lecca et al. (2011). Currently, the research team of the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde with which I am working is estimating econometrically
which structure best fits the current data, and what are the elasticity of
substitution at each level. However, this is still a work in progress, and
therefore for the purposes of the thesis, I adopt the classical KLEM struc-
ture in Figure 2.5, and I assume that this a CES function with a common
elasticity of 0.3 (Harris, 1989; Lecca et al., 2014a). The full list of equa-
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tions for this part of the CGE model is reported in Appendix A from
(A.13) to (A.20).
Finally, to accommodate the use of intermediate products from the
rest of the world (and from the rest of UK in the Scottish case) I assume
that intermediate inputs are given as a combination of domestic and
imported goods, and considered imperfectly substitutable (Armington,
1969) (see equation A.36), with an Armington elasticity of substitution
of 2 (Gibson, 1990; Turner, 2009).
2.4 Investment
Similarly to consumption, investment can be myopic or forward looking.
In the myopic case the time path of investment is given as follows:
Ii,t = v ·
[
K⋆i,t −Ki,t
]
+ δ ·Ki,t (2.15)
Equation (2.15) implies that at each time period investment is deter-
mined by the gap between the desired level of capital K⋆i,t and the actual
level of capital Ki,t, plus the depreciation of the actual level of capital,
and where v is an accelerator that measures the speed at which the cap-
ital stock adjusts to the desired level of capital (Jorgenson, 1963), and δ
is depreciation rate of capital stock and it is equal to 0.1. The desired
level of capital is determined by the cost minimising demand function for
capital, given by the first order condition of the production function.
K⋆j,t =
(
Axρ
X
j δki ·
PYj,t
uckt
) 1
1−ρx
j
· Yi,t (2.16)
In Equation (2.16) A is a technology parameter, PY is the price of
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value added, uck is the user cost of capital, ρ is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and labour, δ ∈ (0, 1) is a share parameter, and Y
represents value added. According to (2.16) the desired level of capital
will respond to changes in the user cost of capital.
In steady state the following conditions are satisfied:
K⋆i,t = Ki,t
therefore
Ii,t = δ ·Ki,t
(2.17)
that is the desired level of capital K⋆i,t is equal to the actual level of
capital Ki,t and therefore capital supply is equal to capital demand. This
implies that investment Ii,t will only cover depreciation. In the thesis, I
only use the myopic capital adjustment model in Chapter 5 where I focus
on long-run equilibrium results and therefore the two models produce the
same results (Lecca et al., 2013).
The forward looking investment option follows Hayashi (1982) and
Abel and Blanchard (1983), and describes the choice of a representative
agent seeking to maximise the value of firms Vt, subject to a capital
accumulation function K˙t constraint, so that:
MaxVt
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1+r
)t
CFt
subject to K˙t = It − δKt
(2.18)
In (2.18) the cash flow CF is given by gross profits less investment
expenditure J which is defined as:
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Ji,t = Ii,t (1− bb− tk + θ(xt))
θ(xt) =
(
β
2
)
(xt − α)
2
xt
and x =
It
Kt
(2.19)
where bb is the rate of current incentive to investment, tk is the
marginal tax credit on investment. θ(xt) is a quadratic adjustment cost
function with parameters α and β and is increasing in the investment cap-
ital ratio (Devarajan and Go, 1998; Go, 1994; McKibbin and Wilcoxen,
1999). It implies that the firm does not instantaneously adjust to the
desired level of capital but makes smaller stock adjustments over time.
The solution of the problem gives the law of motion of the shadow price
of capital, λt, and the tax adjusted Tobin’s q time path of investment
(Abel and Blanchard, 1983; Go, 1994; Hayashi, 1982).
λ˙i,t = λi,t(rt + δ)−R
k
i,t
where Rki,t = rkt − Pk + (xt)
2θ′t(xt)
(2.20)
It
Kt
= α +
1
β
·
[
λi,t
Pkt
− (1− bb− tk)
]
(2.21)
In Equation (2.21) the term in brackets represents the tax adjusted
Tobin’s q. With all the other terms fixed, investment responds to differ-
ences between the shadow price of capital λ, which indicated the mar-
ket value of capital and hence the profitability to invest, and the price
of capital goods Pk which represents the cost of replacing the capital
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stock. When the value of the firm and hence the shadow price of capital
increases, Tobin’s q is greater than 1 and investment will be positive.
Similarly when λ decreases, the value of the firm is falling, and invest-
ment will reduce. However, because the steady state conditions are the
same, myopic and forward looking investment produce identical long-run
results, but they differ in terms of transition period adjustments.
2.5 The labour market, wage bargaining
and migration
One of the main advantages of AMOS and UK ENVI models, is the
possibility of making different assumptions regarding the labour market.
In the current version, both models include three main labour market
closures. These are wage bargaining, fixed real wage, and fixed nominal
wage.
wage setting


ln
[
wt
cpit
]
= ϕ− ǫln(ut) bargaining
wt
cpit
= wt=0
cpit=0
fixed real wage
wt = wt=0 fixed nominal wage
(2.22)
In the wage bargaining case, the real wage is determined in an im-
perfect competition setting, where the bargaining power of workers and
hence the real consumption wage is negatively related to the rate of un-
employment (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2009). In (2.22),
wt
cpit
is the real
consumption wage, ϕ is a parameter calibrated to the steady state, ǫ is
the elasticity of wage related to the level of unemployment u, and takes
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the value of 0.113 in AMOS and 0.068 in UK-ENVI (Layard et al., 1991).
The fixed real wage reflects the case where the worker’s bargaining
power ensures that the purchasing power remains constant over time,
in a ‘real wage resistance hypothesis’. The fixed nominal wage assumes
that the wage is determined exogenously. This is a typical Keynesian
closure. It is designed mostly for the Scottish model, to reflect the case
where wage bargaining occurs at the UK level and the region takes the
bargained wage exogenously (Harrigan et al., 1991).
The steady state condition for the labour market requires that the
labour demand is equal to the labour supply minus the unemployment
rate as follows:
LSt · (1− UNt) = E =
J∑
j=1
(LDj,t) (2.23)
In the UK-ENVI model, the working population is generally assumed
to be fixed and exogenous. In AMOS-ENVI we model interregional mi-
gration from Scotland to the rest of UK as follows:
nimt = ζ − v
u
[
ln(ut)− ln(u¯
N)
]
+ vw
[
ln(wt/cpit)− ln(w¯
N/cpi
N
)
]
(2.24)
In (2.24) net migration rate nim responds to the difference between re-
gional and national real wage, and regional and national unemployment,
subject so the elasticities vu and vw that measure the responsiveness of
workers migration to the differentials (Layard et al., 1991), and where ζ
is a parameter calibrated to the steady state.
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2.6 Government
The Government collects revenue from taxes and spends it on a series of
economic activities as follows:
GOV BALt = GYt −GEXPt (2.25)
In Equation (2.25)8 GOV BAL is the government’s budget, GEXP is
government expenditure and GY is government income. The identity in
(2.25) allows alternative assumptions of government policy. In general,
the Government can choose either to balance the budget or not. When
we assume a balanced budget (GOVBAL fixed) the Government can
either adjust its current consumption (GEXP) or adjust its income (GY)
through varying the tax rate. On the other hand, when the Government
fixes the expenditure, either tax rates or Government’s budget become
endogenous.
The traditional closure for the Scottish model implies that the govern-
ment’s expenditure is completely exogenous and the government’s bud-
get is endogenous. Thus, tax revenues accrue to the central Government
in Westminster, to represent the so called ‘Barnett’ formula (Edmonds,
2001). However, with the gradual devolution of fiscal powers from the
central Government of the UK to Scotland, this closure will become in-
creasingly less accurate. Given that we are still in a transition period,
in Chapter 3 I explore the key principles of allowing for a greater fiscal
autonomy in Scotland by assuming that the Scottish Government main-
tains a fixed budged (GOVBAL), and either government expenditure or
8This is a compact version of Equation (A.40).
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income tax rate are endogenous.
In the UK model however, releasing the government’s budget has con-
sequences on the public debt, and this has implications for the balance
of payments. For this reason, I assume for simplicity a balanced bud-
get constraint, with endogenous government expenditure and fixed tax
rates. This implies that any changes in tax revenues will directly impact
government current expenditure.
2.7 The Social Accounting Matrix
CGEmodels are typically calibrated on a social accounting matrix (SAM).
In this thesis, the AMOS and the UK ENVI models are respectively cal-
ibrated on a 2009 Scottish SAM and a 2010 UK SAMs.9 A SAM can
be defined as a set of accounts of goods and services flows, incomes and
factors of production for a given time period, which is typically one year,
and for a given nation, region, or sets (or subsets) of regions. The SAMs
used in this thesis are constructed as extensions to the Input Output (IO)
accounts (Leontief, 1936, 1941), following the methodology described in
Emonts-Holley and Ross (2014). For this reason I first provide a brief
overview of what an IO account is, and then highlight the main differ-
ences between IO and SAM.
An IO table reports information about sales and purchases among
intermediate industries, final demand and value added within a nation,
region or other types of spatial agglomerates, and for a given period of
9The two datasets are published by the Fraser of Allander Institute, University of
Strathclyde, and they can be downloaded at http://www.strath.ac.uk/business/
economics/fraserofallanderinstitute/research/economicmodelling/.
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time. A schematic representation of an IO table is reported in Figure 2.7.
The main component of the IO is the ‘interindustry transaction’ matrix
T where each industry is identified by the set j, for j = (1, . . . , J). T
is JxJ matrix, where the rows describe the distribution of each indus-
try output among other industries under the form of sales, while the
columns describe the sectoral composition of the output, or purchases
from other industries (Miller and Blair, 2009). This means that each
industry appears both in the column as a buyer, and in the rows as a
seller. Transactions are reported in each cell, typically in monetary terms
at current prices.
The matrix U is a JxA final demand matrix, where a is the set of all
institutions so that a = (1, . . . , A). This matrix reports the final demand
of each sector from several domestic institutions such as government,
households and capital formation, as well as foreign institutions, which
is the external transactor and can include exports to other regions or
purchases by non-resident households. Finally, the factors of production
matrix, Y, is a BxJ matrix where b is the set of factors of productions
and b = (1, . . . , B). This table reports information about inputs that are
non-produced, such as income from employment and other value added,
or inputs that are produced outside the economic system such as imports.
A key characteristic of the IO table, is that total gross output equals total
gross input. This means that the IO can already be regarded as a general
equilibrium system.
IO tables are a useful tool to describe the productive structure of an
economic system, and how income (GDP) is produced within the system.
It also identifies the structure of demand of different institutions within
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a given economy. However, the IO accounts do not describe how income
is distributed among different institutions, and what are the transactions
among institutions. For example, from the IO we know how much house-
holds buy from each sector. However, we do not know where the income
for consumption comes from, how taxes are paid, how much subsidies are
received, and if any income is saved.
For this reason, the SAM incorporates the IO accounts and extends
them to include information about incomes flows, transfers between dif-
ferent institutions, savings and investment (Hosoe et al., 2010; Keuning
and Ruijter, 1988; Stone, 1986). In this way, the SAM describes not only
economic information about a given economy but also social information.
The basic structure of the SAMs used in this thesis is described in Figure
2.8. By comparing Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 it is straightforward to iden-
tify the differences between the two accounting systems. The matrices
T, U and Y are the same as in the IO. However, there are two additional
matrices, X and W. X is an AxB matrix representing income payments
from factors to institutions. It reports for example income from labour
earns by households, or capital income from firms ownership transferred
to households, government, corporate. W is an AxA matrix. It reports
transfers among institutions. For instance,W includes payments to gov-
ernment under the form of taxes, subsidies and intra households or intra
firms transfers.
Similarly to the IO accounting framework, a characteristic of the SAM
is that total receipts are equal to total outlays. Again, this implies that
the SAM is already a general equilibrium system and for this reason it
constitutes the ideal starting point for the construction of a full CGE
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model. Another advantage of the SAM is that each account can be dis-
aggregated to display higher level of details. For example, in Chapter
4, I use a version of the UK SAM where the household sector is dis-
aggregated into 5 income quintiles. This means that instead of having
one single household final demand column, as in Figure 2.8, we have 5
columns, one for each income group. Similarly, the household row that
crosses the matricesX andW is divided in five rows, to display household
income and transfer corresponding to each income quintile.
Both the Scottish and the UK SAM report information about 104
industries, which are derived from the full the Input-Output accounts
(the interindustry matrix). To facilitate the solution of the CGE model,
and the interpretation of the results, these industries are aggregated to
a smaller number. This is a common procedure for the solution of CGE
models, as well as for IO and SAM multiplier analysis. In the AMOS-
ENVI model used in this thesis the sectors are aggregated to 21 (see
Appendix B). In the UK-ENVI model used in Chapters 4 and 5 I aggre-
gate the sectors to 30 industries (see Appendix C).
2.8 Solution procedure
The model is solved as a system of non-linear equations using the solver
CONOPT3 in GAMS. I follow the common procedure of assuming that
the economy is initially in steady state equilibrium (Adams and Higgs,
1990). I solve the model in the absence of disturbances, to verify that
the benchmark database is exactly replicated. Following the introduction
of a disturbance the model runs for a period of time sufficient to allow
the economy to find a new steady state equilibrium. In the first period
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the capital stock and the working population (in the Scottish model) are
assumed to be constant. This is to reflect the fact that capital stock and
labour force adjustment are longer term processes. This period represent
the short-run equilibrium solution. The long-run equilibrium solution is
identified as a situation where capital stocks and the working popula-
tion (again only in the Scottish model) are completely adjusted and the
economy is in a new steady state equilibrium.
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Chapter 3
Increased energy efficiency in
Scottish households:
trading-off benefits of an
economic stimulus and energy
rebound effects?
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3.1 Introduction
In the analysis of energy efficiency improvements, the rebound argument
has received a great deal of attention (Dimitropoulos, 2007; Jenkins et al.,
2011; Sorrell, 2007; Turner, 2013; Van den Bergh, 2011). It focuses on
the fact that the potential for energy-saving from technologies aimed at
reducing energy consumption, can be partially, or even wholly, offset
by increased energy demand from the consequent energy price reduction
(Khazzoom, 1980, 1987) -the so-called rebound effect. For this reason,
it has been generally considered that the boost to energy demand is an
undesired consequence of energy efficiency policies (Gillingham et al.,
2016), and one that needs to be taken into account when assessing the
ability of such policies to reduce the demand for energy.
However, recent studies have noted that the energy rebound effect
is linked to a wider range of positive economic benefits derived from
higher energy efficiency (Barker et al., 2007, 2009; Gillingham et al.,
2016; Turner, 2013). In a recent report, the International Energy Agency
(IEA, 2014) argues that increasing energy efficiency could deliver signif-
icant social and economic benefits that go beyond the traditional single
objective of reducing energy demand. From an economic perspective,
energy efficiency has been shown to positively impact on key macroeco-
nomic indicators, such as employment, exports, and total output (Allan
et al., 2007; Barker et al., 2009; Turner, 2009, 2013).
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have often been used
to investigate the economy-wide impacts of energy efficiency improve-
ments, including the ‘rebound effect’, because of their intrinsic multi
sectoral structure and whole economy characteristics (Gillingham et al.,
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2016; Sorrell, 2007; Turner, 2013). Using CGE frameworks, studies fo-
cused on assessing rebound from energy efficiency increases in production
have already underlined how a more efficient use of energy can deliver
significant economic benefits. For example Broberg et al. (2015), Hanley
et al. (2009), Turner (2009) and Yu et al. (2015) find that improving en-
ergy efficiency in production would lead to a productivity-led expansion.
The findings are quite intuitive, as in these studies energy is one of the
production inputs, along with capital, labour and materials. This means
that improving energy efficiency will deliver similar types of effects as
improving capital or labour efficiency, although with some differences,
given that energy is used in smaller proportions and is a produced rather
than a primary input.
However, macroeconomic impacts of energy efficiency have been also
observed when energy efficiency increases in household consumption. For
example Lecca et al. (2014a) show that a more efficient use of energy
could lead to a reallocation of increased household expenditure towards
non-energy sectors, thereby stimulating the economy through a shift in
aggregate demand, but with some negative impacts on competitiveness
and export demand.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the economy-wide impacts of
increasing household energy efficiency in a regional context, accounting
both for ‘cost’ of the rebound effect in energy use and for the potential
benefits of energy efficiency. I use Scotland as case study, and compare
my analysis to Lecca et al. (2014a), which focuses on the UK case. To
this end, I use a regional Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model
of the Scottish economy.
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Focusing on the case of Scotland allows me to highlight the implica-
tions of moving from a national to a regional context when analysing the
system-wide impacts household energy efficiency improvements. There
are countervailing effects: the greater openness of regional economies
leaves them more sensitive to induced changes in competitiveness; but
the greater supply-side responsiveness of regional economies acts to limit
the scale of any such changes. Overall, I find that household energy effi-
ciency can be an effective instrument of regional development policy, and
that it does indeed typically generate a double (or multiple) dividend.1
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 I define
the rebound effect and review the literature. In Section 3.3 I describe
the CGE model used for this analysis. In Section 3.4 I illustrate the
simulation Scenarios. In Section 3.5 and 3.6 I describe the results and
discuss the main implications in the context of the conventional fiscal
arrangements for Scotland under which the budget constraint of the de-
volved Government does not vary with economic activity. In Section
3.7 I explore the impact of increased household energy efficiency in the
case in which the Scottish Government enjoys a much greater degree of
autonomy, as under the new fiscal arrangements that are currently in
the process of being implemented (Scotland Act, 2016). In Section 3.8 I
conclude.
1The double dividend argument can be decomposed into a number of multiple
benefits as intended by IEA (2014)
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3.2 The rebound effect
3.2.1 Direct, indirect and economy-wide rebound
effect
Improving energy efficiency, whether in its industrial use or in consump-
tion has been often associated with the rebound effect (Khazzoom, 1987,
1988; Saunders, 2000).2 In general terms, I define the rebound effect as
being the ratio between the actual energy savings (AES) obtained from
increasing energy efficiency, and the potential energy savings (PES),3 so
that:
R =
[
1−
AES
PES
]
· 100 (3.1)
Depending on the focus of the analysis we may decompose the rebound
effect in order to distinguish between direct rebound, indirect rebound
and economy-wide rebound. In the literature we find several ways of
defining these three types of rebound, and also different taxonomies (see
for example Gillingham et al., 2016; Greening et al., 2000; Sorrell, 2007;
Turner, 2013). However, here I follow Lecca et al.’s (2014a) approach.
The direct rebound effect occurs when an increase in energy efficiency
in a specific energy use, decreases the price of energy in efficiency units,
2The rebound effect has his roots in the pioneering work of Jevons (1865), who
observed that increasing the efficiency of the use of coal in British industries in the
19th century could actually lead to an increase in energy demand (the so called Jevons
paradox). The rebound effect has then been extended to the household context by
Khazzoom (1980, 1987).
3The potential energy savings correspond to the engineering effect of introducing
a more efficient energy technology (i.e. a 5% more efficient heater). For a different
approach to considering rebound in a general equilibrium setting see Guerra and
Sancho (2010) who quantify the expected energy savings in an Input-Output modelling
framework in terms of quantity adjustments in the energy supply chain.
leading to a rise in energy demand. For example following the installation
of a new more efficient boiler, a household decides to heat its home for
more hours per day or at a higher temperature, offsetting the expected
engineering energy savings.
The indirect rebound effect may be defined in terms of re-spending of
savings following a more efficient use of energy, under the assumption of
fixed nominal income and prices (Lecca et al., 2014a). It could involve
re-spending towards other energy services, for example using the savings
from a more efficient heater to drive a car more, or cook more, or towards
non-energy goods (clothing, leisure etc.) produced using energy. It fo-
cuses on considering the embodied use of energy in the supply chains of
energy and non-energy goods.
Following Lecca et al. (2014a) I define the economy-wide rebound
effect as including both direct and indirect rebound and also accounting
for the wider set of economic impacts that occur as nominal income and
prices adjust in response to the changing demand and supply, following
the initial increase in energy efficiency.
3.2.2 Literature
Several contributions focus on energy efficiency and rebound effect from
increased of household energy efficiency (Chitnis et al., 2014; Chitnis and
Sorrell, 2015; Druckman et al., 2011; Frondel et al., 2012; Linn, 2013; Lin
and Zeng, 2013; Schwarz and Taylor, 1995; West, 2004).4 A key char-
4For extended literature reviews on the state of knowledge of rebound effect see
Dimitropoulos (2007); Jenkins et al. (2011); Sorrell (2007); Turner (2013); Van den
Bergh (2011)
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acteristic of this literature is that the rebound effect is analysed mainly
in a short-run context, it is limited to the micro level and focused on
the direct rebound effect. This also means that most of the studies are
based on partial equilibrium analysis, which is not able to capture the
economy-wide effects of an improvement in energy efficiency, where in-
comes (in the household and other sectors) will be further impacted by
supply side responses.
A number of studies investigate the rebound effect in an Input-Output
(IO) setting (Chitnis et al., 2014; Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Druckman
et al., 2011; Freire-Gonza´lez, 2011). Although the IO modelling frame-
work may be considered a simple general equilibrium model, Lecca et al.
(2014a) explain that rebound at this level cannot be considered as economy-
wide rebound, because of the assumption of fixed nominal incomes and
market prices.
In a CGE framework, a number of authors have examined the economy-
wide impacts of increased energy efficiency on the production/industrial
side of the economy (e.g. Broberg et al., 2015; Grepperud and Rasmussen,
2004; Glomsrd and Taoyuan, 2005; Koesler et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2015).
Some studies have considered the case of UK and Scotland (see for in-
stance Allan et al., 2007 and Turner, 2009 for the UK; Anson and Turner,
2009 and Hanley et al., 2009 for Scotland). However, all these contrib-
utors focus on efficiency improvements in production, and the economy-
wide rebound effects (along with an expansionary impact on the econ-
omy) are driven by increased productivity and competitiveness.
To the best of my knowledge, few CGE studies focus on the economy-
wide effects of increased household energy efficiency (Duarte et al., 2016;
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Dufournaud et al., 1994; Koesler, 2013; Lecca et al., 2014a). Among
the published works, Duarte et al. (2016) investigates different energy
savings policies, including increased energy efficiency improvements in
Spain. However, this study is quite specific to the Spanish economy
characterised by very different energy needs, compared to Scotland, and
focusses mostly on the effectiveness of energy saving policies on CO2
emissions.
Lecca et al. (2014a) study the economic impact of an across-the-board
5% improvement in the energy efficiency of UK household. They il-
lustrate the additional insights obtained in moving from partial to full
general equilibrium analysis by calibrating models with different degrees
of endogeneity on a common dataset. This is done by starting from an
econometric analysis of rebound, then moving to an Input-Output frame-
work, and eventually adopting a full general equilibrium model with en-
dogenous prices and income. On this basis, they show how it is possible
to obtain a decomposition of economy-wide rebound effects into areas
that may merit differential policy responses.
In Lecca et al. (2014a), the general equilibrium analysis of energy ef-
ficiency is carried out in two stages. Firstly, the authors introduce an
efficiency improvement to reflect an increase in the value of energy ex-
pressed in efficiency units, meaning that households can consume the
original ‘pre-efficiency’ bundle of goods (energy and non-energy) but us-
ing less physical energy. This stimulates the wider economy through
an increase in aggregate demand, because households would respond to
the lower energy price (expressed in efficiency units) by substituting the
consumption of energy goods for the consumption of non-energy goods.
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However, while in studies focused on industrial energy use, such as Al-
lan et al. (2007) and Turner (2009) the economic expansion is driven by
an increase in competitiveness, in Lecca et al. (2014a) the demand-led
growth puts upward pressure on consumption prices and so decreases
competitiveness, partially crowding out exports.
Secondly, to understand how this loss in competitiveness may be
avoided, Lecca et al. (2014a) hypothesise that the energy efficiency im-
provement in household energy use is reflected in an overall decrease in
the cost of living. They model this by simply adjusting the consumer
price index (cpi) so that it is calculated to include the price of energy
goods expressed in efficiency units and the price of non-energy goods.
Thus, when energy efficiency improves, the cpi decreases, increasing com-
petitiveness and putting downward pressure on the nominal wage.
In this paper, I build on the general equilibrium analysis of Lecca
et al. (2014a), but focus on a regional case study within the UK, using a
single region CGE model of the Scottish economy. In order to emphasise
the implications of moving from a national to a regional context, I ini-
tially replicate the type of analysis carried out in Lecca et al. (2014a).5
Then, I extend this analysis by relaxing the assumption of a fixed work-
ing population imposed in Lecca et al. (2014a) to consider the impacts
of interregional migration in response to differences in relative unem-
ployment and wage rates. This provides another mechanism by which
reduced competitiveness effects observed in the national case may be re-
duced. Finally, I explore the implications for this analysis of enhanced
5The key differences between the national model in Lecca et al. (2014a) and the
regional model used in this Chapter are explained in Section 3.3.
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fiscal autonomy in Scotland by exploring the consequences of assuming
that the Scottish Government balances its own budget. This provides an
additional source of stimulus where the economy is expanding since the
additional tax revenues may be used either to increase regional public
spending or reduce (devolved) tax rates.
3.3 The CGE model
To identify the general equilibrium impacts of energy efficiency I use
the AMOS-ENVI6 CGE model for Scotland. This model is based on the
general AMOS CGE framework with forward-looking agents explained in
Lecca et al. (2013) but extended to incorporate a more detailed structure
of energy demand and supply (Lecca et al., 2014a).
The regional focus of AMOS-ENVI is reflected in three main char-
acteristics. First it is calibrated using data for Scotland. Second, it
does not impose the balance of payments constraint, to reflect the fact
that regions do not possess a full range of fiscal and monetary policies,
and receive transfers from the central Government.7 Third, it allows for
flow migration, to reflect the free circulation of workers within the UK
territory.
6AMOS is the acronym of a micro-macro model of Scotland and it is the name
of a CGE modelling framework developed at the Fraser of Allander Institute, of the
University of Strathclyde. ENVI indicates a version of this model developed for the
analysis of energy/environmental impacts of a range of policies and other disturbances.
7See Lecca et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion of this aspect.
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3.3.1 Consumption
Consumption is modelled to reflect the behaviour of a representative
household that maximises its discounted intertemporal utility, subject to
a lifetime wealth constraint. The solution of the household optimisation
problem gives the optimal time path for consumption of the bundle of
goods Ct.
To capture information about household energy consumption, Ct is
allocated within each period and between energy goods EC and non-
energy goods NEC so that:
Ct =
[
δE(γECt)
ε−1
ε + (1− δE)NEC
ε−1
ε
t
]− ε
ε−1
(3.2)
In (3.2) ε is the elasticity of substitution in consumption, and measures
the ease with which consumers can substitute energy goods for non-
energy goods, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the share parameter, and γ is the efficiency
parameter of energy consumption. The consumption of energy is then
divided into two composite goods, coal and refined oil and, electricity and
gas. These in turn split into the four energy uses, refined oil, coal, elec-
tricity and gas, through a nested CES structure as illustrated in Figure
3.1. Moreover, I assume that the individual can consume goods produced
both domestically and imported, where imports are combined with do-
mestic goods under the Armington assumption of imperfect substitution
(Armington, 1969).
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Figure 3.1: The structure of consumption
Consumption
σ = 0.35/0.61
energy
coal
oil
coal oil
gas
electricity
gas electricity
non
energy
3.3.2 Production and investment
The production structure reflects the classical KLEM nested CES pro-
duction function, where capital and labour are combined together to form
value added, and energy and materials are combined into intermediate
inputs. The combination of intermediate inputs and value added forms
gross output. Domestic and imported goods are combined under the
Armington assumption (Armington, 1969). This is illustrated in Figure
3.2.
Figure 3.2: The structure of production
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The demand functions for capital and labour are obtained from the
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first order conditions of the CES production function. Following Hayashi
(1982), the optimal time path of investment is derived by maximising the
value of firms Vt, subject to a capital accumulation function K˙t, so that:
MaxVt
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1+r
)t
[πt − It (1 + g(xt))]
subject to K˙t = It − δKt
(3.3)
where πt is the firm’s profit, It is private investment, g(xt) is the ad-
justment cost function, with xt = It/Kt and δ is depreciation rate. The
solution of the problem gives the law of motion of the shadow price of
capital, λt, and the adjusted Tobin’s q time path of investment (Hayashi,
1982).
3.3.3 The labour market, wage bargaining and mi-
gration
In this specification of the model, wages are determined within the re-
gion in an imperfect competition setting, according to the following wage
curve:
ln
[
wt
cpit
]
= ϕ− ǫln(ut) (3.4)
where the bargaining power of workers and hence the real consumption
wage is negatively related to the rate of unemployment (Blanchflower
and Oswald, 2009). In (3.4),
wt
cpit
is the real consumption wage, ϕ is a
parameter calibrated to the steady state, ǫ is the elasticity of the wage
rate related to the rate of unemployment u (Layard et al., 1991).
In the simulations below, the working population is initially assumed
fixed, as in Lecca et al. (2014a). However, as I have already noted,
63
regions are much more open systems than nations, and the assumption
of a fixed working population is likely to be inappropriate in a regional
context. For this reason, I introduce the following migration function
(Lecca et al., 2013):
nimt = ζ−v
u
[
ln(ut)− ln(u¯
N)
]
+vw
[
ln(wt/cpit)− ln(w¯
N/cpi
N
)
]
(3.5)
where nimt is the instantaneous rate of net migration, ζ is a parameter
calibrated to ensure zero migration in the first period, and vu and vw are
elasticities that measures the response to the differences in logs between
regional and national unemployment and real wage rates. In Equation
(3.5) net migration flow is positively related to the difference between
the log of regional and national real wages and negatively related to the
difference between the log of regional and national unemployment rates
(Layard et al., 1991; Treyz et al., 1993). This means, for example, that
when the regional real wage is higher than the national real wage and/or
the regional unemployment rate is lower than its national counterpart,
there will be a net in-migration of workers to the region.
3.3.4 Modelling energy efficiency and the rebound
effect
I define an increase in energy efficiency as any technological improvement
that increases the energy services generated by each unit of physical en-
ergy (Lecca et al., 2014a). This implies that the value of energy in effi-
ciency units has risen. Consequently, the household can achieve the same
level of utility by consuming the same amount of non-energy goods and
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services, but less physical energy.
For simplicity, I follow Koesler et al. (2016) and assume that the
energy efficiency is given as a public good, with no cost of implementation
for the household. This also ensures comparability with the national case
analysed by Lecca et al. (2014a).
Following Lecca et al. (2014a) I derive the economy-wide rebound
effect in two stages. First, I consider the economy-wide rebound in the
household sector (RC) as:
RC =
[
1 +
E˙C
γ
]
· 100 (3.6)
where E˙C measures the proportionate change in household energy con-
sumption, which can be positive or negative, and γ measures the propor-
tionate change in energy efficiency. Because I am analysing the household
economy-wide rebound effect in a full general equilibrium system, E˙C re-
sults from a full range of economy-wide adjustments, not just the direct
response to the change in the price of the energy service as efficiency
increases.8
Second, to identify the impact of the energy efficiency improvement
on the whole economy (i.e. across all industries, household and domestic
institutions) I derive the total rebound RT as follows:
RT =
[
1 +
E˙T
αγ
]
· 100 (3.7)
8Note that the change in sign from (3.1) and (3.6) is due to the fact that we
expect AES to be positive if there is no backfire, which corresponds to a negative
proportionate change in household energy consumption.
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In this case, E˙T measures the proportionate change in the energy used
in the whole economy, and α initial share of household energy use in the
base year.
It is important to notice that the term
E˙T
αγ
can be expressed as:
E˙t
αγ
=
∆ET
γEC
=
∆EC +∆EP
γEC
=
E˙C
γ
+
∆EP
γEC
(3.8)
where ∆ represents absolute change and the subscript P indicates pro-
duction. Substituting equations (3.6) and (3.8) into equation (3.7) gives:
RT = RC +
∆EP
γEC
· 100 (3.9)
This shows that the total economy-wide rebound will be higher than the
household economy-wide rebound if energy consumption in production
increases as result of the improvement in energy efficiency in the house-
hold sector.
To obtain additional insights from the nature of rebound, I decompose
the total economy-wide rebound into the four energy uses included in the
model as follows:
RTj =
[
1 +
E˙Tj
αjγ
]
· 100 (3.10)
where the set j includes coal, gas, electricity and refined oil.
3.3.5 Data and calibration
To calibrate the model I follow a common procedure for dynamic CGE
models (Adams and Higgs, 1990), which is to assume that the economy
is initially in steady state equilibrium. The structural parameters of the
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model are derived from the 2009 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for
Scotland (Emonts-Holley and Ross, 2014), which incorporates the 2009
Scottish Input-Output tables. The Scottish SAM reports information
about economic transactions between industries and other aggregate eco-
nomic agents, namely the Scottish household, the Scottish Government,
and corporate sectors, and accounts for imports and exports to the rest
of the UK (RUK) and the rest of the world (ROW). For this paper, I
aggregate the SAM to 21 industries,9 including four energy sectors, gas,
electricity, coal and refined oil.
The SAM constitutes the core dataset of the AMOS-ENVI model.
However other parameters are required to inform the model, such as
elasticities, and shares parameters. These are either exogenously im-
posed, based on econometric estimation or best guesses, or determined
endogenously through the calibration process.
To observe the adjustment of all the economic variables through time,
simulations are solved simultaneously for 50 periods (years). I introduce
a 5% costless, exogenous and permanent increase in the efficiency of en-
ergy used in household consumption. Following this initial ‘shock’, all the
variables start to adjust over time until they reach a new steady state
equilibrium. Results are reported for two conceptual periods: the short-
run, where the working population and capital stocks are fixed, and the
long-run, which corresponds to the new steady state equilibrium charac-
terised by no further changes in sectoral capital stocks and population.
When appropriate, I also report period by period adjustments.
9See Appendix B for the full list of sectors included in the model.
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3.4 Simulation scenarios
Simulations in this paper reflect four main scenarios, summarised in Table
3.1. All of the simulations use the AMOS-ENVI model, calibrated on
Scottish data, as outlined in Section 3.3.
Table 3.1: Summary of Simulations
No Migration Migration
Standard cpi Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Adjusted cpi Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Scenario 1. In Scenario 1, I use the version of the AMOS-ENVI
model that is most comparable to Lecca et al. (2014a), in that the working
population is assumed fixed. The cpi is calculated using the standard
method.
Scenario 2. In Scenario 2, I repeat the same simulations of Scenario
1, using the AMOS-ENVI model with standard cpi but introducing the
migration function described in equation (3.5).
Scenario 3. Here I modify Scenario 1 by assuming that the energy
efficiency improvement in the household sector is directly reflected in the
wage determination process (equation (3.4)), because the cpi effectively
falls as a consequence of the improvement in energy efficiency Lecca et al.
(2014a). This is implemented by adjusting the cpi to include the price of
energy measured in efficiency units as follows:
pFE =
pE
1 + γ
< pE for γ > 0 (3.11)
so that
cpiτ = cpi(pNE, p
F
E) (3.12)
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In (3.11) and (3.12) pNE is the price of non-energy goods, pE is the price
of energy goods measured in natural units and pFE is the price of energy
goods measured in efficiency units. When the price of energy in natural
units is constant, an increase in efficiency decreases the price of energy
in efficiency units, reducing therefore the cpiτ which directly affects the
real wage as determined in equation (3.4). As in Scenario 1, the working
population is fixed.
Scenario 4. In Scenario 4, I repeat the simulation carried out in
Scenario 3, with the adjusted cpi (as in equations 3.11 and 3.12), but
now allowing for endogenous migration (equation 3.5).
To summarise, Scenarios 1 and 3 differ from one another in the way
the cpi is calculated but they make the same fixed working population
assumption. Scenarios 2 and 4 repeat the same simulations as 1 and 3
but assuming full flow migration.
As in Lecca et al. (2014a) all the short-run simulations are carried out
using two alternative estimates of the elasticity of substitution between
consumption of energy and non-energy goods, the short-run elasticity
and the long-run elasticity.10 There are two main reasons for this ap-
proach. Firstly, there might be some degree of inertia in the adjustment
of household consumption, that would be reflected in a lower response to
an energy price change over the short period. Secondly, the energy effi-
ciency improvement may come through an investment in durable goods.
In this case, in order to access the efficiency improvement an adjustment
of household capital stock would be necessary, and this is generally a
10These are based on the recent estimation carried out by Lecca et al. (2014a) and
are respectively 0.35 and 0.61
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long-run adjustment. Apart from this, differences among the four Sce-
narios are reflected in the way the cpi is calculated and by the degree of
openess of the labour market as follows.
All of these simulations are based on the fiscal arrangements that ex-
isted prior to April 2016. Scotland is now in the process of moving to
a significantly more devolved fiscal system: in particular, the Govern-
ment’s budget will become dependent on Scottish income tax revenues,
which vary directly with economic activity (Scotland Act, 2016). In or-
der to reflect this change I repeat the simulations from Scenario 1, but
assume that the Scottish Government maintains a balanced budget so
that any increased tax revenues resulting from the stimulus to economic
activity generated by the increase in energy efficiency may be spent by
the Government or used to reduce the rate of income tax.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Scenario 1: the standard model with no mi-
gration
Table 3.2 summarises short-run (SR) and long-run (LR) results of sim-
ulations for Scenario 1. Recall that ε is the elasticity of substitution in
consumption between energy and non-energy goods, from equation (3.2).
In the first column I report short-run results using the short-run elasticity
of substitution (ε = 0.35). Following the energy efficiency improvement,
household energy consumption decreases by 2.67%, while household con-
sumption increases by 0.33%. The higher consumption puts upward pres-
sure on the cpi, making domestic products more expensive and reducing
70
Table 3.2: % change in the key economic variables in Scenario
1
Elasticity of substitution ε SR ε LR ε LR
Time period Short-run Long-run
GDP 0.04 0.03 0.11
Consumer Price Index 0.09 0.09 0.04
Unemployment Rate -0.25 -0.21 -0.45
Total Employment 0.06 0.05 0.11
Nominal Gross Wage 0.12 0.11 0.09
Real Gross Wage 0.03 0.02 0.05
Households’ Consumption 0.33 0.32 0.40
Investments 0.14 0.16 0.11
Exports -0.13 -0.12 -0.06
Non-Energy Output 0.07 0.06 0.14
Energy Output -0.41 -0.23 -0.46
Energy Use -0.88 -0.47 -0.61
Energy Demand in Production -0.22 -0.11 -0.30
Households’ Consumption of Energy -2.67 -1.43 -1.48
Households’ Consumption of non-Energy 0.52 0.44 0.52
Household Rebound 46.57 71.45 70.33
Economy-wide Rebound 28.40 61.92 50.08
international competitiveness. On the other hand, this shift in demand
stimulates investment in non energy sector, so that total investment in-
crease by 0.14% and the output of non energy producers rises by 0.07%.
This impacts the labour market, where total employment increases by
0.06%, unemployment decreases by 0.25% and the real wage is 0.03%
higher.
The second column of Table 3.2 reports short-run results using the
long-run elasticity (ε = 0.61). When the elasticity of substitution is low,
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there is stronger complementarity between energy and non-energy goods.
As the elasticity of substitution increases, the degree of substitutability is
greater and consumers substitute more towards energy, because its price
in efficiency units has reduced. This is reflected in a smaller decrease in
energy consumption of -1.43% and a smaller increase in household non-
energy consumption, of 0.44%. Given the lower switch in consumption,
the economic stimulus is smaller, reflecting the fact that, in the Scottish
case, the expenditure in non-energy goods has a higher impact on the
economy than the same spending on energy goods. This is because energy
goods are typically more import-intensive that non-energy goods, and
therefore a higher spending on non-energy goods has a higher impact on
the regional economy.
Long-run results are reported in the third column of Table 3.2. Scot-
tish GDP increases by 0.11% relative to what it would have been without
the efficiency improvement. The fall in household energy demand impacts
energy demanded by industries, which decreases by 0.22%. This is mostly
due to the decreased activity in energy intensive energy suppliers. In fact,
energy production and supply require lots of energy: when household de-
mand less energy, less energy is supplied, and energy producers/suppliers
reduce their energy use. For these reasons, the output of energy sectors
decreases by 0.41%. Moreover, the initial reduction in demand for energy
(as efficiency increases) causes a reduction in the return on capital in en-
ergy supply so that, over time, energy suppliers reduce their capacity.
This is what Turner (2009) calls the ‘disinvestment’ effect.
This can be clearly seen in Figure 3.3 where I plot the shadow price
of capital for the energy sectors and the replacement cost of capital. In
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Figure 3.3: Transitions of shadow price of capital in energy
sectors and replacement cost of capital
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the short-run the shadow price of capital of each sectors drops below
the replacement cost of capital, so that Tobin’s q is lower than 1 and
therefore the cost of replacing the capital is higher than the value of the
stock, and it is not profitable to invest. Over time, the price of energy
rises again, allowing the shadow price of capital to recover and converge
asymptotically to the replacement cost of capital, so that Tobin’s q again
approaches unity. Because of the net contraction in industrial energy use,
the overall long-run economy-wide rebound effect (50.08%), is smaller
than the general equilibrium household rebound effect (70.33%).
Interesting insights can be obtained by disaggregating the rebound
effects for each energy sector using equation (3.10). In Figure 3.4 I plot
household and economy-wide rebound effects disaggregated into coal, re-
fined oil electricity and gas. There is significant variation in the economy-
wide rebound in the use of different types of energy, reflecting the different
composition in the energy used in the production side of the economy.
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Figure 3.4: Long-run Households and Economy-Wide Rebound
Effects in Scenario 1
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The economy-wide rebound in the use of electricity and gas is higher
than the total economy-wide rebound, while refined oil rebound it is
lower. There is a negative rebound in the use of coal, implying that the
energy saved in this sector is higher than the expected savings. It is
important to notice that household and firms do not usually consume
coal directly, but rather they consume electricity produced by coal-fired
power stations. When the demand for electricity drops, power stations
cut the demand for coal, and this dramatically reduces the use of such
fuel, explaining the negative rebound.
Results from Scenario 1 appear to be in line with findings in Lecca
et al. (2014a). However, given the higher degree of openness of the goods
market of regions, exports decrease in Scotland by more than in the na-
tional case.11 The increase in household energy efficiency yields a double
11In the UK case, exports decrease by 0.08 in the short run and 0.04 in the long
run (Lecca et al., 2014a).
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dividend or multiple benefit of increased economic activity (and employ-
ment) and a reduction in total energy use across all simulations in Sce-
nario 1.
3.5.2 Scenario 2: the standard model with migra-
tion
In this Scenario I repeat the simulations of Scenario 1, but include the mi-
gration function described by equation (3.5). Results for key variables are
reported in Table 3.3. To facilitate the comparison to the no-migration
case, I add a fourth column reminding us of the long-run results from
Scenario 1. Short-run results are quite close to the previous case, be-
cause there is no migration in the first period, therefore a comparison is
not necessary.12
In the long-run there is a higher increase in GDP (0.17%), reflecting
the higher level of capital stock (0.17%) and employment (0.18%). The
differences are driven by the effect of the net in-migration triggered by the
initial drop in the unemployment rate and by the rise in the real wage.
Following the energy efficiency improvement, workers start to migrate
into the region in response to wage and unemployment differentials from
the second period. This puts downward pressure on wages, and increases
the unemployment rate according to the wage setting curve (equation
3.4). The dynamics of these variables can be seen in Figure 3.5 where I
plot the time path of the real wage, unemployment, cpi and exports.
The real wage falls and the unemployment rate increases until they
12Short-run results are not exactly the same of Scenario 1 as in this model I have
forward-looking agents, therefore some of the effects of migration are anticipated.
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Table 3.3: % change in the key economic variables in Scenario
2
Elasticity of substitution ε SR ε LR ε LR
Time period Short-run Long-run LR Sc.1
GDP 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.11
Consumer Price Index 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.04
Unemployment Rate -0.24 -0.20 0.00 -0.45
Total Employment 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.11
Nominal Gross Wage 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.09
Real Gross Wage 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.05
Households’ Consumption 0.30 0.30 0.42 0.40
Investments 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.11
Export -0.12 -0.11 0.00 -0.06
Non-Energy Output 0.07 0.06 0.19 0.14
Energy Output -0.41 -0.23 -0.41 -0.46
Energy Use -0.89 -0.48 -0.57 -0.61
Energy Demand in Production -0.22 -0.12 -0.24 -0.30
Households’ Consumption of Energy -2.70 -1.45 -1.47 -1.48
Households’ Consumption of non-Energy 0.49 0.41 0.54 0.52
Household Rebound 46.03 70.94 70.51 70.33
Economy-wide Rebound 27.65 61.22 53.48 50.08
both approach zero, when the labour market reaches its long-run equilib-
rium. Similarly, the cpi returns to its base year value, allowing exports to
increase again until the original competitiveness is completely restored.
This is a crucial result, because it shows that unlike in Scenario 1 and
in Lecca et al. (2014a), where the higher cpi crowds out exports, in a
regional economy with free movement of workers, and flow migration,
this negative effect on international competitiveness disappears in the
long-run, due to the effect of migration on prices.
The restored long-run competitiveness contributes to give additional
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Figure 3.5: Adjustment path of cpi, unemployment rate, nomi-
nal wage and exports
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momentum to the economic stimulus. This is reflected in a rise in output
of non energy sectors of 0.19%. But because these activities use energy as
an input in production, the energy output reduction is slightly less than
in previous scenario, likewise the decrease in total energy use. On the
other hand, household energy consumption decreases by 1.47%, which is
quite close to the outcome in Scenario 1. This is because the lower real
wage decrease household’s labour income, partly mitigating the response
in consumption. For this reasons, only the calculated economy-wide re-
bound effect is higher, (53.5%), while the household rebound is hardly
affected.
The zero variation in prices over the long-run indicates a pure de-
mand response to the introduction of the energy efficiency improvement,
similar to what we would expect in an Input-Output modelling frame-
work (McGregor et al., 1996). The economic expansion observed in this
Scenario is entirely demand-driven. Again, the increase in household en-
ergy efficiency generates a double dividend, although here with a greater
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stimulus to economic activity and smaller fall in total energy use than in
Scenario 1.
3.5.3 Scenario 3: the model with adjusted cpi and
no migration
In Scenarios 1 and 2, the energy efficiency improvement is modelled so as
to reflect a simple change in consumer’s taste, with the macroeconomic
effects being driven by the change in consumption patterns.
Here I consider the case where the increase in household energy ef-
ficiency use is reflected in an overall reduction in the cost of living, by
adjusting the cpi to include the price of energy calculated in efficiency
units according to equations (3.11) and (3.12).
Key results for this case are summarised in Table 3.4. Unlike Scenario
1, where the cpi increases immediately and remains above the initial level
for all 50 periods, and Scenario 2 where it returns to its base year value
in the long-run, here the cpi decreases both in the short-run and in the
long-run, given the lower price of energy in efficiency units. Consequently
the nominal wage decreases by 0.16% in the short-run and by 0.22% in
the long-run, but because of the lower cpi the real wage increases by 0.9%
and 0.16% respectively.
The lower price of goods produced domestically stimulates the de-
mand for Scottish goods from the rest of UK and the rest of the World,
and although in the short-run exports fall by 0.5% (which is less than
what we observed in Scenarios 1 and 2), in the long-run they increase by
0.16%. This difference is crucial in terms of comparison with the stan-
dard case, because it shows that when the energy efficiency improvement
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Table 3.4: % change in the key economic variables in Scenario
3
Elasticity of substitution ε SR ε LR ε LR
Time period Short-run Long-run
GDP 0.12 0.12 0.33
Consumer Price Index -0.25 -0.26 -0.38
Unemployment Rate -0.80 -0.76 -1.38
Total Employment 0.20 0.19 0.34
Nominal Gross Wage -0.16 -0.17 -0.22
Real Gross Wage 0.09 0.09 0.16
Households’ Consumption 0.30 0.30 0.47
Investments 0.44 0.46 0.32
Export -0.05 -0.05 0.16
Non-Energy Output 0.15 0.14 0.34
Energy Output -0.38 -0.20 -0.28
Energy Use -0.85 -0.44 -0.46
Energy Demand in Production -0.17 -0.07 -0.10
Households’ Consumption of Energy -2.71 -1.48 -1.45
Households’ Consumption of non-Energy 0.50 0.41 0.59
Household Rebound 45.74 70.39 71.07
Economy-wide Rebound 31.00 63.76 63.00
is reflected in less pressure for higher wages, we have a long-run increase
in competitiveness, similarly to Allan et al. (2007) and Turner (2009)
which focus on industrial energy efficiency. It is also important to no-
tice that, given the greater openess of the goods market of regions, the
long-run increase in exports is significantly higher than that reported in
Lecca et al. (2014a).
The increase in competitiveness along with the switch in the aggregate
demand triggers a bigger economic stimulus that is reflected in most of
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the key macroeconomic indicators. For example, investment increases by
0.44% in the short-run and 0.32% in the long-run. Consequently, the
increase in labour and capital used in production has a positive effect on
output which increases by 0.12% in the short-run and by 0.33% in the
long-run.13
There is a higher demand for energy by industry sectors. Intuitively,
when the production of goods and services increases, industry consumes
more energy in the production process. However, in the household sector
the decrease in energy consumption is in line with what was reported
for Scenarios 1 and 2. For this reason, the household rebound is only
around 0.5% higher than the standard no migration case. However, the
economy wide rebound is higher in Scenario 3, both in the short-run
(31%) and in the long-run (63%), reflecting the higher use of energy for
industrial purposes. This suggests that the bigger stimulus to economic
activity observed in Scenario 3 results in overall a higher use of energy
and calculated rebound effect, although there is still a double dividend
in that economic activity rises while energy use falls.
Again, here we may argue that in fact there are multiple dividend
or benefits from energy efficiency. First, energy efficiency improvements
reduce to some extent final energy demand. Second, it increase household
income, reducing poverty and fuel poverty and stimulating the aggregate
demand. Third, the demand stimulus has an impact on other sectors
of the economy (multiple benefits). These are enhanced when the cpi is
adjusted to reflect the reduction in prices of energy in efficiency units.
13In Lecca et al. (2014a) GDP increases by 0.1 in the short-run and 0.24 in the
long-run.
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3.5.4 Scenario 4 : the case of migration and ad-
justed cpi
In the final case, I include both the adjusted cpi, equations (3.11) and
(3.12), and the migration function, equation (3.5). Results from these
simulations are reported in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: % change in the key economic variables in Scenario
4
Elasticity of substitution ε SR ε LR ε LR
Time period Short-run Long-run
GDP 0.12 0.11 0.53
Consumer Price Index -0.27 -0.28 -0.49
Unemployment Rate -0.77 -0.73 0.00
Total Employment 0.19 0.18 0.54
Nominal Gross Wage -0.18 -0.19 -0.49
Real Gross Wage 0.09 0.08 0.00
Households’ Consumption 0.22 0.22 0.53
Investments 0.46 0.47 0.50
Export -0.03 -0.02 0.35
Non-Energy Output 0.14 0.13 0.51
Energy Output -0.38 -0.18 -0.07
Energy Use -0.88 -0.42 -0.26
Energy Demand in Production -0.18 -0.06 0.10
Households’ Consumption of Energy -2.79 -1.55 -1.27
Households’ Consumption of non-Energy 0.41 0.33 0.65
Household Rebound 44.17 71.62 74.53
Economy-wide Rebound 28.38 65.36 78.59
In this case, I observe the greatest economic expansion, reflected in
most of the macroeconomic indicators. GDP rises by 0.53% in the long-
run, driven by a 0.5% increase in capital stock and 0.54% in employment.
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The latter is determined by the combined effects of migration and ad-
justed cpi on the labour market.
In the short-run, unemployment decreases by 0.77%, and although the
nominal wage falls by 0.18%, the real wage increases by 0.09%, because
of the lower cpi. This triggers interregional net in-migration. Similarly to
Scenario 2, the real wage and the unemployment rate start to adjust until
they converge to their initial level in the long-run. This is different from
the adjusted cpi case with no migration, where in absence of additional
workers from abroad the unemployment rate drops by 1.48% in the long-
run. However, in this case the cpi does not return to zero in the long-run,
but it behaves as in Scenario 3, decreasing in the long-run by 0.49%.
The lower cpi encourages individuals to consume more. Household’s
consumption increases by 0.22% in the short-run, and by 0.53% in the
long-run. Because goods produced in Scotland become cheaper for foreign
buyers, there is a by 0.35% long-run increase in exports, similarly to
Scenario 3.
The increased competitiveness, along with the shift in domestic aggre-
gate demand, puts upward pressure on the demand for energy in all the
productive sectors. In the long-run, energy output decreases by 0.07%,
and the overall use of energy in the economy decreases by 0.26%, due to
a drop in household energy consumption by 1.27%. However, industries
raise their energy demand, and unlike all the other scenarios there is a
long-run increase in industrial energy use (by 0.1%) . This is the most
interesting result of this Scenario because it underlines that under certain
conditions, an increase in energy efficiency in the household sector may
lead to an actual increase in industrial energy consumption.
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In Figure 3.6 I plot long-run investment in gas, refined oil, coal and
electricity in the four Scenarios. In the first three cases investments are
negative in all the energy sectors due to the disinvestment effect described
in Scenario 1 (Turner, 2009). However, in Scenario 4 the contraction in
investment is lower in gas, coal and electricity, but investment is positive
in the oil sector, which is quite important in the Scottish economy.
Figure 3.6: Long-run investment in the energy sectors
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Because energy used by industries increases in the long-run, the long-
run economy-wide rebound effect is higher (though marginally) than the
household rebound effect, exactly as we would expect (giving equation
(3.9)).
In Figure 3.7 I plot the household’s and economy-wide rebound effect
disaggregate by energy sectors. The economy-wide rebound in oil and
electricity is higher than the household rebound, reflecting the rise in
the use of these fuels in industry. Unlike Scenario 1, where I observed a
negative rebound in the coal sector, (see Figure 3.4), in this case there is
a positive 27.9% economy-wide rebound indicating a rise in the demand
for such fuel, but there is again a double dividend.
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Figure 3.7: Long-run Household and Economy-Wide Rebound
Effects by energy sectors in Scenario 4
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3.6 Discussion: trading-off economic ben-
efits and rebound
Results from the four Scenarios show that increasing household energy
efficiency in Scotland by 5% does stimulate the Scottish economy. How-
ever, there is a clear trade-off between economic benefits and achieved
energy savings, which varies across scenarios, depending on whether the
efficiency improvement influences the cpi and the wage bargaining pro-
cess, and whether there is migration.
Table 3.6 summarises the calculated long-run rebound and household
rebound effects, and the long-run percentage change in GDP in the four
cases. In Scenario 1, with the standard cpi and no migration, the eco-
nomic expansion is triggered by a pure demand shock, which puts upward
pressure on domestic prices, crowding out exports. In this case, the cal-
culated household rebound effect is 70.33%, which reduces to 50.08%
when the whole economy is considered, so that, overall, 50.08% of the
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Table 3.6: Long-run economy wide rebound, household re-
bound, and percentage change in GDP under the four Scenarios
No migration Migration
RC RT GDP RC RT GDP
Standard cpi 70.33 50.08 0.11 70.51 53.48 0.17
Adjusted cpi 71.07 63.00 0.33 74.53 78.59 0.53
5% expected energy savings will be offset by increased energy demand.
In this Scenario, GDP increases by 0.11%.
In Scenario 2, the energy efficiency change delivers again what is
effectively a pure demand shock, with no changes in competitiveness the
long-run, further stimulating economic activity. This results in a greater
increase in GDP of 0.17%. For this reason, while the household rebound
is quite close to the level of Scenario 1, the overall rebound increases to
53.48%, reflecting a higher energy demand by industries.
In Scenario 3, where the cpi is adjusted to include the price of energy
in efficiency units, but there is no migration, I observe an increase in
competitiveness in the long-run and the type of stimulus is similar to the
productivity-led growth observed in previous work focussed on energy
efficiency in production (Allan et al., 2007; Turner, 2009). In this case,
the household rebound effect is 71.07%, very close to Scenarios 1 and 2.
However, given the stimulus to supply, industries demand more energy,
delivering an overall rebound of 63%, and a 0.33% rise in GDP, which is
greater than Scenarios 1 and 2.
Lastly, in Scenario 4, the combination of the adjusted cpi and mi-
gration causes the largest supply side response, reproducing again the
characteristics of a productivity-led stimulus, and triggering the great-
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est economic expansion. In fact, GDP rises by 0.53% and as we would
expect, the economy wide-rebound is 78.6%, which is higher than the
household’s rebound.
The trade-off between economic benefits and energy demand reduction
is reflected in the fact that the higher is the economic stimulus received
from the more efficient use of energy the higher is the rebound effect.
However, in none of these scenarios does the calculated rebound effect
offset completely the expected energy reduction (i.e there is no ‘backfire’
effect), indicating that increasing energy efficiency typically generate a
double dividend of an increase in economic activity and a reduction in
energy use. Nonetheless, the stronger the economic stimulus, the smaller
the reduction in energy use and the greater the extent of rebound.
3.7 Towards new fiscal powers for Scotland
In all the Scenarios above, we have treated Scotland as a regional economy
that has no devolved taxes, which was the case until very recently. In
these circumstances Government expenditure is entirely exogenous and
tax revenues accrue to the central Government in Westminster.
However, with the gradual devolution of fiscal powers from UK to
Scotland, this will be an increasingly inaccurate representation of the
Scottish fiscal framework. Given that we are still in a transition period,
here I illustrate the key principles by focussing on the simple case where
the Scottish Government maintains a fixed government budget according
to this simple relation:14
14This is a simplified version of Equation (C56) in Appendix A.
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GOV BALt = GYt −GEXPt (3.13)
Equation (3.13) indicates that at each period the Government’s bud-
get GOV BAL is equal to Government income, GY , minus Government
expenditure, GEXP . In order to keep GOV BAL constant the Gov-
ernment can either increase/decrease its income by varying the rate
of income tax or increase/decrease its current expenditure. I assume
that whenever Government expenditure varies, the change is distributed
across sectors, according to the baseline Government’s expenditure shares.
To illustrate the implications of introducing a balanced budget con-
straint in the Scottish Economy I repeat the simulations of Scenario 1,
which reflects a 5% increase in household’s energy efficiency assuming no
interregional migration.
I explore 3 sub-scenarios, FIXGOV, FIXBAL, TAX. The FIXGOV
Scenario replicates Scenario 1 by assuming fixed Government expenditure
with tax revenues accruing to Westminster. In the FIXBAL case I assume
that tax revenues are devolved and the Scottish Government maintains
a given fiscal balance by varying public expenditure in response to any
changes in tax revenues. In the TAX scenario I assume that the any
stimulus to the economy, and to tax revenues, is used to reduce the
income tax rate so as to maintain a fixed fiscal balance.
FIXGOV results are reported in the first column of Table 3.7. The
economic stimulus from the improved household’s energy efficiency gen-
erates additional tax revenue for the Scottish Government. However, be-
cause the expenditure is fixed and revenues accrue to the UK, not to the
Scottish Government, the Scottish Government’s fiscal balance increases
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Table 3.7: Comparing impacts of a 5% increase in household
energy efficiency under different fiscal regimes
FIXGOV FIXBAL TAX
SR LR SR LR SR LR
GDP 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.19
Consumer Price Index 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.02
Unemployment rate -0.25 -0.45 -0.32 -0.61 -0.34 -0.76
Total employment 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.19
Nominal Gross Wage 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.04
Real Gross Wage 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.09
Household’s Consumption 0.33 0.40 0.37 0.44 0.41 0.52
Investment 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.19
Exports -0.13 -0.06 -0.15 -0.08 -0.15 -0.03
Non-Energy Output 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.21
Energy Output -0.41 -0.46 -0.41 -0.46 -0.40 -0.39
Energy Use -0.88 -0.61 -0.86 -0.59 -0.85 -0.52
Energy Demand by Industries -0.22 -0.30 -0.22 -0.28 -0.21 -0.22
Households’ Energy Consumption -2.67 -1.48 -2.63 -1.44 -2.60 -1.37
Government Expenditure - - 0.06 0.16 - -
Government Balance 56.7 124.8 - - - -
Income Tax - - - - -0.10 -0.26
Household Rebound 46.57 70.33 47.32 71.10 48.08 72.66
Economy Wide Rebound 28.40 50.09 29.53 51.80 30.82 57.40
Energy productivity 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.79 0.78
both in the short-run and in the long-run.
In the FIXBAL case, the additional income is used to increase the
Scottish Government’s current expenditure by 0.06% in the short-run
and 0.16% in the long-run. The additional resources are now recycled
into the economic system under the form of additional demand, further
stimulating the economy. For this reason GDP increases by more than in
the FIXGOV case, both in the short-run (by 0.05%) and in the long-run
(by 0.14%). Similarly we observe a greater increase in employment, in-
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vestment and output from industries. The additional government spend-
ing puts additional pressure on domestic prices, further reducing exports.
Consistently with what we observed in the other Scenarios of this paper,
the greater economic expansion is also associated with bigger rebound
effects.
Finally, in the TAX case, the results of which are reported in the
third column of Table 3.7, the Government uses the additional resources
to reduce the income tax rate. In this case we have a simultaneous
demand and supply stimulus.
Firstly, tax reduction increases household’s disposable income so that
consumption rises by 0.41% in the short-run and 0.52% in the long-run.
Secondly, the reduced taxation increases the post-tax real consumption
wage, so that there is downward pressure on wage bargaining, reducing
the price of labour and stimulating employment and production. The
long-run nominal wage increases by 0.04% while it was 0.09% in the
standard case. However, the real wage increases by 0.09% which is more
that the FIXGOV and FIXBAL scenarios.
Because production is stimulated by the lower price of labour, in-
dustries produce more output, increasing also the use of other inputs,
including energy. For this reason, the economy wide rebound is sub-
stantially higher than in the FIXGOV case, especially in the long-run
(57.4%).
3.8 Conclusions
The simulation results reported in this paper lead me to five general
conclusions.
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First, increasing energy efficiency in Scottish households stimulates
the regional economy. However, the scale and nature of the stimulus
differs depending on the precise specification of the shock. The key issue
here is whether the cpi is adjusted to reflect the lower price of an efficiency
unit of energy. If the cpi is not adjusted the stimulus to the economy
from the increase in household energy efficiency takes the form of a pure
demand shock; if the adjusted cpi is relevant there is a simultaneous
demand and supply side stimulus.
Second, moving from a national to a regional context, in particular
by opening the labour market to migration typically results in a greater
economic stimulus, because it recovers the initial loss in competitiveness
in the long-run. Even if migration is insufficient to fully restore initial
wage and unemployment rates, the direction of the impact would be the
same: the presence of migration reinforces the impact of any demand or
supply side stimulus on the economy.
Third, the stimulus to household energy efficiency always reduces en-
ergy consumption. So household energy efficiency increases typically de-
liver a double dividend of reductions in energy demands (and emissions)
and increases in economic activity. However, when the economic expan-
sion is higher, the difference between potential energy savings and actual
energy savings (rebound effects) is also higher, indicating a trade-off be-
tween actual energy savings and economy benefits. So energy efficiency
stimuli do help with the achievement of energy or emission targets, but
the extent to which it does so is generally inversely related to scale of the
associated economic expansion.
Fourth, the greater regional fiscal autonomy reinforces the economic
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stimulus, since in this case increases in regional economic activity stim-
ulate the regional Government’s tax revenues. In fact, these can be used
either to increase public spending, or to reduce Scottish tax rates. How-
ever, greater autonomy therefore also implies that the extent of energy
saving will be reduced. This is significant given that Scotland is in the
process of acquiring a substantially enhanced degree of fiscal autonomy.
Finally, the triggers of the rebound effect are typically the drivers
of the economic stimulus. Further investigations should explore ways to
minimise the magnitude of the rebound effect, without sacrificing the
gains in terms of economic welfare.
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Chapter 4
Making the case for
supporting broad energy
efficiency programmes:
impacts on household incomes
and other economic benefits
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4.1 Introduction
In recent years the literature on the wider economic impacts of energy
efficiency improvements has tended to focus on the issue of rebound ef-
fects. In particular, rebound studies have mainly focussed on measuring
direct and indirect (‘re-spending’) rebound effects using microeconomic
or limited input-output economy-wide models (see for example Chitnis
and Sorrell, 2015; Druckman et al., 2011; Freire-Gonza´lez, 2011). Where
different household income groups are identified, emphasis has tended to
be placed on how rebound effects are driven by changes in real income
following an energy efficiency improvement, that will be bigger the larger
the share of total income that is spent on energy consumption (Chitnis
et al., 2014; Murray, 2013; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013).
However, certainly in colder climates like that of the UK, where lower
income households tend to spend a larger share of their income on energy
(Office for National Statistics, 2011, 2012, 2013) there are concerns over
energy or fuel poverty (DECC, 2015).1 This both raises a challenge for
the rebound-focussed literature, in that direct rebound effects triggered
by lower energy costs may in fact be a true representation of required
demand (to adequately heat properties), and focuses attention on the
nature of socio-economic returns from increased energy efficiency.
The latter point reflects the ‘multiple benefits of energy efficiency’
argument proposed by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014). In
particular the current paper focuses attention on the sustained added
1In warmer climates, cooling may be a greater concern than heating but the ex-
pense of running air conditioning systems may deter low income households from
investing in systems, so that expenditure on cooling does not manifest in economic
statistics in the same way as energy poverty linked to heating.
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value to the economy that is created as result of ‘investing’ in increased
energy efficiency. I consider this in the context of a general equilibrium
argument. That is, I propose that the increase in GDP and economic
activity more generally that is triggered by increased energy efficiency
(here in the household sector) delivers more in terms of energy poverty
reduction than the efficiency improvement itself.2 This is through the
additional return to household incomes as the economy expands. The
larger and more wide-ranging the boost to household energy efficiency,
the greater the economic expansion and associated returns are likely to
be.
I also consider a government funding argument, that public support
should be directed at helping those less able to pay for energy efficiency
improvements themselves. Specifically, I consider whether economic ex-
pansion triggered by more wide ranging support of energy efficiency pro-
grammes is likely to provide sufficient payback to justify greater levels of
public support. This may also provide the basis for setting energy effi-
ciency programmes in the context of a national infrastructure argument
linked to improving the quality of a country’s domestic building stock.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 re-
views the recent indirect and economy-wide rebound literature that has
been the recent setting for considering the impacts of increased efficiency
in household energy use. I focus on the extent to which wider economic
expansionary and socio-economic arguments have been made. Section
2Note that in this paper I do not attempt to investigate impacts on precise measures
of energy or fuel poverty currently adopted in the UK. At this stage, in this general
analysis, I focus simply on whether the share of disposable income spent on energy
goes up or down.
94
4.3 then focuses attention on the policy context for identifying the issues
outlined above, expanding on the multiple benefits, general equilibrium
and public funding/national infrastructure arguments. Section 4.4 de-
scribes the UK CGE model that I use to consider the general effects that
may be anticipated if energy efficiency increases in one or more household
income groups in an economy. Section 4.5 details the simulation scenarios
that are then implemented in Section 4.6, where I discuss the results. In
Section 4.7 I test the sensitivity of the results to the assumption of a com-
mon elasticity of substitution across different household income groups.
Finally, Section 4.8 draws conclusions and considers policy implications.
4.2 Existing literature on the wider impacts
of energy efficiency
In recent years a number of studies have analysed the impact of improved
household energy efficiency using microeconomic demand systems, and
input-output (IO) techniques. Their main focus has been the estimation
of direct and indirect rebound effects (see for example Bra¨nnlund et al.,
2007; Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Freire-Gonza´lez, 2011; Lenzen and Dey,
2002; Mizobuchi, 2008).
More broadly, the main objective of this literature is to assess the
effectiveness of energy efficiency, specifically in reducing energy use and
CO2 emissions throughout the economy triggered by a reduction in final
energy demand. For this reason, they estimate the rebound effect as a
measure of the extent to which technically possible energy savings are
eroded by economic responses.
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Some of these studies have estimated energy rebound effects by con-
sidering the impacts of energy efficiency and energy saving behavioural
changes across different household income groups (Chitnis et al., 2014;
Murray, 2013; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). In this context, a common
finding is that the lowest income groups tend to be associated with higher
rebound effects. This is for two reasons. First, lower income groups tend
to spend a larger share of their income on energy. Second, the price
elasticity of demand for energy goods is generally higher when income
is lower, indicating that lower income households are more responsive to
changes in energy price (Chitnis et al., 2014). When the price of energy
in efficiency units decreases due to an increase in energy efficiency, price
elastic groups respond by consuming more energy.
However, a key limitation of the approaches adopted in the aforemen-
tioned studies is to rely on models that implicitly or explicitly adopt the
assumption of fixed market prices and nominal incomes. Such models
are not able to capture the full set of economic responses triggered by
an energy efficiency improvement that will occur as the economy adjusts
to a new steady state with different spending and production decisions.
Thus, they are limited in their capability to identify other potential bene-
fits of energy efficiency (Bra¨nnlund et al., 2007; Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015;
Lecca et al., 2014a).
Duarte et al. (2016) and Lecca et al. (2014a) have estimated the im-
pact of improving energy efficiency in household energy use using more
flexible computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that incorporate
IO data but permit the relaxation of the assumptions inherent in partial
equilibrium and IO studies. Specifically, Lecca et al. (2014a) take the
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case of the UK and explores the value added of moving from a partial
to a general equilibrium modelling framework (via an intermediate stage
involving IO analysis) in the analysis of energy efficiency improvement.
This is done by considering the impact of a 5% increase in household
energy efficiency using models with different degrees of complexity cali-
brated on a common database.
Lecca et al. (2014a) initially estimate the direct rebound effect by
estimating the elasticity of demand for energy goods and then derive the
indirect (re-spending) rebound effects using IO techniques. They find
that the indirect component of rebound is typically negative when the
direct rebound is less than 100% and the economy is characterised by en-
ergy sectors that are relatively energy intensive. In their UK case study,
households decrease their demand for energy and reallocate spending
towards less energy intensive non-energy goods, thereby reducing both
direct energy use and energy embodied in supply chains supporting con-
sumption demand. These net negative indirect effects persist when Lecca
et al. (2014a) derive the full economy-wide rebound using a CGE model.
However, here the fuller economy-wide responses to the energy efficiency
improvement are influenced by endogenous market price determination,
nominal income and supply responses. This implies, for example, that
the initial drop in demand for energy decreases the market price of energy
in the short-run, exacerbating the rebound effect by amplifying the de-
crease in the price of energy services (for any given market price), which
may be considered as the effective price of energy. However, it also nega-
tively influences the revenue and capacity decisions of energy producing
firms and, over time, their output prices (i.e. countering decreases in
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both the effective and market price of energy). Moreover, the increase
in demand for non-energy goods puts upward pressure on domestic con-
sumption prices, negatively influencing competitiveness of UK industries.
Nonetheless, overall the Lecca et al. (2014a) results show a net expan-
sion in the UK economy, with an increase in investment, employment
and household spending. However, with a fixed national labour supply,
depending on how households respond to the change in cost of living
given by increased energy efficiency, a sustained increase in wages may
give rise to a higher price level and reduced export demand.
The Lecca et al. (2014a) contribution helps to clarify the importance
of analysing the full general equilibrium impacts of increased household
energy efficiency. However, it is limited in only considering one single rep-
resentative household, thereby not permitting any differentiation among
household income groups. However, differences in the composition of
both incomes and expenditures are likely to be crucial in influencing
the distribution of the effects of economic adjustment across household
income groups. Here, heterogeneity of households proves to be very im-
portant from a policy perspective.
Duarte et al. (2016) also use a CGE model, this time for Spain, to
assess a range of energy-saving policies including increasing energy ef-
ficiency, but identifying four household income groups. They actually
find that lower income household are less responsive to an energy effi-
ciency improvement, and indeed are associated with lower rebound ef-
fects.3 However, the main point is that, although the focus of the work
3This may relate to the issue of cooling vs. heating and that in warmer climates,
such as Spain, low income households cannot afford more electricity-intensive systems
such as air conditioning.
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is on potential reduction of CO2 emissions, Duarte et al.’s (2016) results
also show that an energy efficiency improvement delivers an economic
stimulus with a broader set of outcomes than reducing energy use.
In general, though, much of the rebound literature neglects the wider
range of potential economic benefits associated with increased energy
efficiency that have been the focus of policy community contributions
such as the IEA (2014) report. In response, this paper aims to add to
the energy efficiency and CGE literature in filling this gap by exploring
the wider impacts of household energy efficiency improvements in more
detail, and to do so with specific focus on identifying different impacts
among household income groups. In particular I focus on how support
of energy efficiency programmes in the household sector may be justified
through ‘pay back’ delivered by macroeconomic expansion.
4.3 Issues for a policy context
If we broaden the focus from estimating rebound effects of increased en-
ergy efficiency more carefully to consider the processes that drive them,
we implicitly turn attention to what has become known as the multiple
benefits argument. While this specific terminology originates with the
IEA (2014), arguments and evidence that energy efficiency will enhance
economic welfare in a range of ways, including as a result of macroe-
conomic expansion, have been considered in other studies, notably (in
terms of reflecting on the recent dominant focus on rebound effects) in
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the recent contribution by Gillingham et al. (2016).4
In the current paper, I build on previous CGE studies of increased
household energy efficiency to consider the wider economic impacts that
fall under the multiple benefits umbrella. In particular, I focus on a
general equilibrium argument that economic expansion will potentially
deliver more in terms of individual household economic well-being than
the initial improvement in energy efficiency. That is, when the economy
expands (through increased investment, employment and output) as a
result of increased and reallocated real household spending, increased in-
comes from employment of labour and capital services will further boost
household incomes.5 In an energy poverty context, while the expansion-
ary process will trigger further rebound in household use (as well as in
the production sector of the economy), this must be set against increased
household incomes (and benefits).
Thus, one implication of this general equilibrium argument is that
support of energy efficiency will deliver on more than just the outcome
of reducing energy use (and related carbon emissions). Rather, by stim-
ulating economic expansionary processes, it will further boost incomes
throughout the economy and potentially deliver a level of pay back that
would justify the public support required to allow the efficiency improve-
4Chan and Gillingham (2015) also provide an analytical exposition of how rebound
effects will have positive welfare implications at the microeconomic level.
5As I show in the CGE simulations reported in Section 6, where there is any
constraint on the supply-side of the economy (e.g. restricted national labour supply)
a demand-led expansion will put upward pressure on prices and potentially damage
competitiveness. While this may benefit household incomes through higher wage
rates, any loss in competitiveness will limit the extent of economic expansion over
time. Where the expansion is triggered by increased energy efficiency this may be
mitigated if households reflect the change in their cost of living in wage demands.
This is explored in Chapter 3 and to some extent in Chapter 5.
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ment to occur.
However, it may be argued that macroeconomic expansion can be
delivered through other policies and that, where energy efficiency policy
requires the support of the public purse, focus should be on helping those
households who are currently unable to heat6 their homes sufficiently.
While the general equilibrium argument above implies that that the more
wide-ranging the energy efficiency improvement, the greater will be the
benefit to all households, it is necessary to consider whether restrictions
on the government budget may erode the multiple benefits. That is,
a government funding argument must also be considered. In the UK
analysis below, I consider the context of a government that requires to
maintain a fixed public sector deficit so that any support for energy
efficiency programmes must be of a balanced-budget nature. That is
to say that the funding for such programmes must come either from
a reallocation of existing public spending or a change in tax revenues,
at least in the short-term (until the costs of introducing the efficiency
improvement have been recovered).
The key issue, then, is whether the resulting expansion is still large
enough to compensate for the impacts of falling government expenditure
(in the areas where spending is reduced) or the distortions triggered by
increasing tax rates in part(s) of the economy. In turn, this is again likely
to depend on how extensive the efficiency improvement is and what type
and level of spending activity (the trigger for demand-led expansion) oc-
curs as a result of freed up (and increased) household (real) disposable in-
comes. If the efficiency improvement is limited to low income households,
6Or, in the context of warmer climates, to cool.
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it must be recognised that these households are (a) a more limited source
of spending power, and (b) less sensitive to the wage and capital incomes
generated by economic expansion, given their greater dependence upon
publicly funded benefits. Stimulating higher income households, on the
other hand, may free up much more spending on non-energy goods and
services and deliver greater benefits through increased wage and capital
incomes.7
This latter point may ultimately support a national infrastructure
argument. If it can be shown that the economic stimulus generated by
support of wider-ranging energy efficiency programmes is likely to de-
liver sufficient pay back to justify the initial levels of funding required,
then arguments for strategic investment in energy efficiency can be more
solidly made. On this basis, the type of quite generalised analysis I offer
below is intended as a first step in impacting policy discussion around
focussing attention on the broader value added/benefits of, for example,
making buildings more energy efficient.
4.4 Model and Data
I simulate the economy-wide and macroeconomic impacts of improving
household energy efficiency using a variant of the UK CGE model UK-
ENVI.8 For the specific application in this paper, I assume that invest-
7Of course, in practice differences in propensities to consume and potential for
further improvement in what may already be relatively energy efficient higher income
homes (where efficiency in the use of luxury appliances may be a greater issue than
heating/insulation) would have to be considered in any practical case study.
8UK-ENVI is a CGE modelling framework designed for the analysis of economic
disturbances to the UK economy. The ENVI version is dedicated to the analysis of
energy and environmental policies.
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ments are made by profit maximising forward-looking agents while (here
five) representative households (distinguished as income quintile groups)
are myopic. This is intended to capture the notion that consumers do
not behave as if they are all rational economic men, as is often assumed
by economic modellers. In particular, households tend to be rather my-
opic, in contrast to firms, and base their spending decisions more on
current income availability rather than on future discounted utility of
consumption.9 In the following sections I provide a description of the
main characteristics of the model.10
4.4.1 Consumption
I model the consumption decision of five representative households h as
follows:
Ch,t = Y NGh,t − SAVh,t −HTAXh,t − CTAXh,t (4.1)
In (4.1) total consumption C is a function of income Y NG, savings
SAV , income taxes HTAX, and taxes on consumption CTAX.
At each period in time, each household allocates its consumption be-
tween energy used for residential purposes, EC, and non-energy goods
and transport (including fuel use in personal transportation), TNEC,
according to the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) func-
tion:
9It could be argued that lower income households are more myopic than higher
income households. Although this is a reasonable observation, I assume the same
behaviour for all households given that a) I focus my attention on lower income
households and b) long-run results are identical, regardless of the chosen dynamic.
10The full mathematical description of the model is reported in Appendix A.
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Ch,t =
[
δEh (γECt,h)
εh−1
εh + (1− δEh )TNEC
εh−1
εh
h,t
]− εh
εh−1
(4.2)
In (4.2) ε is the elasticity of substitution in consumption, and mea-
sures the extent to which consumers substitute energy goods, EC, for
non-energy and transport consumption, TNEC, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the share
parameter, and γ is the efficiency parameter of energy consumption. For
simplicity (and in the absence of better information), in all households we
impose a value, 0.61, for ε that is the long-run elasticity of substitution
between energy and non-energy estimated by Lecca et al. (2014a).11
Figure 4.1: The structure of consumption
Consumption
σ = 0.64
Residential
energy
electricity gas coal
transport
and non-ene
transport non energy
The consumption of residential energy includes electricity, gas and
coal, as shown in Figure 4.1, although the share of coal consumed by
households represents less than 0.01% of total energy consumption. Within
the energy bundle, given that I do not focus on inter-fuel substitution in
the analysis below, I impose a small but positive elasticity.
11However, as noted in the analysis below, I have conducted sensitivity analysis
where I introduce different values for different household income groups.
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4.4.2 Production and investment
The production structure is characterised by a capital, labour, energy
and materials (KLEM) nested CES function. As I show in Figure 4.2
the combination of labour and capital forms value added, while energy
and materials form intermediate inputs. In turn, the combination of
intermediate and value added forms total output in each sector.
Figure 4.2: The structure of production
total output
σ = 0.3
Value Added
capital labour
Intermediate
energy material
Following Hayashi (1982), I derive the optimal time path of invest-
ment by maximising the value of firms Vt, subject to a capital accumu-
lation function K˙t, so that:
MaxVt
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1+r
)t
[πt − It (1 + g(xt))]
subject to K˙t = It − δKt
(4.3)
where πt is the firm’s profit, It is private investment, g(xt) is the
adjustment cost function, with xt = It/Kt and δ is depreciation rate.
The solution of the optimisation problem gives us the law of motion of
the shadow price of capital, λt, and the adjusted Tobin’s q time path of
investment (Hayashi, 1982).
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4.4.3 The labour market
Wages are determined within the UK in an imperfect competition setting,
according to the following wage curve:
ln
[
wt
cpit
]
= ϕ− ǫln(ut) (4.4)
where the real consumption (after tax) wage is negatively related to
the rate of unemployment (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2009). In (4.4),
wt
cpit
is the real consumption wage, ϕ is a parameter calibrated to the steady
state, ǫ is the elasticity of wage rate related to the rate of unemployment
u. The working population is assumed to be fixed and exogenous.
4.4.4 Government
The Government collects taxes and spends the revenue on a range of
economic activities. I constrain the Government to maintain a constant
budget balance. This implies that the aggregate fiscal deficit is taken to
be fixed, so that any changes are constrained to be balanced budget in
nature. The given fiscal deficit is maintained by either adjusting taxation
or expenditure as follows:12
GOV BALt = GYt −GEXPt (4.5)
In (4.5) GOV BAL is the government’s budget which is equal to the
difference between government’s revenues from different sources, GY , and
government’s spending GEXP . In the base year GOV BAL is negative,
12This is a simplified version of equation A.40 in the Appendix A.
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indicating a fiscal deficit that I assume to be fixed in the present analysis.
I initially assume that the Government absorbs the budgetary im-
pacts of any change in the economy by adjusting expenditure and keeping
household income tax rates fixed. However, as explained below, I explore
other cases, including where the Government fixes its expenditure and
adjusts the income tax rate.
4.4.5 Dataset, income disaggregation and energy use
I calibrate the UK-ENVI CGE model on the UK Social Accounting Ma-
trix for 2010.13 The data has 30 different productive sectors,14 including
4 main energy supply industries that encompass the supply of coal, re-
fined oil, gas and electricity. The SAM identifies UK households, the UK
Government, imports, exports and transfers to and from the rest of the
World (ROW).
Table 4.1: Quintiles disaggregation in the 2010 UK SAM by
weekly income
HG1 HG2 HG3 HG4 HG5
up to £237 £238 - £412 £413 - £650 £651 - £1,014 £1,015 and over
As noted above (and explained in Appendix E), I use a version of the
SAM in which the household sector is disaggregated into 5 household in-
come quintiles (HG), according to the UK Living Costs and Food Survey.
The income bands are described and related to weekly gross incomes in
13The SAM is produced by the Fraser of Allander Institute and avail-
able for download at http://www.strath.ac.uk/business/economics/
fraserofallanderinstitute/research/economicmodelling/
14See Appendix C for the full list of sectors and the corresponding sectors in the
2010 IO table.
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Table 4.1.
Table 4.2 shows residential energy spending (on electricity, gas and
coal) for each household as percentage of total energy consumption and
of total consumption spending.
Table 4.2: Percentage of energy used for domestic purposes in
total energy consumption and in total consumption
HG1 HG2 HG3 HG4 HG5
Res. energy /Tot. energy 89.6% 85.2% 81.4% 76.2% 69.9%
Res. energy /Tot. cons. 6.7% 5.5% 4.5% 3.8% 2.6%
As would be expected for a country with a colder climate like the UK,
lower income household groups spend a greater share of their budget
on energy. Moreover, the energy expenditure is mostly for residential
(heating and lighting) use. As income increases, the share of energy in
total expenditure decreases, and spending on fuels for transport increases.
4.5 Simulation scenarios
As explained above (Section 4.3), the aim of the simulations in this paper
is consider the general effects of delivering increased energy efficiency in
different household income groups. For this reason, I focus on specifying
and explaining simple and transparent scenarios, rather than attempting
to detail and conduct simulations of particular policy options. I derive
the impact of an illustrative 10% improvement in household residential
energy use by exploring three main Scenarios. Each scenario is divided
into two sub-scenarios: first, a, where I assume that the energy efficiency
improvement occurs in all households, regardless of their income; then,
108
b, where I assume that efficiency improves only in the energy use of the
lowest income quintile household. From above, the latter case is identified
as a priority focus for public spending where energy poverty is an issue
of policy concern.
In Scenario 1 I explore the impact of a 10% costless (and exogenously
determined) improvement in household residential energy efficiency. This
builds on the work of Lecca et al. (2014a), extending that analysis to
explore how the implications of the efficiency enhancement differ across
the five income quintiles, and focussing only on energy used for heating
and lighting (i.e. excluding refined fuel used in personal transportation).
In Scenarios 2 and 3 I consider in broad terms different options
for how Government may fund the increase in energy efficiency. Given
that I do not have information about the likely cost of increasing house-
hold energy efficiency by 10% in UK, I simplify by assuming that the
Government compensates for the difference in household energy expendi-
ture before and after the efficiency increase, for a limited time period (5
years). This is done by including this difference in the expenditure items
of its own budget, as shown below.
(4.6)
GOV BALt = GYt −GEXPt +∆ECt (4.6)
In order to keep the budget balanced when ∆EC15 is negative, the
Government can either reduce its current expenditure, GEXP, or increase
its income, GY. In the sixth period (year) after the efficiency improve-
ment, I consider that it has been completely paid for and Equation (4.6)
15Recall that EC is household consumption of residential energy use as defined in
Equation eq2:ces
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is replaced by its standard version described in (4.6).16
Following this approach, in Scenario 2 I assume that a 10% household
energy efficiency enhancement is funded via a temporary reallocation of
Government spending. This effectively means that for five years the
Government has to decrease its expenditure on other goods and services
in order to spend on energy efficiency, while ensuring that the government
balance is maintained in each period.
In Scenario 3 I assume that a 10% household energy efficiency im-
provement is funded through a temporary rise in the income tax rate.
This implies that the Government is able to hold its current spending
constant while balancing the budget through additional revenue. The
focus on income tax is motivated in terms of the energy efficiency im-
provement being beneficial to households so that paying through tax
provides an indirect way of having the household sector as a whole pay
for increased efficiency in dwellings. However, there are distributional
implications because higher income households pay more tax. Moreover,
where only the lowest income household benefits from the energy effi-
ciency improvement, the implication is that this is largely paid for by
other households. In terms of the impacts on any economic expansion,
introducing a change in income tax has important implications. This is
because it triggers a change in supply side behaviour through the wage
bargaining process, given that the after-tax or take-home wage, which is
the focus of the bargaining process, is directly impacted.
16Again, I note that this is a simplifying assumption and, unless the change in
expenditure or tax is permanent, the number of periods assumed does not qualitatively
impact the long-run results below.
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4.6 Results
4.6.1 Costless improvement in household energy ef-
ficiency
Table 4.3 shows the short-run (SR) and long-run (LR) impacts on key
macroeconomic and energy use variables of a costless 10% increase in
UK household energy efficiency for the two sub-scenarios: a, where the
energy efficiency improvement occurs in all households (All HG); b, where
efficiency improves only in the energy use of the lowest income quintile
households (HG1).
I report the results as percentage changes from the base year (SAM
2010) values, with the short-run results referring to the first period (year)
after the energy efficiency improvement takes place and the long-run re-
ferring to a conceptual time period where the capital stock is fully ad-
justed to a new steady-state equilibrium. Remember from Section 4 that
I assume a fixed national labour supply, with a pool of unemployed labour
and wage bargaining where there is a negative relationship between the
unemployment rate and real after tax wage.
Beginning with Scenario 1a, where all UK households increase effi-
ciency in residential energy, the first column in Table 4.3 shows that in
the short-run the switch in household expenditure away from spending on
energy for heating and lighting towards other types of consumption has
a small expansionary impact on the economy. Total GDP, consumption
(disposable income after savings), employment, and investment increase
by 0.03%, 0.52%, 0.05% and 1.14% respectively. As the sectors involved
(directly or indirectly) in supplying goods and services where demand has
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Table 4.3: % change in key macroeconomic variables from a
10% costless household residential energy efficiency increase
Scenario 1a Scenario 1b
SR LR SR LR
GDP 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.02
CPI 0.32 0.21 0.03 0.01
Investment 1.14 0.79 0.15 0.11
Unemployment rate -0.82 -2.08 0.04 -0.13
Employment 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.01
Nominal wage 0.42 0.45 0.02 0.03
Import 0.70 0.58 0.07 0.05
Export -0.49 -0.37 -0.04 -0.02
Total energy use -0.67 -0.89 -0.09 -0.11
Disposable income (excluding savings) 0.52 0.58 0.06 0.07
Total energy consumption -1.66 -1.87 -0.22 -0.24
Residential energy consumption -2.35 -2.62 -0.30 -0.33
Household rebound in res. energy 76.53 73.82 79.03 76.71
Household rebound in total energy 78.89 76.33 80.65 78.50
Economy wide rebound 69.86 59.68 71.94 63.91
increased expand (off-set by contractions in energy supply chains), there
is a corresponding stimulus to labour demand. This causes the unem-
ployment rate to decrease by 0.82% while the nominal wage increases by
0.42%, which, with a cpi increase of 0.32%, equates to the 0.09% increase
in the real wage. However, the increase in the cpi does lead to a decrease
in total export demand of 0.49% while imports increase by 0.7%.
Total household residential energy consumption falls by 2.35%, which,
taking into account how a full range of economy-wide adjustments im-
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pact household income and consumption, is a large (76.5%) rebound17
on the 10% potential energy savings. That total household energy re-
bound is higher reflects increased spending on refined fuels for personal
transportation. However, that the full economy-wide rebound is propor-
tionately smaller (just under 69.9%) reflects that there is a net decrease in
energy use on the production side of the economy (due to the contraction
in energy supply activity).
The long-run results for Scenario 1a, reported in the second column
in Table 4.3, show household energy use remaining below its base-year
value. That rebound effects are smaller in the long-run than in the short-
run reflects the impact of ‘disinvestment’ (Turner, 2009), or contraction
in capacity, in energy supply on energy prices and consumption and pro-
duction choices. There is a further (less energy-intensive) expansion in
GDP, with a long run increase of 0.16%. The expansion in the long run is
greater than in the short run because the ability for all production sectors
to adjust capacity allows a greater response to the net positive demand
stimulus from increase real household income reallocated to other goods
and services. However, given that the total labour force is assumed to
be fixed, there is a fall in the unemployment rate generating an increase
in the real wage. This, in turn, puts continued (but declining) upward
pressure on all commodity prices and reduces competitiveness so that
there is a lasting decrease in export demand (-0.37%).
The third and fourth columns of Table 4.3 show the corresponding
results when I limit the increase in energy efficiency to the lowest in-
17See Appendix D for a brief discussion of the rebound effect and details on its
calculation.
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come quintile, Household Group 1 (HG1). The long-run results are qual-
itatively the same as found in Scenario 1a, but the scale of both the
economic expansion and the contraction in total household energy use
is much smaller. In the short-run, crowding out effects impacting ex-
ports and disinvestment in the energy supply sectors actually causes a
very small net negative impact in GDP (-0.001%). However, sensitivity
analysis shows that if the proportionate increase in energy efficiency is
larger, here 14%, this is sufficient to make the short-run increase in GDP
slightly positive, 0.003%, but with the long-run impact, although very
slightly larger, remaining the same to the two decimal places in Table
4.3.
The core issue is that the lowest income quintile, where spending
power is directly boosted by the energy efficiency improvement, is only a
very small source of consumption expenditure in the UK economy. This
group is also not a huge beneficiary of increased labour and capital income
when the expansion occurs. This means that further induced ‘multiplier’
rounds of spending come largely from the other household income groups,
and this is limited in the very small expansion reported.
Indeed if we refer to the long-run results for the change in household
disposable income net of savings (i.e. consumption spending) in Table
4.4, note that around 85% of the increase enjoyed by HG1 when energy
efficiency improves in all households is retained in the case where only
HG1 Increases its efficiency. On the other hand, comparison of the GDP
results in the second and fourth columns of Table 4.3 show that the
long-run GDP increase under Scenario 1b is only around 10% of what is
realised when all households improve their energy efficiency.
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Comparison of the results in Scenarios 1a and 1b reported in Table 4.4
show that residential energy use in the lowest household income group
falls most, as does the share of consumption spending on this energy
use, when the efficiency improvement is targeted only in HG1. This
is because the rebound in energy use is smaller where there is a more
limited boost to household income. However, Table 4.3 has shown that
the total reduction in UK households and economy-wide energy use is
smaller (i.e. rebound is larger) under Scenario 1b when the efficiency
improvement is limited to HG1. This is because the other households do
not experience an improvement in efficiency and slightly increase their
energy consumption with the (very limited) economic expansion.
The conclusion that can be drawn is that more extensive energy effi-
ciency stimuli can deliver a fuller set of desired outcomes. This includes
achieving reductions in energy use through energy efficiency and (by im-
plication from reduced energy use) carbon reduction targets, boosting
household income in low (and other) income households, along with wider
economic expansion. However, so far I have not given any consideration
to how increased energy efficiency may be funded. Therefore, in the next
section, I report on extended simulations where I incorporate a basic
consideration of the impacts of applying some treatment of cost via the
public budget.
For completeness, I have run alternative simulations where the other
income quintiles are in turn each the recipients of the energy efficiency
increase. As we can see from Figure 4.3, where I plot the short-run and
long-run percentage change in GDP for each quintile, in all the other
cases the positive stimulus from their boosted and reallocated spending
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is sufficient to generate a positive expansion from the first period. More-
over, the long-run impact is normally greater the higher is the initial
income level in the household in question.
Figure 4.3: Short-run and long-run percentage change GDP
income from a 10% household energy efficiency increase in each
household group
HG1 HG2 HG3 HG4 HG5
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Short-run
Long-run
4.6.2 Basic options for funding improvements in house-
hold energy efficiency via the Government bud-
get
Funding energy efficiency improvements via a temporary real-
location of current public spending
First, let us consider the case of effecting some payment for the introduc-
tion of the energy efficiency improvement through a temporary realloca-
tion of government expenditure, in the manner detailed above in Section
4.5 (Scenarios 2a and 2b). Results for these Scenarios are reported in
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Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: % change in key macroeconomic variables from a
10% household residential energy efficiency increase funded via
reallocation of current Government expenditure
Scenario 2a Scenario 2b
SR LR SR LR
GDP -0.02 0.16 -0.01 0.02
CPI 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.01
Investment 1.26 0.79 0.17 0.11
Unemployment rate 0.55 -2.08 0.27 -0.13
Employment -0.04 0.13 -0.02 0.01
Nominal wage 0.11 0.45 -0.03 0.03
Import 0.43 0.58 0.02 0.05
Export -0.26 -0.37 0.00 -0.02
Government expenditure -0.86 0.01 -0.21 -0.08
Total energy use -0.74 -0.89 -0.10 -0.11
Disposable income (excluding savings) 0.38 0.58 0.04 0.07
Total energy consumption -1.83 -1.87 -0.24 -0.24
Residential energy consumption -2.51 -2.62 -0.32 -0.33
Household rebound in res. energy 74.92 73.82 77.07 76.71
Household rebound in total energy 76.85 76.33 78.18 78.50
Economy wide rebound 66.31 59.68 67.68 63.91
The main impact of the required reduction in Government spending
in other areas of the economy ( by 0.86%) is a short-run contraction
in economic activity. This is exacerbated by the contraction in energy
sectors due to the lower energy demand and the crowding out of exports
caused by price rises. For this reason, GDP decreases in the short-run
by -0.02%.
Investment falls in the short-run in the energy sectors, and also in the
public administration sector. However, it increases in the other sectors,
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so that net total investment is still increases. This is for two main reasons:
first some sectors are unaffected by the reduction in government spending
simply because the spending on these sectors is zero in the base year;
second because investors have forward-looking expectations, which means
that they adjust their decisions taking into account for the fact that
government spending will rise again in five years.
The contraction in activity actually continues for less than the as-
sumed 5-year period of required reallocation of government expenditure.
Again, this is because firms are forward looking, that is, they know that
the contraction in spending will end, and they adjust their investment
plans accordingly.
At the level of the different household income groups, in Scenario 2a,
where all households improve their energy efficiency, the short-run im-
pact is a slightly smaller boost to consumption (disposable income net
of savings) but with the gap relative to the ‘no cost’ Scenario 1a be-
ing larger in higher income groups where labour and capital incomes are
more important. In Scenario 2b, where energy efficiency only increases
in the lowest income quintile, the impact for HG1 remains more or less
unchanged relative to Scenario 1b. However, all other groups now expe-
rience a slight contraction in their income used for consumption (-0-01%
in HG2&3 and -0.02% in HG4&5).
The key finding, however, is that the long-run results under Scenarios
2a and 2b are unchanged relative to the costless case in Scenarios 1a and
1b. As Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show, following an initial drop, GDP starts
to rise such that in period 5, a year before the government spending
goes back to its original level, it is above its baseline value. In the long-
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run, the costless and the government funded case converge on the same
equilibrium.
Figure 4.4: Period by period % change in GDP from a 10%
residential energy efficiency increase in all households
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Funding energy efficiency improvements via a temporary change
in the income tax rate
When I consider the case of a temporary increase in the income tax rate
(Scenarios 3a and 3b) there are more marked changes in the nature of the
results, as we can see from Table 4.6. First, as noted in Section 4.5, the
change in the income tax rate brings about a change in the supply side
of the economy. This is because the increase in taxation reduces the take
home wage, causing workers to demand higher salaries, putting upward
pressure on the real wage and thereby impacting costs faced by all firms.
While Figure 4.4 shows a very close convergence in long-run GDP under
Scenario 3a, there are some minor differences in the long-run impacts on
GDP, investment and employment/unemployment.
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Figure 4.5: Period by period % change in GDP from a 10%
residential energy efficiency increase in household quintile 1
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However, there is a greater impact on results when the energy effi-
ciency improvement is limited to HG1 in Scenario 3b. First, Figure 4.5
shows that there is a small contraction in GDP that lasts into the long
run (-0.005%). This implies that the increase in energy efficiency in HG1
does not provide a sufficient economic stimulus to demand to deliver a
long-run expansion in the presence of the adverse supply-side shock that
is delivered via the induced rise in wage demands. Also, note that the en-
dogenous income tax rate increases in the long-run (by 0.24 %) in order
to maintain the government’s budget balanced with fixed government
spending. However, again, I find that if any other household group is
the sole beneficiary of the energy efficiency improvement, the resulting
stimulus is sufficient to deliver a net expansion in GDP, and that this is
more so the higher the income level of the group in question, as I show
in Figure 4.6, where I repeat the same simulation one group at the time.
Moreover, while the impact on income used for consumption is very
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Table 4.6: % change in key macroeconomic variables from a
10% household residential energy efficiency increase funded via
income tax
Scenario 3a Scenario 3b
SR LR SR LR
GDP -0.02 0.16 -0.01 0.00
CPI 0.17 0.21 -0.01 0.02
Investment 0.68 0.81 -0.03 0.01
Unemployment rate 0.63 -2.12 0.32 0.09
Employment -0.04 0.14 -0.02 -0.01
Nominal wage 0.09 0.45 -0.04 -0.03
Import 0.29 0.58 -0.03 0.02
Export -0.25 -0.37 0.01 -0.03
Total energy use -0.85 -0.89 -0.13 -0.14
Disposable income (excluding savings) 0.11 0.59 -0.04 0.02
Income tax 0.97 -0.02 0.24 0.24
Total energy consumption -2.05 -1.86 -0.31 -0.28
Residential energy consumption -2.71 -2.61 -0.38 -0.37
Household rebound in res. energy 72.86 73.89 72.96 73.96
Household rebound in total energy 74.03 76.43 72.65 74.83
Economy wide rebound 61.64 59.92 58.51 54.45
similar in Scenario 3b (as compared to 3a) under the government spend-
ing and tax options for HG1 (only slightly worse under the latter), it is
very different for all the other household income groups. Initially, given
that they pay more income tax, HG2-5, effectively pay for the increase in
HG1 energy efficiency through their increased tax contributions. How-
ever, over time, even once the payment for efficiency is complete, the
other groups continue to pay through the greater impact on their dis-
posable (net of savings) incomes from the economic contraction. This is
shown in Figure 4.7. Note that the biggest ‘loser’ is the highest income
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Figure 4.6: Short-run and long-run percentage change in GDP
from a 10% household energy efficiency increase funded via in-
come tax in each household group
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quintile, HG5. This is due to the fact that income from ownership of
capital (most important in HG5) is adversely affected in this scenario
due to more limited investment activity.
I have run a specific sensitivity scenario where I increase the size
of the energy efficiency improvement in HG1 to see what is required
to produce a positive GDP result over the long-run under the income
tax funding scenario. I find that a 12% boost to the residential energy
use in HG1 is sufficient to deliver a net positive (0.0003%) increase in
GDP over the long run, with the positive result emerging from period
11. However, the net negative impact on disposable income in the other
household groups persists, albeit to a lesser extent. I find that, where
we have an income tax funding arrangement as above, a doubling of the
efficiency improvement in HG1 residential energy use to 20% is required
to remove the long-run negative impacts on the disposable income of all
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other groups. Below this, the highest income household remains most
affected, for example with only HG5 losing out over the long run where
the efficiency improvement in HG1 is 19%.
Figure 4.7: Short-run and long-run percentage change in dis-
posable income from a 10% household energy efficiency increase
funded via an increase in income tax
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Overall, the results above suggest that imposing a cost for increasing
energy efficiency via the public budget will constrain the ‘multiple bene-
fits’ of increased energy efficiency at least in the short term. However, if
the economic expansion is sufficiently big, the long-run outcome is one of
net gain in broader economic impacts. When the efficiency improvement
is targeted only in the lowest income households this does deliver the
desired outcomes for that group, but it weakens the economic expansion,
while the need for (and nature of) public funding through the government
budget becomes much more important.
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4.7 Relaxing the assumption of a common
elasticity of substitution across house-
hold income groups
As I explain in section 4.4.1, in the absence of better information I as-
sume a common value for the elasticity of substitution across the five
income groups. However, it may be argued that different household in-
come groups have different tastes in consumption, which suggests that
these values could potentially be different. For example, we could imag-
ine that lower income household groups would be more attracted by a
reduction in the price of energy, especially those households who have
been under heating their homes. For this reason, they could be associ-
ated with a higher elasticity of substitution. Similarly, we may argue that
high income households are already close to their satiation point in en-
ergy consumption, and that they would prefer to shift their consumption
towards other goods and services.18
To reflect this scenario I impose a higher elasticity of substitution the
first group, 0.7, and I impose increasingly lower values for higher income
groups so that group 2 has and elasticity of substitution of 0.6, groups 3
4 and 5 have an elasticity of respectively 0.5, 0.4 and 0.3. I repeat the
simulations of Scenario 1, by increasing energy efficiency in household
residential energy consumption by 10% in all household groups simulta-
neously. I then repeat the same efficiency improvement but applying it
to each group in turn rather than simultaneously.
18This is consistent with the UK findings in Chitnis et al. (2014) where lower income
households are more price elastic in energy use than higher income households.
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As Table 4.7 shows, the elasticity of substitution impacts the extent
to which the energy efficiency improvement can reduce residential energy
use. HG1 decreases its residential energy use by 0.9% in the short-run and
1.45% in the long-run which is less than what I find in Section 4.6. HG2
is virtually unchanged as the elasticity value almost the same as Scenario
1, while groups 3, 4, and 5 reduce their residential energy use by more.
If we focus on Group 1, the share of income spent on residential energy
decreases by less than in Scenario 1. Intuitively, people in this group are
more willing to substitute their consumption in favour of energy when
it becomes relatively cheaper. However, disposable income increases by
0.7% which is in line with what I find in Scenario 1. This implies that
the lowest income group is gaining in terms of additional income and
decides to spend even more on residential energy, even though they can
also afford to increase their spending on other non-energy goods.
The macroeconomic impact is broadly in line with the one from Sce-
nario 1, with a small increase in GDP of approximately 0.16%. However,
because in this case higher income households are associated with lower
rebound, the net total reduction in residential energy use across all the
groups is greater than in Scenario 1. For this reason, the total household
rebound (not reported in the Tables) is more than 10 percentage points
smaller than Scenario 1, 64.6%, and the economy wide rebound is 39.4%.
This implies that in the above case, improving energy efficiency across all
the households groups would be more effective in terms of overall reduc-
tion in final energy demand and consequent CO2 emissions, delivering at
the same time the same GDP boost, and helping poorer households to
increase their energy use and properly heat and light their homes.
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4.8 Conclusions and policy implications
Many recent economic modelling studies of increased energy efficiency
have tended to focus on the issue of rebound effects. However, in con-
sidering economy-wide rebound in particular, some studies have identi-
fied economic expansion resulting from increased energy efficiency as the
driver of rebound, a finding that is consistent with the type of ‘multiple
benefits’ argument proposed by the (IEA, 2014). Here, I have focused
my attention on how the economic expansion may provide a justification
for public/government support of energy efficiency programmes.
Specifically, I have used an illustrative CGE modelling analysis for
the UK to consider the general effects of government support of domes-
tic energy efficiency programmes. I have raised the question of whether
only low income households should be aided in improving their energy
efficiency, or whether there is sufficient return through expansion to jus-
tify potentially supporting wider ranging programmes. A key point that I
have raised is that many governments are committed to the support of en-
ergy efficiency programmes but may focus this in low income households.
However, Governments tend to have a wider set of desired outcomes,
including reduced energy use and carbon emissions, but also in terms
of reducing poverty (including but not limited to energy poverty) and
increasing economic well-being, in part through GDP and employment
growth.
In considering scenarios where support is provided only for the lowest
income households to increase their energy efficiency, my findings sug-
gest that it is likely to be difficult to meet all of government’s objectives
simultaneously through limited support of households that are signifi-
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cantly less connected to the wider economy than others (in terms of their
level of spending and their sources of income). Results from this paper
suggest that in order to stimulate economic activity by this route quite
large proportionate increases in residential energy efficiency in low in-
come household need to be achieved. In contrast, where the introduction
of increased energy efficiency is spread over all (or at least a wider range)
of households, even where there is a cost to supporting energy efficiency
improvements, the return via the impacts of economic expansion is likely
to provide a justification for support.
However, my findings suggest that the means of providing support for
energy efficiency programmes should be carefully considered and exam-
ined. My results imply that a reallocation of government spending will
be less distortive than requiring the household sector to pay indirectly
(according to ability to pay) via income tax. However, I reserve fuller
consideration of specific funding mechanisms for future research, ideally
in consultation with policy decision makers particularly within the UK.
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Chapter 5
Can a reduction in fuel use
result from an endogenous
technical progress in motor
vehicles? A partial and
general equilibrium analysis.
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5.1 Introduction
Gordon (2016) stresses that technical progress in household consumer
services has been a major, typically underestimated, element in the im-
provement in the standard of living in the US since 1870. In the case of
energy savings technical improvements, the IEA (2014) emphasises that
this could deliver a wide range of economic benefits, linked to the more
efficient use of resources. This is also supported by the economy-wide
literature on energy efficiency (Broberg et al., 2015; Duarte et al., 2016;
Lecca et al., 2014a; Turner, 2013; Yu et al., 2015).
However, Gillingham et al. (2016) argues that energy efficiency im-
provements could be linked to changes in characteristics of energy using
technologies. These technologies combined with physical energy produce
energy intensive services, such as using a lighter motor vehicle to increase
the output of miles travelled. This suggests that we should think about
the consumption of energy-intensive services in which physical energy is
only one of the input. These services can be thought of as self-produced
and consumed directly by households (Becker, 1965).
Following Gillingham et al. (2016), I apply this conceptual approach
to the provision of energy-intensive services in household consumption,
such as domestic space heating and light. I operationalise this using the
specific example of private transport, as being produced using refined
fuel and motor vehicles. I am particularly interested in the way in which
improvements in the efficiency of vehicles and fuel affect the implicit price
and quantity consumed of private transport and the subsequent derived
demand for fuel and vehicles. More especially, I wish to investigate the
way in which an increase in the efficiency of vehicles affects the consump-
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tion of fuel. This is highly relevant in the context of policy initiatives to
reduce energy use and associated carbon emissions whilst maintaining,
or stimulating, economic development.
In economics, the standard definition of an energy efficiency improve-
ment is an intervention whereby the same level of output can be ob-
tained using less physical energy, holding all the other inputs constant.
However, the introduction of an energy efficiency improvement does not
imply that the output or the use of other inputs will remain constant.
For example, in the case of this paper an improvement in fuel efficiency
would imply that the same level of private transport could now be pro-
vided with a given vehicle and less fuel, but it also means that the price
of fuel, in efficiency units, falls. Given that it is generally possible to
substitute between inputs in the production of these services, improving
energy efficiency typically leads to lower energy savings than expected
via a rebound effect; in extreme cases, an increase in the use of energy
(or backfire) can result (Khazzoom, 1980, 1987; Saunders, 2000). In this
paper I investigate whether substitution possibilities imply that fuel sav-
ings can be obtained in the provision of private transport as a result of
technical improvements in vehicles. That is to say, I focus on the ques-
tion of whether a reduction in energy use could result as an endogenous
response to efficiency improvements in the other input.
I analyse this initially using a partial equilibrium model. A simple
relationship is adopted between vehicle and fuel use in the production of
private transport, and between private transport and all other goods in
the determination of the household consumption vector. This analysis
holds household income and the prices of all inputs and other consump-
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tion goods constant. The approach is then extended through simulation
using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, parameterised
on UK data. This framework allows the incorporation of endogenous
changes in nominal income, market prices and supply responses. Effi-
ciency improvements in household consumption will affect the implicit
price of the corresponding household service. However, these prices are
not normally used in the standard calculation of the consumer price index
(cpi), leading to potential underestimations of the economy-wide impact
of household efficiency improvements (Gordon, 2016). In a final set of
simulations, I recalculate the cpi using the endogenous price changes for
private transport services. This reduction in the cpi has implications
for the determination of the real wage and produces additional positive
competitiveness effects.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews
the current literature on energy efficiency in the context of modelling the
household consumption of energy-intensive services. Section 5.3 outlines
the partial equilibrium analysis. Section 5.4 describes the CGE model
and Section 5.5 the various simulation set ups. The simulation results
are reported in Section 5.6 and further discussed in Section 5.7. Section
5.8 is a short conclusion.
5.2 Background
Many studies have analysed the impact of energy-saving technical im-
provements in consumption in order to assess the potential net impact
on final energy use (see for example Chitnis et al., 2014; Chitnis and
Sorrell, 2015; Duarte et al., 2016; Dubin et al., 1986; Druckman et al.,
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2011; Frondel et al., 2008, 2012; Lecca et al., 2014a; Lin and Zeng, 2013;
Schwarz and Taylor, 1995; West, 2004). A common characteristic of this
literature is that physical energy is modelled as if it were consumed di-
rectly. Increased energy efficiency is normally found to reduce final energy
use but with some rebound effect. The size of this rebound varies across
the studies, partly depending on the modelling approach. Some of this
work relates energy efficiency improvements to the capital costs associ-
ated with the increase in efficiency (Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Mizobuchi,
2008; Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2008). However, in making the rebound
calculation none explores the relationship between the physical energy
and the capital appliances used in the production of the energy-intensive
consumer services.
There are three papers that specifically attempt to model energy-
intensive consumer services as composite goods combining physical en-
ergy and technology. Walker and Wirl (1993) model the demand for
private transport as a service obtained by a combination of fuels and
technology. This technology converts fuel use into miles travelled. In
this approach, where the consumer allocates all her budget to private
transport services, the marginal utility of consumption is given by price
of the energy-intensive service. This price is calculated as the price of
fuel divided by the efficiency of vehicles. If this efficiency increases, the
price of the energy-intensive service decreases, stimulating a rise in the
quantity demanded. Haas et al. (2008) adopt the same method but focus
on residential energy use. They find that technical progress has the effect
of reducing the price of residential energy services, leading to significant
increases in the demand for these services and the derived demand for
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physical energy, producing a direct rebound effect.
Hunt and Ryan (2015) extend Walker and Wirl (1993) and develop a
model of household consumption by separately identifying several energy-
intensive services (heating, lighting, motoring, etc.), each formed as a
combination of physical energy and technology. These services, together
with all other consumption goods, are elements of total household expen-
diture. Hunt and Ryan (2015) asserts that models that do not consider
consumer energy demand in the context of providing a service are mis-
specified and are likely to produce biased estimation of key behavioural
parameters, such as the price and income elasticities of energy demand.
The paper demonstrates this point by using UK data to econometrically
estimate two models. One is the standard model where energy is included
on the same footing as any other good or service. The second is a model
augmented with technology that converts energy into energy services.
The results show that the income and price elasticities of energy demand
are quite different in the two models. In particular, when technology is
introduced in the model, its coefficient is statistically significant, indicat-
ing that the augmented specification is preferred.
In an attempt to consolidate this literature, Gillingham et al. (2016)
argues that producing vehicles using a lighter material would improve fuel
efficiency of motoring services and increase the number of miles travelled
per unit of fuel. This implies that the price of the energy service would
depend on both the price of energy and the price of the product that de-
liver the service. Although it does not discuss specifically how to model
such energy intensive services, and is mostly interested in the implications
of energy efficiency for the calculation of the rebound effect, Gillingham
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et al. (2016) offer an interesting starting point. In this paper I opera-
tionalise this approach, starting with a partial equilibrium analysis and
them moving to a Computable General Equilibrium approach.
5.3 Modelling household production of mo-
toring services
5.3.1 The basic model
Initially, suppose that a consumer allocates a given nominal budget to
private transport and that market prices are fixed, so that the analysis
takes a partial equilibrium form. The output of the energy-intensive
private transport service is here given by miles travelled, m, which is
produced by households through a combination of motor vehicles, ve, and
refined fuel (petrol and diesel),f e. It is convenient to express these inputs
in terms of efficiency units, indicated by the e superscript. However, it
should be noted that in the present analysis, the efficiency of fuels often
does not change, so that for the fuel input, efficiency and natural inputs
are typically identical. The household production function for private
transport is therefore given as:
m = m(ve, f e) (5.1)
The consumer will choose the combination of vehicles and fuel that
maximises the amount of miles travelled, m, given her budget constraint.
Suppose that the production of private transport becomes more effi-
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cient due to technical progress.1 To investigate the implications of such
improvement I employ a graphical analysis in which motor vehicles and
refined fuels are represented in efficiency units. I specify the relation be-
tween natural and efficiency units in the household utility maximisation
problem as follows:
max m = m(ve, f e)
subject to
pnff
n + pnvv
n − y ≥ 0
where
ze = εzzn and
pez =
pnz
εz
for z = (f, v)
(5.2)
In (5.2) p indicates a price, ε is an efficiency parameter, e is a subscript
for efficiency units and n for natural units. From maximisation we have
that:
∂m
∂zn
= pnz =
∂m
∂ze
εz
∂m
∂ze
= pez =
pnz
εz
(5.3)
Expression (5.3) implies that for any input whose efficiency is in-
creased, technical progress is reflected in a change in its price, expressed in
efficiency units. Technical changes can therefore be represented through
adjustments in the budget constraint, specified in efficiency units.
1There are three primary benchmark cases: a) motor vehicles and fuels become
equally more efficient; b) only motor vehicles become more efficient; c) fuels become
more efficient. However, hybrid cases are also possible where both inputs become
more efficiency but at different rates.
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To illustrate this approach let us start with a simple symmetric tech-
nical improvement in both inputs. I parametrise the model so that f ,
v and m are unity, and in absence of efficiency changes, quantities in
natural and efficiency units are identical.
Figure 5.1: Technical progress in motor vehicles and fuels
f e, fn
ve, vn
m
I1
f e1
ve1 m1
I2
fn
vn
In Figure 5.1 the horizontal axis represents fuels both in natural and
efficiency units, while the vertical axis represents vehicles in natural and
efficiency units. The technical improvement is represented by a parallel
shift in the budget constraint expressed in efficiency units. The consumer
can now choose a higher isoquant and increase her production of private
transport from m to m1.
2 In the simple case of a linear homogeneous
domestic production function, the outcomes will lie on a straight line
through the origin. The new level of private transport is given by the
combination of motor vehicles and fuel, ve1 and f
e
1 , both measured in
2The points m and m1 are where the relevant budget constraints are tangent with
the highest relevant isoquant.
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efficiency units. However, in natural units the expenditure on vn and
fn is unchanged, though the consumer can now produce more travelled
miles from the same nominal budget.
Let us now consider the case where only one input becomes more
efficient, specifically motor vehicles. This represents vehicle-augmenting
technical progress, which is the focus of this paper. However, the fuel
augmenting technical change case would be identical but opposite to
the vehicle augmenting case. In this case the technical improvement
decreases the price of vehicles in efficiency units, while the price of fuel
is unchanged. The impact of the reduction in the price of vehicles on the
consumption of fuel depends on the elasticity of substitution between the
two inputs:
σv,f =
−∂(f e/ve)(MRSfe,ve)
∂(MRSfe,ve)(f e/ve)
(5.4)
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution between vehicles and
fuel, and relates to the slope of the isoquant.3 When σv,f is greater than
1, the two goods are competitors. This implies that a reduction in the
price of vehicles, in efficiency units, leads to a reduction in expenditure on
fuel and therefore fuel use, as the consumer substitutes heavily towards
vehicles. On the other hand, when σv,f is smaller than 1, the two inputs
are complements.4 Here, with a fixed nominal budget and fixed natural
input prices, as the efficiency price of vehicles falls, the corresponding
3The fixed elasticity of substitution measures the proportionate, not absolute,
changes in each input required to maintain a constant output.
4An elasticity of substitution of zero implies that the two goods are perfect com-
plements. This is where the inputs have to be used in fixed proportions and is the
Leontief production technology case.
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increase in consumption of vehicles is insufficient for expenditure on ve-
hicles to increase. Therefore, in this case, following the increase in vehicle
efficiency the expenditure on fuel will rise and the use of both inputs ve-
hicles measured in efficiency units and fuel in natural units - will rise.
For these reasons, the effectiveness of the technical change in reducing
fuel use per unit of output is determined endogenously and depends on
the substitutability between the two inputs.
Figure 5.2: Technical progress in motor vehicles
fn
ve, vn
m
I1
fn
ve
m1
I2
fn1
ve1
m∗vn,∗
In Figure 5.2 I show the case where vehicles and fuel are competitive.
Initially the consumer is at point m on the isoquant I1. The technical
improvement in motor vehicles pivots the budget constraint, expressed
in efficiency units, clockwise, as the price of vehicle in efficiency units
decreases. At point m1 the consumer chooses the combination of f
n
1 and
ve1 that maximises the output of private transport. This is where the
140
new budget constraint is tangent to the highest attainable isoquant, I2.
5
If we project m1 onto the initial budget constraint expressed in natural
units, we see that private transport output m1 is produced at m∗ using
fn1 , and v
n,∗ inputs, both measured in natural units. The vehicle-saving
technical change will always reduce fuel use per unit of output but not
necessarily per £1 spent on motoring. In Figure 5.2 I have assumed that
the two goods are competitive. In this case, the efficiency improvement
in vehicles reduces the quantity of fuels necessary to deliver the increase
in private transport services, while the use of vehicles, measured in nat-
ural units, increases. Clearly for energy-intensive household services in
general, technical improvements in the non-energy inputs generate en-
dogenous changes in fuel use which can be positive or negative.
5.3.2 Incorporating the consumption of multiple goods
So far I have assumed that the consumer has a nominal fixed budget to
be spent on private transport. However, consumers allocate their income
on a number of different goods and services, only one of which is pri-
vate transport. Consider now a household allocating its total household
budget between private transport and a composite that comprises all the
other goods, a. Also assume that private transport is still a combination
of vehicles and fuel. The consumption choice can then be represented by
following nested function:
c = c(a,m(ve, f e)) (5.5)
5For convenience, because the efficiency of fuel does not change I measure the use
of fuel in natural units.
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In this case, the consumption of fuel depends partly on the degree
of substitution between private transport and all the other goods, σm,a.
Figure 5.3 presents a graphical analysis similar to that shown in Figure
5.2. The top panel has vehicles in efficiency units on the vertical axis and
refined fuel on the horizontal axis, in natural units. In the bottom panel
the price of motoring pm is on the downward-pointing vertical axis.
I parametrise the model so that the initial quantity, price, and there-
fore the total budget for private transport (m, pm and b) are all unity.
The consumer initially produces m1 private transport using f
n
1 fuels and
some quantity of motor vehicles. With a fixed nominal budget, technical
progress in motor vehicles has the effect of pivoting the budget line (in
efficiency units) from b1b1 to b1b3. This replicates Figure 5.2 and im-
plies that a constant budged can now produce more private transport
because the increased efficiency of vehicles reduces the price of private
transport. At this point, if we move the new budget line parallel down-
wards until it is just tangent to the initial (unit) isoquant, we identify
the cost-minimising way for the household to produce one physical unit
of private transport. Here I am essentially using the budget constraint
as an iso-cost curve. The unit cost-minimising point is m2.
The lower panel of the diagram can also be used to show the new price
of private transport. This is given by point b2 as measured along the fuel
axis, because the price of fuel remains constant. Because b1 is calibrated
initially as unity, b2 is the new price of motoring, which is now less than
1. If the demand for private transport is price elastic, as its price falls
total private transport expenditure will rise. Similarly if private transport
is price inelastic, with the price reduction total expenditure on private
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Figure 5.3: Technical change in motor vehicles with non-fixed
budget
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transport will fall. In Figure 5.3, I illustrate the case where the elasticity
of substitution between motoring and all other goods and services (σm,a)
is greater than 1 and hence motoring is price elastic.
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In the lower part of the diagram, the 45 degree line through the origin
simply transfers the private transport price, given by the point where the
minimum unit isocost curve hits the fuel axis (here b2) onto the vertical
axis. The B curve then gives the total motoring expenditure associated
with this motoring price. Where this is expenditure figure is translated
to the horizontal axis, it gives the point where the new budget constraint
line cuts the fuel axis. In this case I am assuming motoring consumption
is elastic, so expenditure rises (> 1). The new budget constraint is b4b4.
The point that maximises the private transport output is at m4 with
an input of fuels of fn4 . If the private transport production function,
as represented in Equation (5.5), is linear homogeneous, m2, m3 and
m4 will all lie on a straight line through the origin, each having the same
fuel/vehicle ratio. Also the ratios of the distance from the origin indicates
the change, so that in this case output increases by 0m4/0m2.
If the private transport price elasticity of demand has unitary elastic-
ity, the B curve is vertical and passes through b1(f
n = 1) and also A(1, 1).
For unitary elasticity, the total expenditure on private transport remains
constant and the new budget constraint is b1b3. If the demand for private
transport were price inelastic, the B curve would still go through point
A but would slope in the opposite direction to the curve shown in Fig-
ure 5.3. Total expenditure on private transport would fall as efficiency
increases.
In Figure 5.3 energy use decreases from fn1 to f
n
4 following technical
progress in vehicles. However, while in Figure 5.2 the only condition for
a reduction in fuel use is to have an elasticity of substitution between
refined fuels and vehicles greater than 1, here we need to account also
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for the substitutability between private transport and all other goods. It
transpires that in the partial equilibrium setting, whether fuel use rises
or falls in response to an increase in vehicle efficiency depends solely on
the values of the σv,f and σm,a.
From what we already know, we can deduce ranges of values where
we can unambiguously sign the change in fuel use. When σv,f > 1 and
σm,a < 1 both expenditure on private transport and the share of fuel in
private transport expenditure fall. There is therefore a clear reduction in
fuel consumption in this case. Using an analogous argument, if σv,f < 1
and σm,a > 1 fuel use unambiguously increase. However, when the two
elasticities of substitution are both positive, a reduction in fuel use will
occur only if the increase in motoring expenditure is not sufficiently large
to offset the reduction in the share of fuel in private transport expendi-
ture. Similarly, where both elasticities are negative, fuel consumption will
fall only if the reduction in expenditure on private transport is sufficiently
large to offset a rise in fuel expenditure as a share of total expenditure
on private transport.
Holden and Swales (1993) undertake partial equilibrium analysis in
a more conventional industrial production setting where output is pro-
duced with capital and labour and sold in a perfectly competitive product
market. The paper derives an expression for the cross price elasticity of
one input with respect to a change in the price of a second input.6 A
key result is that a reduction in the price of one input leads to an in-
crease in the use of the second input where the price elasticity of demand
for the output is greater than the elasticity of substitution between the
6Holden and Swales (1993) analyse the impact of labour subsidies on capital use.
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two inputs. This result translates directly to the household production of
energy-intensive services in general and to private transport in particular.
In a partial equilibrium setting, if σv,f > σm,a the negative substitution
effect dominates the output effect, and as vehicles become more efficient,
and their efficiency price falls, fuel use will also fall. On the other hand,
if σv,f < σm,a, fuel use increases accompany any efficiency improvements
in vehicles.
A third issue is linked to the calculation of the cpi. Gordon (2016) ar-
gues that efficiency improvements in household services, especially energy-
intensive services such as domestic lighting, heating and air conditioning,
are a significant source of bias in the calculation of the consumer price
index. This, in turn, has led to an underestimation of the US growth of
real GDP in the past. However, in the American figures, private trans-
port has been treated as a special case and improvements in both fuel
and vehicle efficiency have been incorporated in the calculation of the
cpi and therefore also the growth of GDP. Standard CGE models would
typically fail to account for the impact on the cpi of improvements in
household efficiency. However, in the present simulations I can include
the private transport price in an adjusted calculation of the consumer
price index. I label this adjusted index cpiτ . An efficiency increase in ve-
hicles will reduce the price of private transport, whose impact on the cpiτ
will reduce the nominal wage for any given real wage. This will increase
competitiveness with accompanying positive impacts on the economy.
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5.4 A computable general equilibrium mod-
elling application
I incorporate the conceptual framework developed in Section 5.3 in an
analysis using the UK-ENVI Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
model. UK-ENVI is a dynamic CGE model designed for the analysis of
disturbances in the energy sector of the UK economy.7 It is used here
to assess the impact of an illustrative 10% vehicle augmenting efficiency
increase. In this version, the model is calibrated on a 2010 Social Ac-
counting Matrix reporting transactions between 30 productive sectors,8
the UK households, government, corporate sectors and the rest of the
world (imports and exports). In the following sections I outline the main
features of the model, focussing particularly on the structure of household
consumption.
5.4.1 Consumption
I assume that in each time period, a representative household makes an
aggregate consumption decision, C, determined by its disposable income,
so that:
Ct = Y NGt − SAVt −HTAXt − CTAXt (5.6)
In equation (5.6) total consumption is a function of income Y NG,
savings SAV , income taxes HTAX, and direct taxes on consumption
CTAX, and t indicates the time period, which is considered to be one
7The full mathematical presentation of the model is reported in Appendix A.
8Details about sector’s aggregation are reported in Appendix C.
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year. Total consumption is allocated to sectors through the structure
described in 5.3.2. This is a nested constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) function, illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: The structure of consumption
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This implies that household divides consumption between private
transport and all other goods, where private transport is a CES com-
bination of refined fuels and motor vehicles and ‘all other goods’ is a
Leontief composite. Here, the central point is that in the standard UK-
ENVI model there is no private transport supply sector. For this reason,
I assume that households buy vehicles and fuel inputs, for which there
are supply sectors, to self-produce private transport which they then di-
rectly consume. The price of private transport, albeit unobserved in the
standard production accounts, can be captured through this adjustment
to the consumption structure and is equal to the cost of self-production.
The optimal vehicle input is determined by cost-minimising private
transport production. The demand function for the optimal level of vehi-
cle expenditure is given by equation (A.102) in Appendix A. I note that
motor vehicles are consumer durables and that expenditure in any period
should be considered in a long-term perspective. Essentially expenditure
on such items should be treated similarly to an investment in capital
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in conventional production sectors. For this reason I focus on long-run
equilibrium results here where the desired level of vehicle expenditure,
determined by the cost minimising function, equals, by definition, the
actual level of motor vehicle expenditure.
Clearly, even after this adjustment, in practice consumption choices
are the result of a more complicated set of consumption decisions. In
particular, other energy-intensive services, such as heating and lighting,
can be similarly seen as self-produced composite goods. However, to en-
hance tractability and to simplify the interpretation of the results, I here
isolate the example of private transport and assume that the remaining
consumption comprises a single composite good, leaving the extension
of this framework to future research. Further, household consumption
comprises goods produced in the UK and imported goods from the rest
of the World and these are taken to be imperfect substitutes (Armington,
1969).
5.4.2 Production and investment
The production structure, outlined in Figure 5.5, is represented by a
capital, labour, energy and material (KLEM) CES function.
Figure 5.5: The structure of production
gross output
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149
Here labour and capital are combined to form value added, while en-
ergy and materials form a composite of intermediate inputs. In turn, the
combination of intermediate and value added gives total output. Again,
imported and locally produced intermediate inputs are assumed to be
imperfect substitute, via an Armington link (Armington, 1969).
For simplicity I assume that investment is determined by a myopic9
agent according to the following partial adjustment mechanism:
Ii,t = v ·
[
K⋆i,t −Ki,t
]
+ δ ·Ki,t (5.7)
In (5.7) investment is a function of the gap between the actual and
desired capital stock, K⋆i,t and Ki,t respectively, plus depreciation which
occurs at the rate δ. The parameter v is an accelerator (Jorgenson, 1963)
and represents the speed at which the capital stock adjusts to the desired
level of capital. In steady state the following conditions are satisfied:
K⋆i,t = Ki,t
therefore
Ii,t = δ ·Ki,t
(5.8)
Equation (5.7) simply states that the desired and actual level of cap-
ital stocks are equal. From equation (5.8) this implies that in long-run
equilibrium gross investment just covers depreciation.
9The model offers the possibility of forward-looking expectation in investment.
Given that in this application I am primarily interested in long-run outcomes, the two
specifications would produce identical results as the long-run equilibrium conditions
are identical (Lecca et al., 2013). I therefore adopt the simpler option.
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5.4.3 The labour market
Ie assume that the working population is fixed and explore two alternative
labour market closure; fixed real wage and wage bargaining. The fixed-
real-wage closure is motivated by the ‘wage resistance hypothesis’, which
implies that the bargaining power of workers resists any reduction in the
real wage.10
wt
cpit
=
w0
cpi0
(5.9)
Equation (5.9) represents the conventional fixed real wage closure,
calculated as the after tax wage w divided by the standard cpi. However,
in this paper I argue that in calculating the cpi, the price of private
transport, pm, which is normally unobserved, should replace the prices
of refined fuel and vehicles in an augmented cpi. This means that:
cpiτ,t(pa, pm(pv, pf )) (5.10)
When motor-vehicle efficiency improves, the price of vehicles falls
thereby reducing the price of private transport. In the absence of other
prices variations, there will also be a corresponding reduction in the ad-
justed cpiτ,t. The labour market can then be closed using the adjusted
fixed real wage:
rwτ,t =
wt
cpiτ,t
(5.11)
10As explained in the next Section, 5.5, this ensures zero variation in prices in
natural units in the long-run, so that essentially we do not relax the fixed prices
assumption of the partial equilibrium.
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If cpiτ,t falls, the nominal wage decreases and this has competitiveness
effects in the economy.
In the wage bargaining closure, the real wage is determined according
to the following wage curve:
ln
[
wt
cpit
]
= ϕ− ǫln(ut) (5.12)
In this equation, the bargaining power of workers, and hence the real
consumption wage, is negatively related to the rate of unemployment
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2009). In (5.12),
wt
cpit
is the real consumption
wage, ϕ is a parameter calibrated to the steady state, ǫ is the elasticity
of wage related to the level of unemployment u and takes the value of
0.06 (Layard et al., 1991). Again, I can use the adjusted cpi, cpiτ,t, to
calculate the real wage.
5.4.4 The Government
I assume that the Government faces a balanced budget constraint, as il-
lustrated in equation (A.40) in Appendix A. Tax rates are held constant.
Any variation in revenues driven by variations in economic activity is ab-
sorbed by adjusting Government current spending on goods and services
proportionately.
5.5 Simulations
The simulations are arranged into three main Scenarios. In each Scenario
I introduce a 10% efficiency improvement in motor vehicles and explore
four variants. These variants exhibit different elasticities of substitution
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between private transport and all the other goods and between motor
vehicles and refined fuels. These combinations of elasticities are given
in Table 5.1. I have chosen two specific values for each of the two key
elasticities, one elastic (> 1) and the other inelastic (< 1) and then run
simulations for each of the four possible combinations. This extends the
partial equilibrium analysis outlined in Section 5.3.2 to general equilib-
rium.
Table 5.1: Summary of sub-scenario simulation parameter val-
ues.
Transport & Motor vehicles &
Non Transport Refined Fuels
A) Competitive σm,a = 1.5 Competitive σv,f = 1.2
B) Complementary σm,a = 0.5 Competitive σv,f = 1.2
C) Competitive σm,a = 1.5 Complementary σv,f = 0.3
D) Complementary σm,a = 0.5 Complementary σv,f = 0.3
The Scenarios differ in that I impose a different wage setting process in
each. In Scenario 1, I assume that the real wage is fixed and calculated
using the standard consumer price index. This produces simulations
where, in the long run, all the prices in natural units are unchanged. In
this sense I retain one of the key assumptions of the partial equilibrium
analysis, fixed prices, whilst allowing the aggregate level of economic
activity to change.
In the second Scenario, I again impose a fixed real wage, but in this
case calculated using the adjusted consumer price index, cpiτ , as defined
in equation (5.10). As anticipated, the reduction in the price of private
transport caused by the increase in efficiency in motor vehicles reduces
the cpiτ . The nominal wage therefore falls, reflecting the fact that a lower
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nominal wage will maintain the constant real wage, measured using the
adjusted consumer price index, cpiτ . The reduction in the real wage in-
creases competitiveness. In the third Scenario, I incorporate the wage
bargaining function, detailed in equation (5.12), but again use the ad-
justed consumer price index, cpiτ , to calculate the real wage. In this case,
any aggregate stimulus to the domestic economy that generates a reduc-
tion in the unemployment rate will partly be mitigated by a reduction in
competitiveness.
5.6 Simulation results
I report only long-run equilibrium results, where the conditions in equa-
tion (5.8) are satisfied. This is because I am primarily concerned with
the steady-state impacts, rather than the short-term dynamics of adjust-
ment. However, it was also the case that in earlier test simulations the
short- and long-run results were in fact very similar.
5.6.1 Scenario 1: the model with fixed real wage
and standard cpi
Table 5.2 has two sections. The top section reports percentage changes
in the composition of household consumption; the bottom section, the
impact on key macroeconomic indicators. Each column of the table rep-
resents a different simulation. For each case I report the results for par-
ticular values for the elasticity of substitution between refined fuels and
motor vehicles, σv,f , and between private transport and all other goods,
σm,a.
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Table 5.2: Percentage change from the baseline from a 10% effi-
ciency improvement in households motor vehicles consumption
(Scenario 1)
A B C D
σm,a=1.5 σm,a=0.5 σm,a=1.5 σm,a=0.5
σv,f=1.2 σv,f=1.2 σv,f=0.3 σv,f=0.3
Household consumption
All other goods -0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.03
Private transport 5.82 1.97 5.65 1.90
Price of transport -3.67 -3.67 -3.58 -3.58
Motor vehicles 3.12 -0.64 -2.24 -5.71
Price of vehicles 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Price of vehicles eff units -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00
Fuels 1.18 -2.51 4.50 0.79
Price of fuel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Vehicles intensity in transport 1.16 1.16 -4.03 -4.04
Fuels intensity in transport -0.75 -0.74 2.58 2.58
Macroeconomic impacts
GDP -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.00
cpi 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nominal wage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real wage — — — —
Employment -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.00
Unemployment rate 0.29 -0.27 0.60 0.04
Investment -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.01
Household consumption -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00
Household income -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00
Exports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
The macro-economic changes reported for this Scenario are very small,
so that initially I focus on the micro-economic results for specific sectors.
Because the income variations are slight, the qualitative results are very
close to those derived in the partial equilibrium analysis from Section
5.3.2. To begin, note that in the long run there are no changes in the
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price of vehicles, fuel or the cpi in any of the simulations in this Scenario.
This is as we would expect: the fixed real wage assumption, together
with unvarying, exogenous interest rates and import prices, ensures that
once capacity is fully adjusted, there are no endogenous changes in the
market prices of goods (McGregor et al., 1996).
Because there is no change in the price of fuel or vehicles measured
in natural units, in all of the simulations reported in Table 5.2 the price
of vehicles, measured in efficiency units, falls by 10%, the full amount of
the efficiency gain. This fall in the price of vehicles lowers the price of
private transport. The change in this price varies across the simulations,
reflecting the different elasticities of substitution between vehicles and
fuel imposed in each case. However, this price variation is quite limited,
the range being between reductions of 3.56% and 3.67%. Essentially, the
differences between the outcomes in the individual simulations in this
Scenario reflect how consumers react to the same reduction in the price
of vehicles, in efficiency units, and the corresponding very similar across
simulations - reductions in the price of private transport.
The results reported in column A are for elasticity values for which
both fuel and vehicles, and private transport and other commodities are
competitors. The values of σv,f and σm,a are 1.2 and 1.5 respectively, so
that σv,f < σm,a. Therefore from the analysis in Section 3, we expect
fuel use to rise. In this case, the price of transport falls by 3.67% which
translates to a 5.82% increase demand for, and a 2.15% increase in ex-
penditure on private transport. This output is generated by a 13.12%
increase in vehicles use (in efficiency units) and 1.8% increase in fuels.
With the specific elasticity values adopted in this simulation, the
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change in fuel use is positive. Although the share of fuel in private trans-
port, as measured by
pnff
n
pmm
decreases by 0.75%, reflecting the high elas-
ticity of substitution between fuel and vehicles, this is not large enough
to offset the impact of the increased demand for private transport on the
derived demand for fuels. There is a small, 0.05%, contraction in the
consumption of all other goods.
In column B, the relatively high value of the elasticity of substitution
between vehicles and fuel, σv,f , is retained, but σm,a is reduced to 0.5, so
that private transport and all other goods are now complements. Because
the elasticity of substitution between vehicles and fuel has not changes,
the reduction in price of private transport is as in column A. Following
this reduction, the consumption of private transport increases. However,
the value of σm,a is smaller than for the simulation reported in column A,
so that output of private transport rises only by 1.97% and expenditure on
private transport falls by 1.70%. Vehicle consumption increases by 9.36%
in efficiency units, which corresponds to a 0.64% reduction in physical
units, while fuel input falls by 2.51%. In this case, consumption of all
other goods slightly increases by 0.04%.
In the partial equilibrium analysis in Section 5.3.2, with the parameter
values used in the simulation reported in column B we know unambigu-
ously that refined fuels use will fall. This is because there must be a
lower share of fuels in private transport production and the expenditure
on private transport must also fall and there is no change in the price of
fuel. If this simulation were represented in Figure 5.3, the B curve would
be sloped in the opposite direction.
In the simulation reported in column C, σm,a equals 1.5, as in col-
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umn A, while σv,f equals 0.3. In this simulation, private transport and
all other goods are competitors, but refined fuels and motor vehicles are
complements. This is another case where in the partial equilibrium anal-
ysis in Section 5.3.2 the outcome is unambiguous; fuel use will rise. The
reduction in the price of private transport is here slightly less than in
simulations A and B. This reflects the lower elasticity of substitution be-
tween fuel and vehicles which restricts substitution into the use of the
input whose price has fallen. As a result of the price reduction, consump-
tion of private transport increases by 5.65%. As expected, this increase
in the consumption of private transport is very similar to the correspond-
ing result in column A. In this case, the complementarity between motor
vehicles and fuels means that the use of both increases. Consumption of
vehicles increases by 7.76%, measured in efficiency units, and the con-
sumption of refined fuels increases by 4.50%, measured in natural units.
As in column A, the consumption of all other goods decreases, in this
case by 0.06%.
Finally, for the simulation results reported in column D, I use the
same value for σm,a and σv,f as in simulation B and C respectively. Both
elasticities are less than 1 which implies that both private transport and
all other goods, and refined fuels and motor vehicles are complements.
But again, because σv,f < σm,a, we expect fuel use to rise. The 3.58%
reduction in the price of private transport equals the corresponding fig-
ure in Simulation C, whilst the 1.90% increase in the output of private
transport is similar, but slightly less, than the corresponding result in
Simulation B. Total expenditure on private transport falls by 1.68% but
the share of fuel in private transport increases. The net result is that fuel
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use increases by 0.79%. There is also a small increase in the consumption
of all other goods of 0.03%.
To investigate in more detail the sensitivity of fuel consumption to
changes in elasticity values, I conduct a sensitivity exercise where I vary
in turn both σm,a and σv,f . In these simulations these elasticity values
take 0.2 increments between the values of 0.1 to 1.3 inclusive. Results are
represented in Figure 5.6, where the percentage change in refined fuels is
plotted for each combination of σm,a and σv,f . The figures suggest that the
percentage change in fuel consumption is positively related to the value of
σm,a and negatively related to the value of σv,f . In particular, within the
accuracy of the elasticity values used here, where σm,a > σv,f , then fuel
use increases with an increase in vehicle efficiency; where σv,f > σm,a, fuel
use falls. These simulation results clearly support the analysis of Holden
and Swales (1993).
Recall that in the discussion in Section 5.3.2, I argued that I had no
prior expectation as to the direction of the macroeconomic impact of the
technical progress in vehicles where the natural prices of inputs were held
constant. In the long-run simulations reported in Table 5.2, the product
prices (and therefore also the conventional cpi) do not change. This re-
flects the fixed real-wage labour market closure. In these circumstances,
the macro-economic impact is similar to that generated by a change in
consumer tastes affecting the composition of consumption. If the change
in vehicle efficiency in the production of private transport leads to the
household consumption vector having a higher direct, indirect and in-
duced domestic content, then economic activity will rise: if the change in
consumption choice leads to a reduction in domestic content, aggregate
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Figure 5.6: Percentage change in refined fuels use from a 10%
motor vehicles efficiency increase
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economic activity will fall.11
In the simulations A and C, the consumption of all other goods falls
and the consumption of fuel rises. Both simulations exhibit a decline
in GDP, together with employment, investment, household income and
aggregate household consumption. On the other hand, in simulation B,
where the consumption of all goods increases and the consumption of
fuel falls, all indicators of economic activity rise. In simulation D the
consumption of both all other goods and fuel increases and this produces
11The model here operates as an extended SAM multiplier where exports are exoge-
nous. The change in the consumption vector therefore changes the multiplier values.
The exogenous export expenditure remains unchanged.
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a neutral impact on economic activity. In this simulation the only ag-
gregate variable that shows any change is investment which increases by
0.01%. These results are consistent with the intuitive notion that all
other goods have a relatively high domestic content, whilst fuel has a rel-
atively low one. Outcomes which shift consumption towards the former
and away from the latter have a small stimulating impact on aggregate
economic activity. Note that in this Scenario there is no conflict between
energy reduction and economic expansion: in these simulations, where
fuel use falls, output increases.
5.6.2 Scenario 2: using the adjusted cpi and real
wage
In Scenario 1, the long-run cpi, conventionally measured, is unchanged
from its baseline value because the real wage is fixed and no other mar-
ket price is changing. However, the price of private transport falls by
approximately 3.7%. This price is normally unobserved, as households
self-produce this service and consume it directly without selling it in a
market. It is therefore not included in the standard calculation of the cpi.
As I argue in previous discussion, this may lead to bias in the calculation
of cpi, as stressed by Gordon (2016). For this reason, I here calculate an
adjusted consumer price index, cpiτ , in which the fuel and vehicle prices
are replaced by the price of private transport. I then use this adjusted
consumer price index to derive an adjusted real wage, as explained in
Section 5.4.3.
Table 5.3 reports the simulation results for this Scenario including
the adjusted consumer price index, cpiτ , and both the conventional and
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Table 5.3: Percentage change from the baseline from a 10% effi-
ciency improvement in households motor vehicles consumption
with adjusted cpi (Scenario 2)
A B C D
σm,a=1.5 σm,a=0.5 σm,a=1.5 σm,a=0.5
σv,f=1.2 σv,f=1.2 σv,f=0.3 σv,f=0.3
Household consumption
All other goods 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.09
Private transport 5.87 2.02 5.69 1.95
Price of transport -3.71 -3.71 -3.61 -3.61
Motor vehicles 3.17 -0.57 -2.20 -5.66
Price of vehicles -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Price of vehicles eff units -10.04 -10.04 -10.04 -10.04
Fuels 1.21 -2.46 4.54 0.84
Price of fuel -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Vehicles intensity in transport 1.17 1.17 -4.03 -4.03
Fuels intensity in transport -0.75 -0.75 2.58 2.58
Macroeconomic impacts
GDP 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.13
cpiτ -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
Nominal wage -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
Real wage -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
Real wage (cpiτ deflated) — — — —
Employment 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.13
Unemployment rate -1.80 -2.48 -1.42 -2.11
Investment 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.12
Household consumption 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.06
Household income (cpiτ deflated) 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.11
Exports 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
adjusted real wage. The private transport price reduction triggers a drop
in the cpiτ . In all the simulations where the cpiτ is used to calculate a
constant adjusted real wage, both the adjusted consumer price index and
the nominal wage fall by 0.10%. The conventionally calculated real wage
falls between 0.05% and 0.06%.
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The fall in the nominal wage has three primary impacts. First, the
reduction in product prices, triggered by the fall in the cost of labour,
generates competitiveness-driven expansionary effects. This is reflected
in an increase in export demand, which rises in the long run by 0.09%
in all the simulations in Scenario 2. Second, the lower nominal wage
leads producers to substitute labour for capital in production and reduce
the relative price of labour intensive commodities. This is reflected in
higher employment and in a corresponding reduction in unemployment.
It is important to remember that the import prices are exogenous and
are therefore unchanged. This means that there will be some additional
substitution of vehicles for fuel in the household production of private
transport. Third, household nominal income increases as employment
rises, stimulated by the substitution and output effects already identified,
so that household total consumption increases in all the cases reported
in Table 5.3.
In Scenario 2, in all the simulations GDP is higher, by 0.12% or 0.13%
(in percentage points difference), than the comparable figure for Scenario
1. This means that there is a positive increase in GDP for all the sim-
ulations of between 0.09% and 0.15%. Further, the adjustment to the
consumer price index increases the consumption of particular commodi-
ties, as compared to the results for Scenario 1. Consumption of all other
goods, vehicles and fuel all rise, relative to the corresponding figures in
Table 5.2, by between 0.03% and 0.07%. These changes are relatively
small so as not to affect the qualitative fuel use results. However, in sim-
ulation A the sign on the change in the consumption of all other goods
is affected, with the -0.05% figure in Scenario 1 replaced by 0.01% in
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Scenario 2.
5.6.3 Scenario 3: introducing wage bargaining and
adjusted cpi
In Scenario 2 I introduced cpiτ but maintained a fixed real wage. This
has an impact on key macroeconomic indicators, such as employment,
investment and exports. The economic stimulus from the increased com-
petitiveness delivers a boost to GDP and all the other measures of ag-
gregate economic activity. In Scenario 3 I explore an intermediate case,
where the adjusted consumer price index is used to calculate the real
wage but I relax the fixed real wage assumption by imposing the wage
curve from equation (5.12). The key point is that in this case, if employ-
ment increases with a fixed labour force, the accompanying fall in the
unemployment rate drives an increase in the real wage. In the simula-
tions in Scenario 3 this increase in the wage reduces some of the impact
of the efficiency improvement on competitiveness.
Table 5.4 reports results for this Scenario. It is useful to compare
these with the corresponding figures given in Table 5.3 for Scenario 2.
Note first that the long-run adjusted real wage now increases for all the
simulations as employment rises. Whilst in Table 5.3 the nominal wage
across all simulations falls by 0.10%, this reduction now lies between
0.05% and 0.01%, which limits the reduction in product prices as reflected
in the cpiτ . Also, in the fixed real wage Scenario 2, exports increased by
0.09% across all simulations. With the wage curve in Scenario 3, the long-
run stimulus to exports is now much lower, between 0.01% and 0.04%.
Whilst all simulations in Scenario 3 register increases in GDP and the
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Table 5.4: Percentage change from the baseline from a 10% effi-
ciency improvement in households motor vehicles consumption
with adjusted cpi and wage bargaining (Scenario 3)
A B C D
σm,a=1.5 σm,a=0.5 σm,a=1.5 σm,a=0.5
σv,f=1.2 σv,f=1.2 σv,f=0.3 σv,f=0.3
Household consumption
All other goods -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.04
Private transport 5.84 1.98 5.67 1.91
Price of transport -3.68 -3.68 -3.59 -3.59
Motor vehicles 3.14 -0.63 -2.22 -5.70
Price of vehicles -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
Price of vehicles eff units -10.01 -10.00 -10.02 -10.01
Fuels 1.19 -2.50 4.52 0.80
Price of fuel -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Vehicles intensity in transport 1.17 1.16 -4.03 -4.03
Fuels intensity in transport -0.75 -0.75 2.58 2.58
Macroeconomic impacts
GDP 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
cpiτ -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08
Nominal wage -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03
Real wage -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
Real wage (cpiτ deflated) 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.05
Employment 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
Unemployment rate -0.43 -0.60 -0.34 -0.51
Investment 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
Household consumption 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Household income (cpiτ deflated) 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.08
Exports 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02
other indicators of aggregate economic activity, these are smaller than
the corresponding figures in Scenario 2. The long-run Scenario 3 impacts
on the components of consumption (fuel, vehicles and all other goods) lie
between the Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 values.
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5.7 Discussion
The simulations report the results from modelling private transport as
an energy-intensive self-produced household service. Investigating varia-
tion across the simulations produces an increased understanding of the
relationship between the inputs in the production of this service. Specif-
ically, when considering improvements in the efficiency in the production
of private transport, a vehicle-saving technical improvement can lead to
a reduction in fuel consumption, depending upon the values of key elas-
ticities. However, such a reduction in both the fuel-intensity of private
transport and the use of refined fuels is not brought about by an ex-
ogenous improvement in fuel efficiency. In fact, this is an endogenous
reaction to an improvement in the efficiency of a good closely linked,
either as a substitute or complement, in this case motor vehicles.
This shows the importance of modelling energy-intensive household
services in general, and private transport in particular, as the output
of a number of inputs. Moreover, in determining the overall impact of
technical progress in motor vehicles on the demand for fuel, it is funda-
mental to take into account changes in the demand for private transport.
Such changes in the quantity demanded of the energy-intensive service
generate an additional increase or reduction in the derived demand for
the input goods.
When the cpi is calculated using the conventional method, the macroe-
conomic impact of the technical improvement simply reflects the switch-
ing of demand between different commodities within the household bud-
get. Commodities, which have, directly or indirectly, more domestic con-
tent will have a larger impact on GDP. In the present case, this switching
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depends on the degree of substitution between private transport and the
composite commodity ‘all other goods’, and between fuel and vehicles in
the production of private transport. GDP falls when, following the effi-
ciency change, the consumer reduces expenditure on the consumption of
all other goods competing with private transport, and increases the con-
sumption of fuel. However, I recognise that the structure of consumption
adopted here is extremely rudimentary. In practice the demand impact
will depend heavily on changes in demand for other commodities that
are close substitutes and complements to private transport. For exam-
ple, I would expect consumers to substitute between public and private
transport.
When the adjusted cpi is used, the price of private transport, which is
normally unobserved, is incorporated into the calculation of the real wage.
With a fixed real wage, I then report an increase in competitiveness and
a productivity-led economic stimulus. This is because the nominal wage
falls. This reduces domestic prices, stimulating the demand for exports,
and reducing the demand for imports. It also leads to some substitution
of labour for capital. When workers are able to bargain, the real wage
will rise as the unemployment rate falls, limiting the reduction in the cpi,
the nominal wage and the subsequent increase in economic activity.
5.8 Conclusions
In this paper I have four main aims. First, I attempt to model the
use of energy-intensive consumer services in a more appropriate man-
ner than the conventional approach in the literature. In particular, I
operationalise the approach suggested by Gillingham et al. (2016) by ex-
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plicitly incorporate both energy and non-energy inputs to the supply of
the energy-intensive service and the determination of its price. I adopt,
as an example, the household production of private transport services
using inputs of refined fuels and motor vehicles and I incorporate this
approach into a Computable General Equilibrium model for the UK.
Second, I analyse the impact of an efficiency improvement in the
provision of this energy-intensive service. I distinguish between energy-
and vehicle-improving technical changes and discuss this in a partial and
general equilibrium context.
Third, I investigate, through simulation, the conditions under which
an increase in the efficiency of vehicles in the production of private trans-
port reduces the fuel use in the economy as a whole. The empirical results
from the CGE modelling show that when the elasticity of substitution
between motor vehicles and refined fuels is greater than the elasticity of
substitution between private transport and all other goods, as long as
any positive aggregate output effects are not too large, the consumption
of refined fuels falls.
Fourth, I consider the impact of technical change in the household
consumption sector on the aggregate level of economic activity. Where
the consumer price index is calculated in the standard way, the aggregate
effect on economic activity is very small and can be positive or negative.
This impact is driven solely by the changes in the composition of house-
hold demand and the direct, indirect and induced domestic content of
the affected sectors. However, when the price of private transport, which
is normally not observed, is included in the calculation of cpi, the fall in
the price index reduces the nominal wage and improves competitiveness
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in the economy as a whole. This produces a positive economic stimulus.
This work provides a more sophisticated treatment of private trans-
port demand, as a household self-produced energy-intensive service. While
in this paper I investigate the consequences a technical improvement in
motor vehicles, the modelling framework is clearly suited for the analysis
of technical progress in refined fuels or both vehicle and fuels at the same
time. In fact, I plan in future research, to extend this work to derive a set
of conditions that specify under which circumstances technical progress
in motor vehicles use delivers a better outcome than a refined fuel effi-
ciency improvement (and vice versa), in terms of reduced fuels use and
economic stimulus.
Another natural extension would be to model other energy intensive
services, such as home heating, in a similar way. Here it is crucial to
obtain accurate estimates of the relevant elasticities of substitution be-
cause the results are sensitive to their values. Furthermore, the adoption
of new technological vintages, such as in motor vehicles, require invest-
ment. The accumulation of the new stock of vehicles should be modelled
as a formal investment process similar to the way I model capital stock
accumulation in the production side of the economy. However, whilst this
will affect the time path of the introduction of the more efficient technol-
ogy, it does not affect the long-run analysis applied here. Finally, in the
specific case of motor vehicles, fuels savings from an efficiency improve-
ment have often been offset by the increase in size and weight of vehicles.
A more sophisticated way of modelling private transport services should
therefore identify a framework where variations in these characteristics
are linked to fuel efficiency.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions, extensions and
plans for future research
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6.1 Contributions to, and general lessons
for, the analysis of household energy
efficiency improvements
In this thesis I have analysed the system-wide implications of households’
energy efficiency improvements in Scotland and the UK. The analysis is
conducted by focussing on three main aspects of energy efficiency and
its impacts, reflected in three main self-contained, but interconnected,
papers in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
In Chapter 3 I investigate the implications of moving from the na-
tional case of the UK to the regional case of Scotland in the analysis of
an across the board 5% increase in households’ energy efficiency. I find
that energy efficiency improvements deliver an overall stimulus to the re-
gional economy through boosted real income combined with an increase
in the demand for non-energy goods. That is, increased household en-
ergy efficiency manifests as a straightforward net demand boost to the
wider economy. This has a positive impact on employment, investment
and overall GDP. When I assume no interregional migration of workers,
I find that some of the exports are crowded out by rising domestic prices,
a similar finding to that reported for the national UK case in Lecca et al.
(2014a). On the other hand, when interregional migration is introduced,
this acts to drive domestic prices back to their baseline in the long-run
as labour supply is augmented, so that exports fully recover, and there is
a greater GDP expansion. Nevertheless, there is a net decrease in house-
hold energy consumption, accompanied by a net decrease in industrial
energy use. However, there are positive rebound effects at household and
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economy-wide levels, indicating that actual energy savings are propori-
tionately smaller than may be expected in pure engineering terms as a
result of an increase in energy efficiency. Furthermore, I conclude that
there is a trade-off between the achieved energy savings and the scale
of the GDP stimulus; that is the bigger the economic stimulus from im-
proved household energy efficiency the higher the rebound is likely to be
(though the exact magnitude of both will depend on the composition of
economic activity).
In this first paper I also explore the implications of allowing for the
greater fiscal autonomy that the Scottish Government is in the process
of acquiring. I find that, since the household energy efficiency improve-
ment delivers a small economic expansion, the government enjoys higher
revenue from taxes. When the Government uses the extra revenue to
increase its current expenditure we have an additional positive demand
shock. On the other hand, when revenues are recycled to reduce income
tax rates, this has also positive supply side effects that add to the de-
mand stimulus through increased consumption. This is because the real
after tax consumption wage increases, and there is downward pressure
on nominal wage demands.
Overall, the first paper adds to the still thin literature of system wide
impacts of household energy efficiency improvements. Apart from being
the first study that examines the case of Scotland, it proposes for the first
time energy efficiency improvements as an instrument of regional develop-
ment policy. This is relevant in a current policy debate where the Scottish
Government have identified energy efficiency as a national infrastructure
priority (The Scottish Government, 2017b) and, in September 2016, the
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First Minister announced public spending on energy efficiency as part of
a post-Brexit stimulus package. Moreover, it provides a first attempt to
analyse the implications of such development policy in the context of a
fiscally devolved Scotland. Results from the study can directly input into
the Scottish energy policy debate, given that the recently released Scot-
tish Energy Strategy (The Scottish Government, 2017b) highlights the
key role of energy efficiency in pursuing its energy and climate objectives.
In the second paper, (Chapter 4), I analyse the distributional impact
of improving household residential energy use in the UK. That is, the use
of gas and electricity in delivering household heating and lighting. Here
I focus also on potential options for government to fund the efficiency
improvement programmes via either a temporary increase in income tax
rates or a temporary reallocation of government spending as compared
to a costless energy efficiency improvement. I argue that the economic
expansion from the increased household energy efficiency could provide a
justification for public support of energy efficiency programmes, linking
with the IEA (2014) multiple benefits argument (as with the findings in
the first paper).
Specifically, I question whether only those households that are more
likely to be in fuel poverty should receive help to increase their residen-
tial energy efficiency, or whether there is sufficient economic expansion
to justify wider support. This is explored by contrasting the results of
simulations in which a 10% residential energy efficiency improvement oc-
curs in all households with one where only the poorest household income
group (which corresponds to the lowest income quintile) experiences the
improvement.
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I find that an improvement in residential energy efficiency across all
households delivers a bigger stimulus to the economy than improving
only some household’s energy efficiency. This is because both a larger
base of households receives the efficiency improvement, and because, in
contrast to lower income groups, inclusion of higher income households
reduces reliance on transfers from the Government, with these households
benefiting more from endogenous changes in labour and capital incomes.
In fact, improving only the lowest household income group efficiency still
delivers a small net stimulus to the economy, which is one tenth of the
stimulus delivered by improving all household’s energy efficiency in terms
of GDP. However, the income increase for lower income households is 80%
of what it would be when all household benefit from higher efficiency.
When the Government provides support for energy efficiency, I find
that a temporary reallocation in government spending creates less dis-
tortion in the economy than a rise in income tax rates. This is because
income tax rate influences the real take home wage and this adversely
impacts the supply side of the economy, as workers seek to restore their
net-of-tax real wage. Particularly when efficiency improves only in the
poorest household group, a 10% increase in energy efficiency is not suf-
ficient to generate a net long-run GDP expansion; rather it actually de-
livers a small net contraction, because all households pay higher income
taxes but only one group (the lowest income group with the least spend-
ing power) enjoys the higher efficiency. On the other hand, a temporary
government spending reallocation delivers a small medium term and long-
run GDP expansion. However again, when lower income households are
targeted, the income gains are very close in all cases.
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On the basis of these findings, my recommendation would be that
governments should carefully consider supporting energy efficiency im-
proving programmes in order to realise a wider set of sustained eco-
nomic benefits, but also evaluate which policy instrument delivers the
best overall economic impact, depending on its priority. While improv-
ing all households’ efficiency in energy use delivers a higher stimulus, it
also raises the overall energy use in the economy (across industry as well
as in household personal transportation). On the other hand, when only
poorer households become more energy efficient, there is a smaller stim-
ulus, but the targeted group retains most of the income gains that allow
it to consume more energy and benefit from better heating and lighting.
This second paper contributes to the literature in at least three re-
spects. Firstly, while the previous literature has focussed predominantly
on rebound effects from improved households’ energy efficiency. Here I
propose and implement a system wide approach and analyse the impact
of energy efficiency on the economy as a whole. By taking this perspec-
tive, the presence of rebound effects is only one of the impacts of the
increased efficiency that has to be balanced against a set of macroeco-
nomic impacts.
Secondly, while past studies have typically explored the impact of
household energy efficiency on the aggregate household sector, here I
study the distribution of such impact on five different household income
groups. This allows me to assess the extent to which energy efficiency
policy actions are able to deliver in terms of inclusive growth and acces-
sibility of energy.
Finally, past CGE studies in the same field have assumed that im-
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proving energy efficiency is costless. Although this assumption can be
useful to isolate the pure impact of efficiency, costs involved in the im-
plementation of efficiency measures can impact both the actual energy
savings and the wider economy. For this reason I explore the case where
the Government pays for efficiency via different mechanisms. Ideally, the
simulation scenarios could be repeated in consultation with the Govern-
ment using real estimates of energy efficiency improving investments, to
assess their impact on energy use and on the economy. This is a focus of
current research building on my thesis work.
In the third paper, (Chapter 5), I consider the impact of technical
progress that is not directly energy saving on households fuels consump-
tion, and on the wider economy. To this end, I develop a partial equilib-
rium model in which households do not consume energy directly, but they
use energy together with energy powered appliances to produce energy
services that are energy intensive. I use the example of private transport
as being composed of refined fuels and motor vehicles, by imagining that
households self-produce private transport and consume it directly. Using
diagrams, I illustrate the case where technical improvement in motor-
vehicles deliver reduced refined fuels use and impacts the demand for
private transport. I find that this depends on the substitutability be-
tween the inputs of motor vehicles and fuels, and on the substitutability
between private transport and other goods and services.
I incorporate the partial equilibrium model illustrated in the first part
of the paper into a CGE model for the UK. By simulating a 10% improve-
ment in vehicles efficiency I find that the CGE model delivers results that
are largely consistent with the partial equilibrium framework. I use the
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CGE model to assess the system wide impact of technical progress in
households’ use of motor vehicles. Here I find that a small economic
stimulus is delivered for elasticity values for which the technical progress
triggers a net increase in demand. However, when I calculate the cpi
to include the price of the composite good private transport, which is
normally non observable, the adjusted cpi decreases, and this stimulates
the economy through competitiveness.
The contribution of the work to the literature in this case is both the-
oretical and empirical. The previous literature has often modelled energy
as if it is consumed directly, or considered energy services composed of
technology and physical energy where technology only in terms of trans-
forming physical energy in energy services. This implies that that the
price of the service is a function of the price of physical energy and effi-
ciency of energy use. Here, I show how energy services can be modelled
as composite goods of physical energy and technology and that technical
improvements in both inputs can potentially reduce (or increase) physical
energy use and influence the price of the service. While, for simplicity,
I use the example of private transport, the modelling framework can be
easily extended (where appropriate data are available) to consider other
services such has home heating. Using this framework it is possible to
identify the implicit price of private transport (or any other energy in-
tensive service). This price can then be used to adjust the calculation of
the cpi and this has significant implications for the economy-wide impact
of technical improvements in the production of motoring services.
From a policy perspective, this paper shows how a reduction in physi-
cal energy can be achieved through technical progress that is not directly
177
fuel’ saving depending on the substitutability between fuels and vehicles,
and on the price elasticity of private transport service.1 Furthermore,
the macroeconomic impact of such efficiency improvements can deliver
a positive stimulus to the economy, especially if the cpi is adjusted to
account for the increased efficiency in consumer goods, such as motor
vehicles, as Gordon (2016) suggests. Based on this findings my recom-
mendation would be that governments should not only focus on energy
efficiency improvements but look more in generally at technical progress
in designing policy initiatives that simultaneously reduce energy use and
carbon emissions and maintain or stimulate economic development.
6.2 Contributions to CGEmodelling of house-
hold energy efficiency changes
Throughout the thesis, the impact of efficiency improvements in house-
hold’s energy use are analysed using CGE modelling techniques. The
choice of this modelling approach reflects my concern with the several
system-wide ramifications of household energy efficiency changes. Pro-
viding this analysis has involved the development of parts of existing
Scottish and UK CGE models, named AMOS-ENVI and UK-ENVI re-
spectively, to consider the specific research issues that are the focus of
each chapter. Specifically, I focus on the household consumption side
and develop alternative consumption models that can be adopted for the
1Clearly, the same modelling set-up can be used to analyse the impact of fuel
saving technical improvements, and again it is possible to identify a range of elasticity
values that will always deliver a reduction in fuel use.
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analysis of potential energy policies. This includes also the development
of my own computer codes of the model in GAMS.
In Chapter 3 I take the most recent version of the AMOS-ENVI model
used in (Lecca et al., 2013) and extend it to include a consumption func-
tion that reflects the decision of a representative household consuming
energy and non-energy goods as imperfect substitutes.
In Chapter 4, I extend the UK-ENVI model in Lecca et al. (2014a) by
modifying the consumption function so that residential energy use, the
consumption of energy for transport, and the consumption of non-energy
use, are considered alternative choices for the consumer. In this work, I
also try to improve the assumption of a single forward looking household
utility maximiser, by separately modelling the preferences of five different
household groups corresponding to five different agents. Moreover, I in-
troduce mixed expectations in the model for the first time, by assuming
that while households are myopic, investors are forward looking profit
maximisers. Potentially, the model can also accommodate mixed expec-
tations formation processes between the different household groups, so
that some groups can be myopic and others forward looking. This con-
stitutes a step towards the development of a behavioural CGE model of
household consumption.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I further extend the UK-ENVI model and con-
sider household energy-intensive commodities by using the example of
private transport. Specifically, I assume that household self-produce pri-
vate transport, for which there is no corresponding supply sector, by
combining motor vehicles and refined fuels purchased from the corre-
sponding supply sectors, and then consume it directly without selling it
179
into a market. This implies that this framework can capture the implicit
price of private transport and it depends on both the price of vehicles
and the price of fuels. In this setting it is possible to analyse how even
technical progress that is not fuel saving can have an impact on fuel use.
Moreover, it allows me to adjust the calculation of the cpi by using the
price of private transport.
6.3 Extensions and plans for the future
With this work I show that energy efficiency proves to be much more
than simply an instrument for the reduction of final energy use. In fact,
I show that, with energy efficiency improvements it is possible to simul-
taneously deliver a reduction in energy use, reduce inequality and energy
inequality, and stimulate the wider economy. I also show that other types
of technical progress can deliver both in terms of physical energy use re-
duction and stimulus to the economy, when these occur in the technology
input of energy intensive services. For this reason, I believe that future
research should focus more on double or even multiple dividends and
multiple benefits of energy efficiency policies, and not be limited solely
to the assessment of the rebound effect, as this may discourage policy
makers from properly evaluating the effectiveness of energy efficiency im-
provement as an energy policy instrument of wider economic policy, as
well as energy policy, conventionally defined.
The analysis in this thesis focusses on the cases of the UK and Scot-
land, and tackles only some of the complex issues that are linked to energy
efficiency and energy programmes in general. Moreover, the economic
modelling frameworks used in this work could be improved potentially
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to increase the depth and the accuracy of the analysis. Here, I outline
some potential extensions of this work, which also form plans for future
research.
First, because my focus is on both Scotland and the UK, one natural
extension is to look at the impacts of energy efficiency in an explicitly
interregional setting, by developing and applying a two region model
of Scotland and the Rest of UK (RUK). This enables consideration of
interregional feedback and spillover effects. In fact, Scotland and the
rest of UK are two highly integrated regions of the same country, with
strong links in trade, labour market, regulations and other policies. Any
impact from energy efficiency changes (and any other policy) in one region
would necessarily impact the other, and this would ultimately influence
the overall impact of such policies, in Scotland, the RUK and the UK as
a whole.
The interregional setting is also particularly important for the evalu-
ation and implementation of new energy policies in the light of the new
devolved fiscal powers that Scotland is in the process of acquiring, and
of the decision of the UK to leave the European Union. Any analysis in-
volving asymmetric policies between the two regions should not neglect
the connections between the central and the devolved governments, and
their links through the goods and job market. For example, the ‘no detri-
ment’ principle whereby fiscal decisions in Scotland should not adversely
impact the rest of UK and vice versa, can be hugely important in the
assessment of the implications of energy policies in a fiscally devolved
Scotland, or in a (at least temporarily) less internationally integrated
UK. To this end, I have recently been working with an interregional
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model of Scotland and RUK to look at impacts of future potential trade
agreements in light of new international scenarios including the possibil-
ity of leaving the European single market area.2 My plan is to develop
the CGE model used in this analysis in order to have a multiregional
energy model of Scotland and RUK, which in principle is able to deal
with energy-economic-environment issues in a wider and more complex
(and complete) spatial framework.
Second, both the Scottish and the UK Governments have now adopted
an energy systems model called TIMES.3 This is a modelling tool that
generates energy systems for a given geographic area, by minimising the
cost of delivering energy given a set of constraints. Although TIMES is
a useful tool to inform decisions on energy systems implementation, it is
not capable of analysing the economic impact of these systems. Given
the extent of the interrelation of the energy economy and environmental
sub-systems, TIMES use should be supported by other modelling ap-
proaches such as CGE models. For this reason there is wide interest in
understanding how TIMES and an energy CGE model may be linked and
how policy makers should use these two modelling frameworks to inform
their decisions. For instance, TIMES takes some economic parameters
exogenously, such as GDP trends and prices, which could be taken from
a CGE model. On the other hand, CGE models could use bottom-up
information on energy supply curves from TIMES (see for example Bye
et al., 2015; Fortes et al., 2014). Currently, I am involved in a research
2The output of this research is summarised in Roy et al. (2016)
3TIMES is the acronym of The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System. In turn
MARKAL is the acronym of Market Allocation and EFOM is Energy Flow Optimi-
sation Model.
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project that is starting to explore possible links between the Scottish
CGE model developed in this thesis and the Scottish TIMES model.4
However the work is still in its initial stages.
Third, CGE models’ micro foundations rely on assumptions that may
not entirely reflect the structure of real economic systems. A growing
literature in behavioural economics is constantly challenging some of the
neo-classical impositions in economic theory, and this stimulates a debate
on the micro foundations of CGE models. For this reason, I believe
that it is important to test the implication of incorporating elements
of behavioural economics into the CGE framework, and to move, when
appropriate, towards a behavioural CGE model.
In this thesis I have already taken some steps in this direction, by in-
troducing different expectations formation processes between consump-
tion (myopic) and investment (forward-looking) behaviour (see Chap-
ter 4) to reflect the fact that households have less foresight than firms.
However, here there are a number of models that we can borrow from
behavioural economics that would represent intermediate steps between
full myopic and completely forward-looking consumers. For instance,
the forward looking consumption behaviour assumes that consumers dis-
count future utility, at a constant rate over time. However, empirical and
experimental research find (Laibson, 1997) that individuals may have de-
clining rates of time preference, which means that they discount more
over a longer period of time. This behaviour has been described as hy-
perbolic discounting, to reflect the fact that consumers are impatient and
4The project started in September 2016. Details can be
found here https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/en/projects/
climatexchange-201617(dbdda63d-51da-48da-a64c-cdaf0076798a).html
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draw more utility from consumption over a shorter period of time, and
therefore their discounted function takes the form of a hyperbola.
Another interesting intermediate case is the idea that consumers ex-
hibit some habit formation behaviour (Boldrin et al., 2001; Sundaresan,
1989). In the myopic consumption model, consumers base their consump-
tion on current disposable income, while in the forward looking model
they base consumption decisions on future discounted wealth. In habit
formation models, consumer’s preferences can be affected by past levels
of consumption. This habit can also be linked to external aggregate con-
sumption rather than only to the consumer’s past consumption, to reflect
the fact that consumption decisions are influenced by the current state
of the economy.
From the production side of the model, the assumption of perfectly
competitive firms may be challenging to support in the market for energy
where most firms operate in an oligopolistic or monopolistic competition
setting (see for example Balistreri and Rutherford, 2013). Here, together
with the research group of the Centre for Energy Policy and the Fraser
of Allander Institute of the University of Strathclyde, I am already look-
ing at improving the representation of the electricity sector. Specifically
we are looking at the impact of modelling this industry as a monopoly,
oligopoly and monopolistic competitive sector, starting from the limiting
case, where the price of electricity is exogenous and not determined in
the market.
Fourth, energy efficiency is only one of the instruments used by policy
makers in trying to meet ambitious energy and environmental targets.
As we have seen this instrument is relevant not only for the impact on
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final energy use but also for the wider economic implications. However,
there are other policies that can be used together with energy efficiency
to deliver on these objectives, and to which the modelling framework
developed in this thesis would be immediately applicable. For example,
interest is growing in carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies
are becoming more popular in Scotland and the UK, for the potential
impact of investment in the sector and on the possibility of retaining
more carbon intensive activities, by ‘cleaning’ their emissions. Analysis of
the energy-environment-economic implications of the introduction of such
technology can in principle be analysed using the modelling framework
developed in this thesis, provided that adequate data are available, even
though in this case there are issues related with the introduction of a new
technology.
Alternative energy sources such as renewables are also very popular
especially in Scotland. Here price mechanisms such as induced substitu-
tion via improved efficiency, or other instruments, can be analysed in a
CGE framework in order to assess the impact of increasing the share of
energy produced by renewables consumed by households, and the wider
implications for the economy. For example, should an energy efficiency
improvement in household consumption result in a higher consumption
of energy produced by renewables this could where there is less concern
about the rebound effect given the negligible impact on carbon emissions.
Finally, another interesting focus would be carbon taxes and other
energy or environmental taxes. Although these are a controversial instru-
ment, because they may induce distortionary effects in the economy, and
cause pollution spillover, the carbon tax is regarded by some economists
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as an effective instrument to reduce carbon emissions and preserve natu-
ral resources. Moreover, in the case where carbon taxes are compensated
by a reduction in other type of taxes, such as income tax, the distor-
tionary effects can be minimised, as has been shown in a past Scottish
focussed study (Allan et al., 2014). Again, given the increasing devolved
fiscal powers that Scotland is set to enjoy in the near future, carbon taxes
should be regarded as an interesting subject in the context of UK regions
interactions under different fiscal regimes.
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A The mathematical presentation of the
AMOS and UK-ENVI models
A.1 The default model
Prices
PMi,t = PMi (A.1)
PEi,t = PEi (A.2)
PQI,T =
PRi,t ·Ri, t+ PMi,t ·Mi, t
Ri, t+Mi, t
(A.3)
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V IRi,j,t
=
[(
δvmj
1− δvirj
)
·
(
PIRi,t
PMi,t
)] 1
1−ρA
j
(A.22)
V IRi,j,t = Y
vir
i ·
[
δvii · V I
ρAi
i,t + (1− δ
vr
i ) · VM
ρAi i, t
] 1
ρA
i (A.23)
V Ri,j,t
V Ii,j,t
=
[(
δvrj
1− δvij
)
·
(
PIi,t
PRi,t
)] 1
1−ρA
j
(A.24)
Ei,t = E¯t ·
(
PEi,t
PQi,t
)ρxi
(A.25)
Regional (or national in UK ENVI) demand
Ri,t =
∑
i
V Ri,j,t +
∑
i
QHRi,h,t +QV Ri,t +QGRi,t (A.26)
Total absorption equation
Xi,t +Mi,t =
∑
i
V Vi,j,t +
∑
i
QHi,h,t +QVi,t +QGi,t + Ei,t (A.27)
Households and other domestic institutions
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U t(ct) =
T−t∑
i=1
(1 + ρ)−t
C1−σt − 1
1− σ
(A.28)
Ct
Ct+1
=
[
PCt · (1 + ρ)
PCt+1 · (1 + r)
]
−
1
σ
(A.29)
Wt = NFWt + FWt (A.30)
NFWt(1 + r) = NFWt+1 + (1− τt)L
s
t(1− ut)wt + Trft (A.31)
FWt(1 + r) = FWt+1 +Πt + St (A.32)
Trft = Pct · Trf (A.33)
St = mps · [(1− τt)L
s
t(1− ut)wt + Trft] (A.34)
QHz,t =
(
δfρ
c
i ·
Pct
PQz,t
)rhoci
·NEct (A.35)
QHI,t = γ
f
i
[
δhirQHIR
ρAi
t + (1− δ
hm)QHM
ρAi
t
] 1
ρA
i (A.36)
QHIRi,t
QHMi,t
=
[(
δhiri
1− δhmi
)
·
(
PMi,t
PRi,t
)] 1
1−ρA
(A.37)
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QHIRI,t = γ
fir
i
[
δhrQHR
ρhri
t + δ
hiQHI
ρAi
t
] 1
ρA
i (A.38)
QHRi,t
QHIi,t
=
[(
δhri
1− δhii
)
·
(
PIi,t
PRi,t
)] 1
1−ρA
(A.39)
Government
FDt = Gt · PGt +
∑
dgins
TRGdngins,t · PCt−
(
dg ·
∑
i
rki, t ·Ki,t +
∑
i
IBTi, t+
∑
i
Lj, t · wt + FEǫt
) (A.40)
In the national model a balanced budged constraint is assumed and Gov-
ernment consumption becomes endogenous.
QGi,t = δ
g
i ·Gt (A.41)
QGRi, t = QGi, t;QGMi, t = 0; (A.42)
Investment demand
QVi,t =
∑
j
KMi,j · Jj,t (A.43)
QVI,t = γ
v
i
[
δqvmQVM
ρAi
t + (1− δ
qvir)QV IR
ρAi
t
] 1
ρA
i (A.44)
QVMi,t
QV IRi,t
=
[(
δqvmi
δqviri
)
·
(
PIRi,t
PMi,t
)] 1
1−ρA
(A.45)
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QV IRI,t = γ
vir
i
[
δqviQV I
ρAi
t + (1− δ
qvr)QV R
ρAi
t
] 1
ρA
i (A.46)
QV Ri,t
QV Ii,t
=
[(
δqvri
δqvii
)
·
(
PIi,t
PRi,t
)] 1
1−ρA
(A.47)
Time path of investment
Ji,t = Ii,t

1− bb− tk + β
2
(
Ii,t
Ki,t
− α
)2
Ii,t
Ki,t

 (A.48)
It
Kt
= α +
1
β
·
[
λi,t
Pkt
− (1− bb− tk)
]
(A.49)
λ˙i,t = λi,t(rt + δ)−R
k
i,t (A.50)
θ(xt) =
β
2
(xt − α)
2
xt
; and xt =
xt
kt
(A.51)
Rki,t = rkt − Pk + t
[
Ii,t
Ki,t
]2
θ′t(I/K) (A.52)
Factors accumulation
KSi,t+1 = (1− δ)KSi,t + Ii,t (A.53)
Ki,t = KSi,t (A.54)
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LSt+1 = (1+ζ−v
u
[
ln(ut)− ln(u¯
N)
]
+vw
[
ln(wt/cpit)− ln(w¯
N/cpi
N
)
]
)·LSt
(A.55)
Equation (A.55) is only appears in AMOS-ENVI
LSt · (1− ut) =
∑
j
Lj,t (A.56)
Indirect taxes and subsidies
IBTi,t = btaxi ·Xi,t · PQi,t (A.57)
Total demand for import and current account
Mi,t =
∑
i
V Ii,j,t+
∑
i
VMi,j,t+
∑
i
QHMi,h,t+QGMi,t+QV Ii,t+QVMi,t
(A.58)
TBt =
∑
i
Mi,t · PMi,t −
∑
i
Ei,t · PEi,t + ǫ ·
( ∑
dngins
REMdngind + FE
)
(A.59)
Assets
V Fi,t = λi,t ·Ki,t (A.60)
Dt+1 = (1 + r) ·Dt + TB + t (A.61)
210
Pgt+1 ·GDt+1 =
[
1 + r +
(
Pct+1
Pct
− 1
)]
· PGt ·Gdt + FDt (A.62)
Steady state conditions
δ ·KSi,T = Ii,t (A.63)
Rki,T = λi,T (r + δ) (A.64)
FDt =
[
1 + r +
(
Pct+1
Pct
− 1
)]
· PGt ·Gdt (A.65)
TBT = r ·Dt (A.66)
NFWt · r = (1− τt)L
s
t(1− ut)wt + Trft (A.67)
FWt · r = Π− St + Trft (A.68)
To produce short-run and long-run results
KSi,t=1 = KSi,t=0 (A.69)
LSi,t=1 = LSi,t=0 (A.70)
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GDi,t=1 = GDi,t=0 (A.71)
Di,t=1 = Di,t=0 (A.72)
A.2 Extensions to AMOS-ENVI for Chapter 3
Prices
PNEt =
∑
z PQz,t · V¯z∑
z PQz · V¯z
(A.73)
PENt =
∑
E PQE,t · V¯E∑
E PQE · V¯E
(A.74)
Consumption
Ct =
[
δE(γECt)
ρe + (1− δE)NECρet
]
−
1
ρe (A.75)
Ect =
(
γεδE ·
Pct
PENt
) 1
1−ρe
· Ct (A.76)
Ect =
[
δcoCO
ρg
t + (1− δ
co)EG
ρg
t
] 1
ρg (A.77)
COt
EGct
=
[(
δco
1− δco
)
·
(
PEGt
PCOt
)] 1
1−ρg
(A.78)
COt =
[
δclCLρot + (1− δ
co)OILρot
] 1
ρo (A.79)
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CLt
OILt
=
[(
δcl
1− δcl
)
·
(
PQoil,t
PQcoal,t
)] 1
1−ρ0
(A.80)
QHz,t =
(
δfρ
c
i ·
Pct
PQz,t
)rhoci
·NEct (A.81)
EGt =
[
δEleEleρelt + (1− δ
el)GASρelt
] 1
ρel (A.82)
Elet
GASt
=
[(
δGAS
1− δGAS
)
·
(
PQGAS,t
PQEle,t
)] 1
1−ρel
(A.83)
QHele,t = Ect (A.84)
QHGAS,t = GASt (A.85)
QHCoal,t = CLt (A.86)
QHOIL,t = OILt (A.87)
A.3 Extensions to UK-ENVI for Chapter 4
Prices
PTNEt =
∑
z PQz,t · V¯z∑
z PQz · Q¯Hz
(A.88)
PREt =
∑
E PQE,t · V¯E∑
E PQE · Q¯HE
(A.89)
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Consumption
Ch,t = Y NGh,t − SAVh,t −HTAXh,t − CTAXh,t (A.90)
Equation (A.90) replaces equations (A.28) to (A.32) to produce myopic
behaviour in household intertemporal consumption
Ch,t =
[
δEh (γREt,h)
ρe + (1− δEh )TNEC
ρe
h,t
]
−
1
ρe (A.91)
REh,t =
(
γρeh δ
E
h ·
PCh,t
PREh,t
) 1
1−ρe
· Ch,t (A.92)
TNECh,t =
(
γρneh (1− δ
E
h ) ·
PCh,t
PNENh,t
) 1
1−ρhe
· Ch,t (A.93)
QHne,h,t = δ
NE
h ·
(
PCh,t
PQne,h,t
) 1
1−ρhne
·QNTRAh,t (A.94)
QHe,h,t = δ
NE
h ·
(
PCh,t
PQe,h,t
) 1
1−ρhe
·REh,t (A.95)
Equations (A.33) to (A.39) are indexed in ‘h’ to identify the differ-
ences between different household income groups.
A.4 Extensions to UK-ENVI for Chapter 5
Prices
PFt =
∑
f PQf,t · Q¯Hf∑
f PQf · Q¯Hf
(A.96)
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Consumption
Ct = Y NGt − SAVt −HTAXt − CTAXt (A.97)
Equation (A.97) replaces equations (A.28) to (A.32) to produce myopic
behaviour in household intertemporal consumption
Ct =
[
δTR(TRt)
ρm,a + (1− δTR)A
ρm,a
h,t
]
−
1
ρm,a (A.98)
TRt =
(
γ
σm,a
h δ
TR
·
PCt
PTRt
) 1
1−ρm,a
· Ct (A.99)
At =
(
γσm,a(1− δTR) ·
PCt
PAt
) 1
1−ρm,a
· Ct (A.100)
TRt =
[
δV (γV Ct)
ρv,f + (1− δV )F
ρv,f
t
]− 1
ρv,f (A.101)
V Ct =
(
γ
σv,r
h δ
V
·
PTRt
PVt
) 1
1−ρv,f
· TRt (A.102)
Ft =
(
γσv,rδF ·
PTRt
PFt
) 1
1−ρv,f
· TRt (A.103)
QHa,t = delta
A
·
(
PCt
PQa,t
) 1
1−σa
· At (A.104)
QHveichles,t = V Ct (A.105)
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QHfuels,t = Ft (A.106)
Time path of investment
Equations (A.48) to (A.52) are substitute by the following equations, in
order to produce the time path of myopic investment.
Ii,t = v ·
[
KS∗i,t −KSi,t
]
+ δ ·KSi,t (A.107)
KS∗j,t =
(
Axρ
X
j δki ·
PYj,t
uckt
) 1
1−ρx
j
· Yi,t (A.108)
A.5 Glossary
Set
i, j i = j the set of goods or industries
ins the set of institutions
dins(⊂ ins) the set of domestic institutions
dngins(⊂ dins) the set of non-government institutions
fins(⊂ dins) the set of foreign institutions
h(⊂ dngins) the set of households
Z(⊂ i) the set of energy sectors including transport
E(⊂ i) the set of energy sectors excluding fuels transport
NE(⊂ i) the set of non-energy
(a ⊂ i) the set of non-private transport
(m ⊂ i) the set of private transport
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(v ⊂ m) the set of motor vehicles
(r ⊂ m) the set of refined fuels
Prices
PYi,t value added price
PRi,t regional price
PQi,t output price
PIRi,t national commodity price(regional+RUK)
wt unified nominal wage
wbt after tax wage
rki,t rate of return to capital
Pkt capital good price
UCKt user cost of capital
λt shadow price of capital
Pct aggregate consumption price
PEt consumption price of energy
PNEt consumption price of non-energy
PREt consumption price of residential energy
PNENt consumption price of non-energy and transport
PTRt consumption price of private transport
PAt consumption price non private transport
PVt consumption price motor vehicles
PRt consumption price refined fuels
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PGt aggregate price of Government consumption goods
ex exchange rage (fixed)
Endogenous variables
Xi,t total output
Ri,t regional supply
Mi,t total import
Ei,t total export (interregional+regional)
Yi,t value added
Li,t labour demand
Ki,t physical capital demand
KSi,t capital stock
LSi,t labour supply
V Vi,j,t total intermediate inputs
Vi,t total intermediate inputs in i
V Ri,j,t regional intermediate inputs
VMi,j,t ROW intermediate inputs
V IRi,j,t national intermediate inputs (Scotland+RUK)
V Ii,j,t RUK intermediate inputs
Gt aggregate Government expenditure
QGi,t Government expenditure by sector i
QGRi,t regional Government expenditure by sector i
QGMi,t national Government expenditure by sector i
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Ct aggregate household consumption
Ect household consumption of energy
NEct household consumption of non-energy goods
COt household consumption of coal and oil
EGt household consumption of electricity and gas
ELEt household consumption of electricity
GASt household consumption of gas
CLt household consumption of coal
OILt household consumption of oil
REh,t household consumption of residential energy
TNECh,t household consumption of non-energy and transport
TRt household consumption of private transport
At household consumption of non-private transport
V Ct household consumption of motor vehicles
Ft household consumption of refined fuels
QHi,t household consumption by sector i
QHRi,t household regional consumption by sector i
QHIRi,t regional+RUK consumption by sector i
QHMi,t imported consumption by sector i
QVi,t total investment by sector of origin i
QV Ri,t regional investment by sector of origin i
QIRi,t ROW investment demand by sector i
219
QV Ii,t RUK investment demand by sector i
Ij,t investment by sector of destination j
Jj,t investment by destination j with adjustment cost
ut regional unemployment rate
uNt national unemployment rate
Rki,t marginal revenue of capital
St domestic non-government savings
Trft household net transfer
Trsfdngins,dnginsp,t transfer among dngins
HTAXt total household tax
TBt current account balance
Exogenous variables
REM t remittance for dngins
FEt remittance for Government
GSAVt Government savings
r interest rate
Elasticities
σ constant elasticity of marginal utility
ρXi elasticity of substitution between intermediate and value added
ρYi elasticity of substitution between capital and labour
ρAi elasticity of substitution in Armington function
ρxi elasticity of export with respect to term trade
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ρei substitution in consumption between energy and non-energy
ρgi substitution in consumption between CO and EG
ρoi substitution in consumption between coal and oil
ρeli substitution in consumption between electricity and gas
ρv,f substitution between vehicles and fuels
ρa,m substitution between transport and rest of goods
Parameters
αVi,j input-output coefficients for i used in j
αYj share of value added in production
δY,Vj share in CES output function in sector j
δk,lj share in value added function in sector j
δvir,vm,vr,vii,j share in CES function for intermediate goods
δqvvir,qvm,qvr,qvii,j share in CES function for investment
δE,co,cli,j share in CES function for household consumption
δhr,hmi,j share of regional and imported consumption in CES
δgr,gmi,j share in CES function for Government consumption
γvv,viri,j shift paramenter in CES for intermediate goods
γfi shift paramenter in CES for household consumption
γgi shift paramenter in CES for Government consumption
btaxi rate of business tax
KMi,j physical capital matrix
mps rate of saving dngins
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τ rate of income tax
ρ pure rate of consumer time preference
bb rate of distortion or incentive to invest
δ depreciation rate
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B Industries included in the AMOS ENVI
model
Table B.1: The industrial disaggregation of the AMOS ENVI
21- sectors model and corresponding Standard Industrial Clas-
sification (SIC) code in the 2009 Scottish SAM
Sector’s name Original sector from
the 104 Scot IO table (SIC)
Agriculture, forestry and logging 01-03
Sea fishing and fish farming 03.1-0.32
Mining and extraction 06-09
Food, drink and tobacco 10.1-12
Textiles and clothing 13-15
Mfr Chemicals etc 20.3-23other
Metal and non-metal goods 24.1-25
Transport and other machinery 27-30
Other manufacturing 16-18, 31-33
Water, sewerage and waste 36-39
Construction 41-43
Distribution 45-47, 55-56
Transport 49.1-53
Communications, finance and business 58-71, 73-82
R&D 72
Education 85
Public and other services 84, 86-97
Coal extraction 05
Oil (refining and distribution) 19-20B
Gas 35.2-35.3
Electricity 35.1
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C Industries included in the UK-ENVI model
Table C.1: The industrial disaggregation of the UK-ENVI 30
sectors model from the original 2010 UK IO table
Sector’s name Original sector
from 2010 IO table (SIC)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 01-03.2
Mining and quarrying 05
Crude petroleum and natural gas + coal 06-08
Other Mining and mining services 09
Food (and tobacco) 10.1-10.9, 12
Drink 11.01-11.07
Textile, leather, wood 13-16
Paper and printing 17-18
Coke and refined petroleum products 19-20B
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 20.3-21
Rubber, cement, glass 22-23other
Iron, steel and metal 24.1-25
Electrical manufacturing 26-28
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers etc. 29
Transport equipment and other manufacturing 30-33
Electricity, transmission and distribution 35.1
Gas distribution 35.2-35.3
Water treatment and supply and sewerage 36-37
Waste management and remediation 38-39
Construction-Buildings 41-43
Wholesale and retail trade 45-47
Land and transport 49.1-49.2
Other transport 49.3-51
Transport support 52-53
Accommodation and food and services 55-56, 58
Communication 59-63
Services 64-82, 97
Education health and defence 84-88
Recreational 90-94
Other private services 95, 97
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D Calculating the rebound effects
In general terms the rebound effect can be defined as one minus the ratio
between actual energy savings (AES) and potential energy savings (PES)
from an increase in energy efficiency so that:
R = 1−
(
AES
PES
)
· 100 (D.1)
It is normally expressed in percentage. Depending on how AES are
measured we may distinguish between different types of rebound effects.5
In Chapter 4, I focus on the general equilibrium household rebound from
an improvement in household residential energy use. However I also re-
port the full general equilibrium household rebound across all the energy
types (residential+refined fuels for private transport), and the economy-
wide rebound, which is across the whole economy (household+industries)
from an efficiency improvement in residential energy use. Finally I cal-
culate the general equilibrium household rebound effect for each of the
household group described in the paper. In this Appendix I show how
these are calculated and what are the relations among these different
measures of rebound.
For simplicity let us start from the case where all household groups
improve energy efficiency at the same time in the use of residential energy
use, and calculate the household rebound in the household’s use of resi-
dential energy. This calculation will be identical if any household energy
5For extended discussions about different levels of rebound effects see for example
Dimitropoulos (2007), Gillingham et al. (2016), Greening et al. (2000), Jenkins et al.
(2011), Sorrell (2007), Turner (2013). For the specific taxonomy used in this thesis,
please refer to Chapter 3, Section 3.2.
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efficiency improvement occurs in a one or more household energy uses j
that are not total household energy consumption, for j=(electricity, gas,
coal, refined fuels). For this reason here I refer to a generic household
rebound in the use of j, which I call Rj.
The household rebound in j can be derived as:
Rj =
(
1 +
E˙j
γj
)
· 100 (D.2)
where E˙j
6 is the proportionate change in household consumption of j
and γj > 0 is the proportionate change in efficiency of j. When −E˙j = γj
the reduction in the residential energy consumption equals the increment
in efficiency and there is no rebound effect. However, if the proportionate
change in consumption of j is lower than the increase in efficiency there
is rebound effect.
The total household rebound effect from an efficiency increase in j,
RC is derived as:
RC =
(
1 +
E˙C
γjαj
)
· 100 (D.3)
where E˙C =
∑j Ej and represents the proportionate change in total
household energy consumption in response to an efficiency improvement
in household consumption of j, and αj is the initial share of consumption
of j in total household energy use (across all j = 1, ..., N).7 The term
E˙C/γjαj can be written as:
6Note that because here I are measuring AES as the proportionate change in Ej
and this is expected to be negative, I need to change the sign in equation D.2.
7When energy efficiency is improved in all household energy uses I have that∑N
j=1 αj = 1 and the term α disappears.
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E˙C
γjαj
=
∆EC
γjEj
=
∆Ej +∆EC,−j
γjEj
=
E˙j
γj
+
∆EC,−j
γjEj
(D.4)
where ∆ represents absolute change and the subscript −j indicates all
households energy uses excluding the specific j for which efficiency has
improved. Substituting (D.4) into (D.3) and using (D.2) we have that:
RC = Rj +
(
∆EC,−j
γjEj
)
· 100 (D.5)
Equation (D.5) indicates that the total household rebound depends
on the net change in the aggregate household energy consumption. When
the efficiency improvement in j results in a positive (negative) absolute
change in all the other energy types −j then the households total rebound
is bigger (smaller) than the specific sector household rebound.
Finally, I derive the full economy-wide rebound as:
RT =
(
1 +
E˙T
γjβj
)
· 100 (D.6)
where E˙T measures the proportionate change in energy use across all
the sectors in production and consumption and βj is the initial share of
energy use j in the whole economy. Accordingly, I can express the term
E˙T/γjβj as:
E˙T
γjβj
=
∆ET
γjEj
=
∆Ej +∆EC,−j +∆ET,−C
γjEj
=
E˙j
γj
+
∆EC,−j
γjEj
+
∆ET,−C
γjEj
(D.7)
Where the subscript T,−C indicates all energy uses in the economy
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except for household energy consumption. Substituting (D.7) in (D.6)
and using (D.2) and (D.3) I obtain:
RT = RC +
(
∆ET,−C
γjEj
)
· 100 (D.8)
Equation (D.8) indicates that the economy-wide rebound will be larger
(smaller) than the household rebound effect if there is a net increase (de-
crease) in the energy used by the rest of economy.
Let us now consider the case where only one household group h im-
proves energy efficiency in consumption of j. In this case I derive house-
hold group’s rebound in the use of j, Rh,j, and total household rebound
from an efficiency improvement in the single group use of j, Rj. We can
derive group’s h household rebound in the use of j similarly to (D.2) so
that:
Rh,j =
(
1 +
E˙h,j
γh,j
)
· 100 (D.9)
where h is a the set for household groups, that is h = (HG1, . . . , HG5).
To derive, the total household rebound across all groups from an efficiency
improvement in j in only one group I use the following expression:
Rj =
(
1 +
E˙j
γjβh,j
)
· 100 (D.10)
where βh,j is the share of one group consumption of j in total house-
hold energy consumption. Again, even in this case I can write:
E˙j
γjβh,j
=
∆Ej
γjEh,j
=
∆Eh,j +∆Ej,−h
γjEh,j
=
E˙h,j
γh,j
+
∆Ej,−h
γjEh,j
(D.11)
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And so by substituting (D.11) in (D.10) and using (D.9) and I have
that:
Rj = Rh,j +
(
∆Ej,−h
γjEj
)
· 100 (D.12)
where the subscript −h indicates all the household groups except for
those who are receiving the efficiency improvement. When the efficiency
in one group’s use of j increases the other groups might use more or less
j. If they use more, than the total household rebound in the use of j will
be bigger than the group’s rebound in j and vice versa.
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E Disaggregation of 2010 UK SAM house-
hold sector
For the purposes of this work, I use a 2010 UK SAM in which the house-
hold sector is disaggregated by income quintiles. The disaggregation has
been carried out by the team of the Centre for Energy Policy, Univer-
sity of Strathclyde, with which I am currently working. Because the
methodological documentation is not publicly available yet, here I briefly
summarise the main steps of the disaggregation procedure. The income
quintiles are determined following the approach adopted by the UK Of-
fice for National Statistics (ONS) in its Family Spending publication,8
which reports the findings of the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS;
Office for National Statistics, 2011, 2012, 2013). Each of the quintiles
refer the following weekly gross income:
• 1st quintile 0-237 per week;
• 2nd quintile 238-412 per week;
• 3rd quintile 413-650 per week;
• 4th quintile 651-1,014 per week;
• 5th quintile over 1,015 per week;
Given the above income groups, the UK SAM is disaggregated in three
distinct steps, following the methodology developed to disaggregate the
8Family Spending reports deciles so for this study two deciles at a time have been
merged to create a quintile.
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2009 Scottish SAM by the Fraser of Allander Institute (Emonts-Holley,
2016). The first step is the disaggregation of household final demand.
The main dataset required for this step is the table of the derived
household variables, published as part of the LCFS. In this dataset, the
household spending is reported in 12 spending categories (varying from
food to manufactured goods to provision of services). The other dataset
required is the household final consumption expenditure (HHFCe) table,
which is published by the ONS. In the 2015 edition of HHFCe the outputs
of the 104 UK industrial sectors included in the UK Industry x Industry
Input-Output table, are aggregated into 36 categories of household final
consumption. For this reason it is necessary to march the 36 categories
of HHFCe to the 12 types of spending, through the use of an appropriate
mapping matrix.
Following that, and by using the data from specific derived variables
from the LCFS dataset, the spending of each quintile (as reported in
LCFS) is disaggregated for each of the 104 sectors and the share of each
sector’s household consumption that is allocated to each quintile is esti-
mated. Finally, final consumption for each of the quintiles and each of
the SAM sectors is obtained by multiplying the shares of each quintile’s
consumption by the household consumption as reported in the UK SAM.
The second step is to disaggregate the income and expenditures of
each quintile. Contrary to the previous step, for most types of income
and expenditure, there is no clear derived variables to be used for the
purposes of disaggregation. For this reason, a number of different derived
variables from LCFS need to be used. Once the appropriate variables are
identified, the disaggregation process essentially involves using the values
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to create coefficients, which are in turn used to allocate the appropriate
share of each type of income/expenditure to each of the quintiles. Please
note that in order to enhance the robustness of the sample a 3-year
average data is used both in step one and two (Emonts-Holley, 2016).
The last step involves balancing the SAM. The CGE model requires
a balanced SAM to generate results, i.e. the sum of each row is the same
as the sum of the corresponding column. Even though the 2010 UK SAM
was balanced, disaggregating the households leads to imbalances to each
of the household quintiles. Therefore, it is necessary to re-balance the
SAM. To do so, any discrepancies between the rows and the columns of
each quintile is allocated to the income from capital formation entry of
each quintile.
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